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ABSTRACT
In this dissertation, I critically examine the philosophy of transcendental empiricism.
Transcendental empiricism is, among other things, a philosophy of mental content. It attempts to
dissolve an epistemological dilemma of mental content by splitting the difference between two
diametrically opposed accounts of content. John McDowell's minimal empiricism and Richard
Gaskin's minimalist empiricism are two versions of transcendental empiricism. Transcendental
empiricism itself originates with McDowell's work.
This dissertation is divided into five parts. First, in the Introduction, I state the
Wittgensteinian metaphilosophical orientation of transcendental empiricism. This
metaphilosophical approach provides a plateau upon which much of the rest of this work may be
examined. Second, I offer a detailed description of McDowell’s minimal empiricism. Third, I
critique Gaskin's critique and modification of McDowell's minimal empiricism. I argue that (1)
Gaskin's critiques are faulty and that (2) Gaskin's minimalist empiricism is very dubious. Fourth,
I scrutinize the alleged credentials of McDowell's minimal empiricism. I argue that McDowell's
version of linguistic idealism is problematic. I then comment on a recent dialogue between
transcendental empiricism and Hubert Dreyfus's phenomenology. The dialogue culminates with
Dreyfus's accusation of the “Myth of the Mental.” I argue that this accusation is correct in which
case McDowell's direct realism is problematic. I conclude that minimal empiricism does not
dissolve the dilemma of mental content. Finally, I argue that Tyler Burge successfully
undermines the doctrine of disjunctivism, but disjunctivism is crucial for transcendental
empiricism. Ultimately, however, I aim to show that transcendental empiricism is an attractive
alternative to philosophies of mental content.
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Preface

This dissertation was originally a writing sample for graduate school. At that time I did not
expect to write a dissertation on John McDowell's minimal empiricism, much less Richard
Gaskin's critical engagement. This book is pleasantly unexpected.
McDowell’s philosophy of content is profound---and his work is not limited to the
philosophy of mind and language. He has also published important papers in the history of
philosophy and value theory. This work, for better or worse, is exclusively concerned with
McDowell's theoretical philosophy.
McDowell's writings are stimulating. They exhibit an unusual combination of analytic
philosophy and a comprehensive understanding of the history of philosophy. The influences of
Frege, Russell and Wittgenstein are the impetus for his analysis, whereas Aristotle, Kant and
Hegel situate his analyses within a broad historical context. I view this work as a contribution to
what is sometimes known as post-analytic philosophy. Post-analytic philosophy is, roughly,
analytic philosophy in the wake of Quine, Sellars and the later Wittgenstein.
This dissertation was enriched by Edward Minar’s Spring 2008 semester on the
philosophies of language and mind. It was a generous seminar. He also provided invaluable
feedback on earlier drafts. Without his supervision, this dissertation would not be possible. In
addition, I am indebted to the courses, seminars and conversations I have had over the years with
graduate students and professors at the University of Arkansas and the University of California,
at Santa Barbara. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to study at these institutions.
I am most indebted to my friends and family for sitting with me through this difficult
process. It seems to me that Merleau-Ponty was absolutely right when he wrote: “Man is but a

network of relationships, and these alone matter to him.”1

1

Cf. Merleau-Ponty (1962/1995; citation omitted), p. 456.
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Introduction

John McDowell’s philosophy is Wittgensteinian. That is, McDowell, following Wittgenstein,1 is
deeply suspicious of so-called philosophical “problems.”2 Such problems induce unnecessary
anxiety and discomfort. The philosopher’s task is plain: he or she should cure the anxious
‘patient’ of undue turmoil. In other words, a philosopher should show that deep-seated
philosophical worries are really rooted in false and stubborn conceptions of reality. Strictly
speaking, philosophical problems do not admit of solutions, since talk of solutions implies that
there are genuine problems. A philosopher can only dissolve philosophical questions; that is, a
philosopher can only show that urgent philosophical concerns are merely apparent:
The therapeutic method McDowell prefers is to expose and
question the assumptions generating the tension: once we clearly
see that we are not driven to theorize our way out of the problem,
anxiety will subside, and everything will be left ‘open to view’.
(MacDonald & MacDonald, 2006, p. ix)
The quintessential philosophical question asks, “How is x possible?”---where “x” is
satisfied by some structural feature of reality. McDowell focuses on the question, “How is
content possible?,” with an eye to dissolving the entire question. Here is a nice programmatic
statement:
My aim is to propose an account, in a diagnostic spirit, of some
characteristic anxieties of modern philosophy---anxieties that
centre…on the relation between mind and world. Continuing with
See, in particular, Wittgenstein’s (1953) Philosophical Investigations.
McDowell’s project has an obvious affinity with Richard Rorty’s (1979) Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature. For the classical pragmatist statement of Rorty's philosophical program, see
Dewey’s (1925/1958) Experience and Nature. Indeed, McDowell has moments where he sounds
like Dewey. For instance: “We must think of empirical rationality in a dynamic way, in terms of
a continuing adjustment to the impact of experience” (McDowell, 1996, p. 135).
1
2
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the medical metaphor, we might say that a satisfactory diagnosis
ought to point towards a cure. I aim at explaining how it comes
about that we seem to be confronted with philosophical obligations
of a familiar sort, and I want the explanation to enable us to
unmask that appearance as illusion.
It matters that the illusion is capable of gripping us. I want
to be able to acknowledge the power of the illusion’s sources, so
that we find ourselves able to respect the conviction that the
obligations are genuine, even while we see how we can, for our
own part, reject the appearance that we face a pressing intellectual
task. (McDowell, 1996, p. xi)
At the outset, our metaphilosophical orientation toward philosophical problems should be
examined. There is a sense in which our manner of approaching philosophical questions can be
either proper or improper. Improper philosophical procedure yields confusion. To McDowell’s
mind, a “sideways-on” approach is faulty. The sideways-on approach says, roughly, that the
mind and the world are fundamentally distinct; nevertheless, somehow both make contact from a
sideways-on perspective. “Sideways-on accounts say or imply that there is ‘an outer boundary
around the sphere of the conceptual, with a reality outside the boundary impinging inward on the
system’” (Peacocke, 1998, p. 387). It is a spatial metaphor.
A sideways-on orientation naturally lends itself to the idea that philosophy ought to reach
an “Archimedean” standpoint from which to view sideways-on interactions. An Archimedean
aspiration or temptation is that which approximates to an ideal standpoint, one which is
somehow “external” to sideways-on occurrences, one which somehow transcends the interplay
between conceptuality and non-conceptuality: “…an ‘Archimedean point’, from which a
comparison could be set up between particular representations of the world and the world itself”
(McDowell, 1998b, “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World,” p. 126). We
want to attain: “…‘a synoptic vision which will somehow synthesize every other possible view,
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will somehow bring the outside and the inside points of view together’” (McDowell, 1996, p.
154). McDowell sometimes dubs this the “cosmic exile” perspective. He writes: “…the
perspective of a cosmic exile—a perspective, that is, that is not to any extent coloured or affected
by the occupant’s own involvement in a form of life…” (McDowell, 1998c, “Anti-Realism and
the Epistemology of Understanding,” p. 329). It is a Peircean aspiration, really. Indeed, the very
practice of science presupposes Peirce’s principle:
Scientific enquiry must be conceived as defined by a determinate
method---one capable of yielding its practitioners some sort of
assurance that they are on a path that, if properly followed, would
lead at the limit to the ideal convergence Peirce envisaged.
(McDowell, 1998b, “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric
of the World,” p. 119)
There is nothing wrong with a thoroughgoing scientific Peirceanism. Science seems to operate
according to Archimedean standards, and unbridled relativism is silly. Unfortunately, it is a short
step from scientific Peirceanism to a much stronger metaphysical form of Peirceanism:
Once we have the idea of the Archimedean point, it is irresistible to
suppose that all genuine truth about the world and our relation to it
should be discernible from there. And since the Archimedean
point has been introduced on the basis of the Peircean conception
of scientific enquiry, we seem now to have been given a
metaphysical foundation for the view that science constitutes the
frame for all reflection on our relation to reality… (ibid., p. 128;
McDowell’s emphasis)
The entire project of approximating to an Archimedean standpoint is misguided,
according to McDowell. The notion of unadulterated or unvarnished objectivity is exceedingly
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problematic, because the Archimedean aspiration is rooted in an improper metaphilosophical
orientation.3
What exactly is wrong with a sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation? Well, a
sideways-on metaphilosophy asserts that there is a fundamental distinction between mind and
world. The mind is that which is conceptual. The world is that which is nonconceptual. A
consequence of a sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation is that there is an objective,
detached vantage point from which one may 'understand' conceptuality and nonconceptuality. In
principle, we may understand conceptual and nonconceptual content from an Archimedean
perspective, a perspective which is 'outside' of conceptuality and nonconceptuality. And this
implies that there is a third kind of content which is neither conceptual nor non-conceptual. Call
it a-conceptual content. But what exactly is this kind of content supposed to look like? Where
exactly does one understand conceptuality and nonconceptuality? It cannot be from somewhere,
for it is outside that which is somewhere, namely, the mind and the world. Thus the overarching
perspective must be from nowhere. But where is nowhere? The question doesn’t even make
sense. In short, a sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation seems nonsensical. Therefore it is
not proper.
McDowell is offering us a different metaphilosophical procedure:
It cannot be a matter of picturing the system’s adjustments to the
world from sideways on: that is, with the system circumscribed
within a boundary, and the world outside it. That is exactly the
shape our picture must not take. (McDowell, 1996, p. 34)
And:

Despairing of a “God’s-eye view” is an existentialist motif. See Charles Guignon and Derek
Pereboom’s (1995) “Introduction: The Legacy of Existentialism,” section 4.
3
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The facts that are made manifest to us…or at least seem to be, are
not beyond an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere,
and the impingements of the world on our sensibility are not
inward crossings of such a boundary. My point is to insist that we
can effect this deletion of the outer boundary without falling into
idealism, without slighting the independence of reality. (ibid., p.
34)

We may erase the (illusory) boundary between the mind and the world without falling prey to
idealism. We may eat our cake and have it, too. McDowell is a realist of sorts.4 It is not the
case that, if we want to adopt a realistic stance, we must assume a sideways-on perspective. A
sideways-on approach simply harbors superfluous perplexity. McDowell’s orientation, on the
contrary, dissolves unsolvable questions.
In effect, McDowell is recommending a strong dose of quietism. Quietism is an antidote
to a confused aspiration, which is rooted in an improper metaphilosophical orientation. Quietism
itself is a non-sideways-on approach to philosophical questions; it rejects the claim that the mind
and the world are fundamentally distinct; it rejects the initial distinction between conceptuality
and nonconceptuality. But notice that quietism need not lead to idealistic consequences. There
is an implicit assumption that, if we tackle philosophical questions from a non-sideways-on
perspective, we are obliterating the world. Conceptuality is unbounded, and this smacks of
idealism. But this assumption is presumptuous, for a non-sideways-on orientation is fully
compatible with realism:
[S]ince the world is everything that is the case…there is no gap
between thought, as such, and the world. Of course thought can be
But not in a philosophical sense: “…McDowell sees himself as pursuing a more quietist
agenda, and…he regards his writings as springing from an opposition to anti-realism (taken as a
positive thesis), and so as pursuing an anti-anti-realistic programme, rather than as aiming to
argue directly for realism” (Gaskin, 2006, p. vi).
4
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distanced from the world by being false, but there is no distance
from the world implicit in the very idea of thought. (ibid., p. 27)
There is no gap between thought and world; but it does not follow from this that our thoughts
about the world cannot sometimes be false. On the contrary.
(Notice that McDowell’s non-sideways-on approach is related to his modest theory of
meaning.5 The latter says, very roughly, that we cannot step outside of our linguistic practices,
contrary to Michael Dummett's espousal of “full-blooded” theories of meaning.6)
There are two benefits associated with quietism. First, through releasing the grip of
familiar philosophical anxieties, quietism can affect an exorcism of the philosophical tradition.
And this is good because the philosophical tradition is an agent of unnecessary psychic tension.
If we can attain temporary relief from philosophical anxieties, we can then dismantle the
corrosive categories of traditional philosophy. We need not be shackled to traditional
dichotomies. Second, and most importantly, if our intellectual discomfort is intermittently
uplifted, we can then invest our energies in other intellectual activities. The net result is greater
perspicuity:
Without the anxieties there is no need for reduction and thus no
need for constructive philosophy at all….McDowell’s work is
intended, therefore, to contribute towards transcendence or
overcoming of the philosophical tradition---an exorcism of the
dualistic oppositions that have given rise to the traditional
‘problems of philosophy’. (Friedman, 2002, p. 29)
Further:

See McDowell's (1998c) “In Defense of Modesty,” “Another Plea for Modesty,” “AntiRealism and the Epistemology of the Understanding” and “On the Sense and Reference of a
Proper Name,” section 10.
6
See Dummett’s (1993) “What is a Theory of Meaning (I)?” and “What is a Theory of Meaning
(II)?”
5
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…‘quietism’, the avoidance of any substantive philosophy, is really
the point. Questions such as ‘How is meaning possible’? express a
sense of spookiness, and Wittgenstein’s point is that we should not
indulge the sense of spookiness, but rather exorcize
it….[P]hilosophy’s task is…to dislodge the assumptions that make
it look difficult to find a place for meaning in the world. Then we
can take in our stride meaning’s role in shaping our lives.
(McDowell, 1996, p. 176)

McDowell's minimal empiricism is the product of proper procedure; it accomplishes a
non-sideways-on orientation. It establishes our unmediated contact with reality. Once the proper
approach is in place, we may experience a sense of quietude. “In Wittgenstein’s poignant phrase,
it would be to have achieved ‘the discovery that gives philosophy peace’” (ibid., p. 86).
Furthermore, minimal empiricism yields a thorough exorcism of the philosophical tradition,
according to McDowell. If minimal empiricism is the case, epistemological and/or semantic
anxieties wane, and then our practices may proceed uninterrupted. McDowell’s minimal
empiricism dissolves philosophical questions, thereby resolving unnecessary discomfort and
anxiety. “Minimal empiricism promises to cast light on certain sorts of philosophical anxiety”
(McDowell, 1995, p. 232). In particular, minimal empiricism allegedly portrays content in a
more revealing light. If minimal empiricism is the case, the issue of content dissolves---and then
we cease to worry. And if we stop worrying so much about content, we can then integrate our
energies into different intellectual practices.
Richard Gaskin’s (2006) Experience and the World’s Own Language is, among other
things, a significant contribution to McDowell studies. Indeed, as Julian Dodd reports:
“[Gaskin’s] command of McDowell’s oeuvre is nothing short of magisterial” (Dodd, 2007, p.
1118). His book offers an extended interpretation and modification of McDowell’s theoretical
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philosophy. Moreover, Gaskin provides an arresting (albeit highly controversial) framework
within which semantic issues may be examined. All of this is to be expected, given that: “Gaskin
has thought hard about a range of challenging topics---perception, content, knowledge, singular
thought, reference---and he has insightful and suggestive things to say about them” (Bridges,
2007, para. 28).
With respect to minimal empiricism, Gaskin states:
McDowell likes to think of his philosophy of experience [=
minimal empiricism] as enjoying pre-theoretical plausibility, as a
position which it is natural to adopt in advance of being exposed to
traditional philosophy’s corrupting influence, and as the default
position to which we automatically revert when we have escaped
its allurements: he likes to think of his philosophy of experience as
achieving the Wittgensteinian ideal of doing no more than reciting
truisms. (Gaskin, 2006, p. 119, see note 129)
The enterprise of philosophy ‘questions’ the legitimacy of truisms, generating the so-called
traditional problems of philosophy. McDowell's quietistic orientation yields a dissolution of
philosophical problems, reminding us of the truistic fact that the content of thought is necessarily
rooted in the senses. This fact seems intuitively obvious; for, without the senses, what content is
there to our concepts? The very notion of content seems inextricably tied to the deliverances of
the senses. “I take it to be intuitively obvious---if only philosophy did not distort our thinking--that empiricists are right to want what they do” (McDowell, 2002a, p. 285). And what
empiricists want is an acknowledgment of the truistic fact that the content of thought is
necessarily dependent on sensory experience; that without experience, there is no content to our
concepts.
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Gaskin is sympathetic to a minimal or transcendental empiricism. For the purpose of
understanding mental content, some transcendental form of empiricism must be the case.
Nevertheless, he is opposed to McDowell's version of transcendental empiricism. He writes:
I am not...opposed to the very idea of a minimal
empiricism, so long as it is set up in the right way--provided it is, as I put it in the course of my study, not
minimal in McDowell's sense, but minimalist in a sense I
will make clear....[T]o that extent my critique of
McDowell's attempt to establish a minimal empiricism
seems to me at any rate, despite the many points on which I
criticize his manner of executing the project, to be cooperative and constructive in overall tenor rather than
merely destructive or hostile. (Gaskin, 2006, p. vii;
Gaskin's emphasis)
Gaskin’s critique of minimal empiricism is a means toward the end of improving upon
transcendental empiricism. As such, it is an attempt at laying further groundwork for
transcendental empiricism. Gaskin argues that McDowell's minimal empiricism is not minimal
enough. Gaskin's minimalist empiricism attempts to subtract the purportedly faulty elements of
McDowell's minimal empiricism, and thereby establish a viable transcendental empiricism.
Thus Gaskin's positive account of minimalist empiricism is essentially a negative account. I will
argue that Gaskin's critique and modification of McDowell's minimal empiricism is inaccurate.
I then present my own misgivings with McDowell's minimal empiricism. While minimal
empiricism is trenchant, I do not think it is entirely consistent. Still, transcendental empiricism is
promising. I view my contribution as that of improving upon the theoretical underpinnings of
transcendental empiricism. Although I am critical of both minimal empiricism and minimalist
empiricism, my principle thesis is that transcendental empiricism is a significant contribution to
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the philosophy of mental content. Wittgensteinian approaches toward content remain
illuminating.

11
1

McDowell’s Minimal Empiricism

§ 1.1 Minimal Empiricism in Outline

In addition to the cosmic exile perspective, the sideways-on approach invariably leads to a
constructive dilemma. If the mind, or conceptuality, is distinct from the world, or nonconceptuality, then we are faced with two undesirable ways of understanding the epistemic status
of mental content. On the one hand, if content is rationally justifiable, intentionality problems
ensue. If, on the other hand, content is involuntarily received in sensation, epistemological
problems emerge. Now recall that a sideways-on orientation is the characteristic posture of
modern philosophy. Modern philosophy is replete with epistemology, partly because it assumes
a sideways-on stance. Indeed, the first horn of the dilemma could be seen as representing
classical rationalism, while the second horn encapsulates classical empiricism. As we will see,
the dilemma itself deepens our understanding of mental content in general.
The first horn of the constructive dilemma discounts the idea that discrete experiences
yield individual thoughts (or sentences). We cannot parse out mental content thought by thought
(or sentence by sentence), for the meaning of an epistemologically significant thought is a
function of its place within a totality of interwoven thoughts. Epistemological notions such as
justification make sense only within a system of logically interrelated concepts. Meaningful
thoughts cannot be principally segregated into neat packages of content. But now content is
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indeterminate;1 now we encounter serious intentionality problems. Mental content cannot be
individuated. We have derived an epistemologically rich notion of content at the expense of
determinacy. But this doesn’t seem right.
The second horn of the dilemma asserts that the content of any given thought is
determined by its corresponding sensory experience. The content of thought is essentially
beholden to sense experience, and since sensory experiences are discrete, the content of thought
is individuated. But now we encounter epistemological problems. Namely, how can discrete
sensory impressions justify corresponding empirical thoughts or beliefs? There is nothing
justificatory about merely having a given sense impression, for we are justified in thinking
something only if we exercise voluntary reflection.
McDowell walks us through this familiar, and uncomfortable, sort of dilemma:
Suppose we are inexplicitly aware that our thinking is subject to
both these forces; that makes it intelligible that we should find
thought’s being about the empirical world philosophically
problematic. (McDowell, 1996, p. xvi)
McDowell's minimal empiricism is supposedly an antidote to this worry:
If philosophical anxiety about the very possibility of being in touch
with the world can be traced to the tension between...two forces, a
cure would require resolving the tension. Obviously the
description I have given leaves various options available for doing
that. In this book I recommend one way of resolving [better:

This is an allusion to W. V. Quine’s linguistic behaviorism. See Quine (1960), chs. 1-2. Word
and Object argues, among other things, that “radical translation,” i.e., translation of a hitherto
unknown language, is indeterminate. That is, there is no behavioral fact of the matter which
determines what exactly a native speaker means through his or her utterances. In McDowell's
(1998c) “Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding,” there is a suggestion that
Michael Dummett’s brand of anti-realism is really an unconscious reaction to Quine’s
indeterminacy of translation thesis---see, in particular, pp. 338-340. Also see Dummett (1981),
chapter 17.
1
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dissolving] this tension. I shall briefly locate it by distinguishing it
from a couple of others. (ibid., pp. xvi-xvii)
Minimal empiricism effectively escapes between the horns of the dilemma. Minimal empiricism
is roughly the view that mental content is both rationally and causally rooted in experience. The
world is amenable to thoughts; and thoughts are about the world. The first point demands
comment. By “the world is amenable to thoughts” I mean that independent reality is structurally
thought-like or propositional. Gaskin adumbrates this kind of philosophical analysis:
Fundamental to McDowell’s minimal empiricism is the claim that
the world-directedness of empirical thought involves both rational
or normative connections between world and thought on the one
hand, and causal connections on the other. Putting it in general and
abstract terms for the moment, we can say that the rational
connections ensure that empirical thought can be correct or
incorrect, while the causal connections guarantee that empirical
thought is genuinely about the empirical world: taken together,
these connections ensure that empirical thought is not empty---that
it is not, as McDowell likes to put it, mere “frictionless spinning in
a void.” (Gaskin, 2006, p. 7; Gaskin’s emphasis)
Here is McDowell’s statement of minimal empiricism:
[This] is what I mean by a 'minimal empiricism': the idea that
experience must constitute a tribunal, mediating the way our
thinking is answerable to how things are, as it must be if we are to
make sense of thinking at all. (McDowell, 1996, p. xii)
With respect to the issue of content, McDowell is an empiricist. And he thinks that a workable
form of empiricism must incorporate a minimal requirement. The requirement is that experience
must be conceived of as a “tribunal.” If we conceive of experience as a tribunal, then experience
can determine whether our empirical beliefs are true or false. Moreover:
[O]ne's control over what happens in experience has limits: one
can decide where to place oneself, at what point to turn one's
attention; and so forth, but it is not up to one what, having done all
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that, one will experience. This minimal point is what I am
insisting on. (ibid., p. 10, see note 8)
So, although the tribunal conception of experience provides a rational constraint to our empirical
beliefs, experience must causally constrain our beliefs. The tribunal of experience must be
causally given (not Given, as we will see in a moment). Otherwise content would be
ungrounded. However, notice that there is no elaboration on this basic empiricist principle. In
fact, McDowell's empiricist philosophy of content is somewhat rationalistic, since experience is
conceived of as a tribunal. Our judgments are answerable to the deliverances of experience.
Judgments are either correct or incorrect, according to the verdicts of sensory experience. For a
classical rationalist like Leibniz, mental contents are not brute reflexes conditioned by given
sense-data. On the contrary, contents necessarily utilize reflective capabilities. Sensations are
conceptually structured.
McDowell’s minimal empiricism incorporates Kantian terminology. For Kant
(1787/1929), the mind possesses two interrelated faculties: sensibility and understanding.
Sensibility is a receptive faculty; it receives intuitions. Understanding is a spontaneous faculty;
it entertains concepts. Knowledge occurs only when sensibility and understanding co-operate.
Put another way, concepts are meaningful only if they incorporate received intuitions; and
intuitions are received only if they are conceptually structured:
Kant makes his remark about intuitions and concepts in the course
of representing empirical knowledge as the result of a co-operation
between receptivity and spontaneity, between sensibility and
understanding. (ibid., p. 4)
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Kant’s terminology is ostensibly epistemological. The interrelation between sensibility and
understanding is a way of representing empirical knowledge. However, Kant’s epistemological
story is at bottom an unconscious worry regarding content:
It is true that modern philosophy is pervaded by apparent problems
about knowledge in particular. But I think it is helpful to see those
apparent problems as more or less inept expressions of a deeper
anxiety---an inchoately felt threat that a way of thinking we find
ourselves falling into leaves minds simply out of touch with the
rest of reality, not just questionably capable of getting to know
about it. (ibid., p. xiii)
More importantly, Kantian terminology does account for the content of thought, according to
McDowell. Content emerges only if the faculty of understanding is informed by the faculty of
sensibility; but the faculty of understanding is informed by the faculty of sensibility only if
sensibility is conceptually structured. Thus content is the product of an interdependent
relationship between sensibility and understanding:
So the picture is this: the fact that thoughts are not empty, the fact
that thoughts have representational content, emerges out of an
interplay of concepts [= the faculty of understanding] and
intuitions [= the faculty of sensibility]. (ibid., p. 4)
The sideways-on orientation basically divorces the interconnected relationship between
sensibility and understanding. The idea is that sensibility is not conceptually structured.
Sensations are nonconceptual. Something nonconceptual is brutally given (= Given) in sensory
experience. Sensory impacts harness the spontaneous nature of the faculty of understanding.
Not surprisingly, McDowell dissents from this view:
…an alien force, the causal impact of the world, operating outside
the control of our spontaneity. But it is one thing to be exempt
from blame, on the ground that the position we find ourselves in
can be traced ultimately to brute force; it is quite another thing to
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have a justification. In effect, the idea of the Given offers
exculpations where we wanted justifications. (ibid., p. 8)
The Given, for McDowell, is a term of disparagement. It is a by-product of sideways-on
thinking; it is the insistence on rendering sensations as nonconceptual. But insisting on
sensibility’s independence from understanding merely substitutes exculpation for justification.
Consequently, we encounter epistemological difficulties. And problematic epistemologies are
usually symptomatic of faulty accounts of content. Again, sideways-on approaches cannot
adequately explain mental content.
Additionally, McDowell enthusiastically employs Wilfrid Sellars’s (1956/1997)
distinction between the logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature. Indeed: “[T]he
contrast Sellars draws [between the logical space of reasons and the logical space of nature] can
set an agenda for philosophy” (McDowell, 2009a, “Naturalism in the Philosophy of Mind,” p.
258). Here is Sellars’s well known characterization of the distinction:
The essential point is that in characterizing an episode or a state as
that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of that
episode or state [unlike entities within the space of nature]; we are
placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being
able to justify what one says. (Sellars, 1956/1997, p. 76; Sellars’s
emphasis)
For Sellars, the space of nature is descriptive. It comprises empirical facts, facts which are
captured by the natural sciences. The space of reasons, on the contrary, is a normative domain.
Items in the space of reasons are either correct or incorrect. The space of reasons does not
concern itself with empirical facts; rather, it focuses on justification. McDowell writes:
I think we capture the essentials of Sellars’s thinking if we take it
that the logical space of nature is the logical space in which the
natural sciences function, as we have been enabled to conceive
them by a well-charted, and in itself admirable, development of
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thought. We might say that to place something in nature on the
relevant conception, as contrasted with placing it in the logical
space of reasons, is to situate it in the realm of law. (McDowell,
1996, pp. xiv-xv)
And:
The relations that constitute the logical space of nature, on the
relevant conception, do not include relations such as one thing’s
being warranted, or---for the general case---correct, in the light of
another. That is what Sellars is saying when he insists that
‘empirical description’ cannot amount to placing something in the
logical space of reasons. (ibid., p. xv)
Gaskin canvasses Sellars’s distinction between the space of nature and the space of reasons in
terms of external and internal relations, respectively:
My perception of a ginger cat sitting on a black and white mat, say,
has its space-of-reasons cause in that particular cat’s sitting on that
particular mat (the very fact that, when observed by me, ultimately
justifies my judgment that that cat is sitting on that mat), but that
cause is not “logically distinct” from the effect, in the relevant
sense, since a statement of the existence of the effect (my
perceiving that cat sitting on that mat) entails a statement of the
existence of the cause (that cat’s sitting on that mat). In other
words…while realm-of-law causation is an external relation,
space-of-reasons causation is an internal relation. (Gaskin, 2006, p.
32)
How is this relevant to McDowell’s minimal empiricism? Well, McDowell wants to
claim that Sellars's distinction is a false dichotomy, as the space of nature and the space of
reasons are interconnected. The thought is this. The space of reasons is shaped by the space of
nature. Sensory experiences possess conceptual content which sculpts the conceptuality of the
space of reasons. McDowell warns against the tendency toward interiorizing the space of
reasons. “The deformation is an interiorization of the space of reasons, a withdrawal of it from
the external world” (McDowell, 1998c, “Knowledge and the Internal,” p. 395). We deform the
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space of reasons if we isolate it within an interiorized sphere. In fact, if we withdraw the space
of reasons from the space of nature, we obliterate content. “If the space of reasons as we find it
is withdrawn from the objective world as it makes itself manifest to us, then it becomes
unintelligible how it can contain appearances, content-involving as they must be, either” (ibid., p.
410). Concurrently, experience delivers determinate and descriptive content. Sensations are
discrete. And the determinate and descriptive content of sensory experiences can enter into
justificatory relations, for it is conceptual or propositional. Robert Brandom (1995) claims that:
“[J]ustification [= space of reasons] and truth conditions [= space of nature]…are treated as
independent of one another. But being justified in holding a belief just is being justified in taking
it to be true” (Brandom, 1995, p. 900; Brandom’s emphasis). There is thus a reciprocal
relationship between the space of nature and the space of reasons:
If one succumbs to the temptation to identify the logical space that
is set off against the space of reasons as the logical space of nature,
one will take the idea of sensibility and the idea of actualizations of
conceptual capacities to belong in logical spaces that are alien to
each other. [But they are not alien to each other---quite the
contrary.] (McDowell, 1998a, p. 367)
Gaskin depicts this as a non-sideways-on maneuver:
Now it is indeed one of McDowell’s principal aims to insist that
impressions, though rightly conceived as “transactions in nature,”
are nevertheless within the space of reasons, and hence able to
provide a grounding for judgments. And impressions can only
provide that grounding if they have conceptual content, the content
(to put it schematically) that things are thus and so, which is the
content of the judgment they ground. Since that things are thus
and so is also how things (schematically) are in the world, if the
judgment is true, there is in general “no ontological gap” between
thought and world. (Gaskin, 2006, p. 22; Gaskin’s emphasis)
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Nevertheless, McDowell assents to Sellars's rejection of classical empiricism, since
classical empiricism is committed to “The Myth of the Given.” The Myth of the Given is the
idea that something sensory is given to the mind outside the conceptual sphere. But this idea is
epistemologically problematic. If content is entirely sensory, it cannot stand in justificatory
relations. But content does stand in justificatory relations, since content is a semantic notion. So
a purely space of nature rendition of ‘justification’ (= “The Myth of the Given”) does not provide
a satisfying picture:
The Given is introduced into the dialectic as offering us one
superficially attractive way to provide an exogenous grounding for
something recognizable as empirical thought (judgment)….But,
McDowell argues, the Given cannot satisfy our just demand for an
endogenous constraint on judgment. For nothing which is no more
than a non-conceptual “bare presence” is fit to ground judgment.
(ibid., p. 55; citation omitted)
An exogenous constraint on judgment does not confer justification. An external relation is
merely causal, not rational. An exogenous constraint or external relation is inarticulate. An
endogenous constraint or internal relation, on the contrary, is articulate or rational. And a
justificatory relation is, necessarily (or by definition) articulate. So the Myth of the Given is the
erroneous thought that an exogenous constraint is sufficiently epistemological.
Now according to McDowell, Donald Davidson’s (1984, 2001) philosophy, while
illuminating the issue of content, ultimately embraces the first horn of the dilemma. Davidson’s
philosophy of content adopts the indeterminacy of content---contrary to Davidson’s intentions.
Similarly, Gareth Evans’s (1982) philosophy of content is a highly innovative approach; still,
Evans’s philosophy illicitly adopts the notion of the epistemological Given---contrary to Evans’s
intentions:
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[O]ne has two options: either, like Davidson, to insist that
experience is only causally related to empirical thinking, not
rationally; or else, like Evans, to fall into the Myth of the Given,
and try to credit experience, conceived as extra-conceptual, with
rational relations to empirical thinking. (McDowell, 1996, pp. 6263)

Further:
There is a danger of falling into an interminable oscillation
[between Davidson’s position and Evans’s position]….We can
dismount from the seesaw if we can achieve a firm grip on this
thought: receptivity does not make an even notionally separable
contribution to the co-operation. The relevant conceptual
capacities are drawn on in receptivity. It is not that they are
exercised on an extra-conceptual deliverance of receptivity. We
should understand what Kant calls ‘intuition’---experiential intake--not as a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as a kind
of occurrence or state that already has conceptual content. (ibid., p.
9; McDowell’s emphasis)
McDowell wants to claim that minimal empiricism incorporates the best of both Davidson and
Evans while avoiding their respective pitfalls. Moreover, an understanding of the failures of
Davidson and Evans affects a deeper appreciation of the illusive power of the dilemma. Let us
begin with Davidson’s account of content.

§ 1.2 Davidson qua Coherentist

Davidson’s philosophy of content is illuminating but ultimately unsatisfying, according to
McDowell. It is illuminating (for McDowell) because it achieves a non-sideways-on
understanding of the relations between mind and world. Davidson’s non-sideways-on orientation
follows from his philosophy of truth. For Davidson, truth is an irreducibly semantic concept.
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The epistemological sense of truth is secondary. Truth, epistemologically speaking, is a function
of representations accurately or inaccurately representing an external (and internal) reality. If the
world is fundamentally distinct from the mind, it follows that our access to the world is
necessarily mediated by representations. Talk of accurate or inaccurate representations, then, is
rooted in a sideways-on approach. The semantic sense of truth is not dependent on the concept
of representation. “Truth is beautifully transparent…and I take it as a primitive concept”
(Davidson, 2001, p. 139). So-called T-sentences exhibit the transparent nature of truth. All Tsentences have the following structure:

(1)

‘Snow is white’ is true if, and only if, snow is white.

T-sentences, as exemplified by (1), show that truth is disquotation. And disquotation does not
turn on the concept of representation. Disquotation is transparent or diaphanous. It is
tautologous. Davidson states: “[A] theory of truth confers a clear content. That it does so
without introducing meanings as entities [= representations] is one of its rewarding qualities”
(Davidson, 1984, “In Defense of Convention T,” p. 71; Davidson’s emphasis). 2
Now, we can account for meaning via truth-conditions, according to Davidson.3 And
content is a meaning-theoretic notion. So we can account for content in terms of truthconditions. Moreover, truth-conditions are diaphanous, as we have just seen. Thus Davidson's
philosophy of content, which is parasitic on his philosophy of truth, is couched within a non2

This is grossly simplified. For a careful and critical discussion of Convention T, see Richard
Heck (2004).
3
See Davidson's (1984) “Truth and Meaning.” For a Wittgensteinian interpretation of
Davidson’s program, see Evans and McDowell (1976).
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sideways-on metaphilosophical framework. Davidson is able to account for content without
assuming a sideways-on stance, and this is a virtue of his philosophy:
[Davidson’s] meaning-theory assumes meaning---the right-hand
side of the ‘T-sentences’ use a sentence to provide the meaning of
the sentence named on the left-hand side. It is not the aim of the
project to provide a theory of meaning from ‘the outside’, as it
were, by giving an analysis of the concept of meaning in terms that
reduce it to something else. Such an aim McDowell characterizes
as trying to get a ‘sideways-on’ perspective, and he believes it is a
characteristic temptation to try and attain such a perspective, a
temptation to be resisted by seeing that such a perspective is both
impossible and unnecessary. We have to learn to be more modest
in our ambitions. (MacDonald and MacDonald, 2006, p. xi; their
emphasis)
Furthermore, Davidson argues that traditional empiricism’s epistemological given is a
myth; so he agrees with Sellars. For Davidson, the Myth of the Given is a corollary of the third
dogma of empiricism. The first dogma of empiricism asserts that there is a sharp distinction
between truths which are analytic and truths which are synthetic. The second dogma of
empiricism claims that there is an isomorphic relation between empirically meaningful sentences
and sense-data. But, according to Davidson, W.V. Quine has established that (i) there is no
principled distinction between truths which are analytic and truths which are synthetic, and that
(ii) there is no one-to-one correspondence between empirically meaningful sentences and sensedata.4 Davidson wholeheartedly accepts Quine’s lessons here. He parenthetically stated: “(On
all these points [ = (i) and (ii)], I am Quine’s faithful student.)” (Davidson, 2001, p. 144).
However, he thinks that Quine mistakenly accepts the third (and final) dogma of traditional
empiricism. The third dogma of empiricism, according to Davidson, is the false assertion that
there is a principled distinction between organizing scheme and uninterrupted content. The
4

Cf. Quine (1953/1980).
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distinction is bogus because distinguishing between uninterpreted content and propositional
schemes (or languages) presupposes the first disreputable dogma of empiricism---namely, that
propositional schemes are analytically constituted while uninterpreted contents are synthetically
constituted. So the third dogma of classical empiricism is false, and this, in turn, dismantles
traditional empiricism as a whole:
Davidson has identified the dualism of scheme and content as ‘the
third dogma of empiricism’, and accordingly he has suggested that
when we abandon the dualism, as we must, we are thereby
discarding the last vestige of empiricism. By ‘empiricism’ here, he
means the thesis that the deliverances of the senses are
epistemologically significant: they stand in relations of
justification or warrant to world views or theories. (McDowell,
1999, p. 90)
Davidson succinctly summarizes the structure, and fatal consequence, of his argument:
My target was the idea that on the one hand we have our world
picture, consisting of the totality of our beliefs, and on the other
hand we have an unconceputalized empirical input which provides
the evidence for and content of our empirical beliefs. I urged that
this dualism of scheme and content, ‘of organizing system and
something waiting to be organized, cannot be made intelligible and
defensible’. I thought that if this dogma were abandoned, there
would be nothing worth calling empiricism left. (Davidson, 1999,
p. 105)
If there is a bona fide distinction between scheme and content, then something nonconceptual is
given---awaiting schematization, so to speak. But since Davidson has dismantled the third
dogma of empiricism, we have an immediate disproof of the epistemological Given, since it is a
corollary of the third dogma’s untenable distinction.
In addition, the Given is epistemologically useless, because (to use Sellars’s helpful
terminology) it resides in the space of nature, not the space of reasons. Again, the space of
reasons is normative, whereas the space of nature is descriptive. Alternatively, the space of
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reasons is conceptual, whereas the space of nature is nonconceptual. Since the space of nature
comprises experience or that which is nonconceptual, it follows that experience is neither
normative nor conceptual. In other words, sensory experience is not epistemologically
significant:
Davidson is clear that if we conceive experience in terms of
impacts on sensibility that occur outside the space of concepts [=
the space of reasons], we must not think we can appeal to
experience to justify judgments or beliefs. That would be to fall
into the Myth of the Given, with its confusion of justification and
exculpation. (McDowell, 1996, p. 14)
Again, experiences do not justify corresponding beliefs:
According to Davidson, experience is causally relevant to a
subject’s beliefs and judgments, but it has no bearing on their
status as justified or warranted. Davidson says that ‘nothing can
count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief’, and he
means in particular that experience cannot count as a reason for
holding a belief. (ibid., p. 14; citation omitted)
And:
The relation between a sensation and a belief cannot be logical,
since sensations are not beliefs or other propositional attitudes.
What then is the relation? The answer is, I think, obvious: the
relation is causal. Sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense
are the basis or ground of those beliefs. But a causal explanation
of a belief does not show how or why the belief is justified.
(Davidson, 2001, p. 143; Davidson’s emphasis)
Consequently, Davidson advocates an extreme form of coherentism (according to
McDowell). A belief is justified only by another justified belief. Experience cannot justify a
given belief, for it is nonconceptual. At best, experience exerts a causal influence on the totality
of our empirical beliefs; but this causal influence plays no justificatory role. The result of
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dismantling the three dogmas of empiricism is Davidsonian coherentism. Davidson’s
coherentism, then, is fundamentally anti-empiricist.
There is one big problem, however. If we adopt a non-sideways-on approach, if we adopt
Davidsonian coherentism, how do we preserve the intuition that our beliefs are about some
things rather than other things? How do we account for intentionality within Davidson’s picture?
How does Davidson’s coherentism account for the determinacy of thought?
Well, Davidson propounds a transcendental argument purporting to show that thought
determinacy is a necessary condition for mutual understanding. The claim is that our
interpretative practices necessarily attribute mostly true beliefs to those we are interpreting (and
vice versa). “[B]elief is in its nature veridical” (Davidson, 2001, p. 146). Rationality dictates
that our interpretations must be charitable. This is often known as the “principle of charity” or
the “constitutive ideal of rationality.” We must deem one another as uttering by and large true or
correct beliefs. Otherwise we could not make sense of one another. But we do make sense of
one another. Hence most of our beliefs are true. “Charity is forced on us; whether we like it or
not, if we want to understand others, we must count them right in most matters” (Davidson,
1984, “On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,” p. 197). Or: “The question 'how do I know
my beliefs are generally true'? thus answers itself, simply because beliefs are by nature generally
true” (Davidson, 2001, p. 153). Now a true belief has a determinate meaning. Therefore our
beliefs are individuated. We know that most of our beliefs are intentional, because our
interpretations must be charitable:
Davidson’s picture is that we cannot get outside our beliefs.
Of course Davidson knows that such confinement imagery
tends to prompt a recoil to the idea of the Given, the idea that truth
and knowledge depend on rational relations to something outside
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the conceptual realm. He thinks he can allow free rein to
confinement imagery, but pre-empt the recoil by arguing, within
his coherentist framework, for the evidently reassuring thesis that
‘belief is in its nature veridical’. Davidson argues for that thesis by
connecting belief with interpretation, and urging that it is in the
nature of interpretation that an interpreter must find her subjects
mostly right about the world with which she can observe them
causally interacting. (McDowell, 1996, p. 16; citation omitted)
Metaphilosophically speaking:
Davidson’s radical interpreter starts with a sideways-on view of the
relation between her subjects and the world. But she finishes with
a theory whose point is exactly that it is not from sideways- on: a
theory that enables her to capture some of her subjects’ relations to
the world from their own point of view, though in her terms rather
than theirs. It is just the beauty of the notion of disquotation in the
extended sense that it is available for this capturing of the inside
viewpoint. (ibid., pp. 152-153)
McDowell is both satisfied and dissatisfied with Davidson’s philosophy of content. On
the one hand, McDowell applauds Davidson’s metaphilosophical orientation. And he thinks that
Davidson’s argument from scheme/content dualism goes through. As a consequence, the
epistemological Given is rendered obsolete. This is further confirmation of Sellars’s results. On
the other hand, Davidson’s coherentism is flawed, according to McDowell. The problem is this.
Davidson’s transcendental argument---that which is supposed to establish that thought is
necessarily intentional or bounded or determinate---begs the question:
Davidson’s well-known transcendental argument that a system of
beliefs must be mostly true “comes too late,” by McDowell’s
lights, because it presumes---what it has not yet earned the right to
presume---that observational beliefs or judgments do indeed have
empirical content. (Gaskin, 2006, p. 110)
It is a subtle point. According to Davidson, beliefs are contentful, since beliefs are by and large
true. And according to Convention T, truth is epistemologically divorced from perceptual
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experiences. The act of interpreting beliefs as largely true is independent of perceptual
experiences. So even though beliefs are epistemologically independent of experiences, they are
fully contentful. But this assumes what is at issue, namely, whether or not content
metaphysically depends on determinate experiences. For Davidson, true beliefs are determinate,
and therefore contentful. However, according to McDowell, determinacy cannot depend on the
mere act of interpretation. Rather, determinacy demands individual experiences. So although
Davidson’s transcendental argument is valid, it is unsound, because it begs the question. And if
Davidson's argument begs the question, then he has failed to account for the determinacy of
beliefs. Therefore Davidsonian coherentism is impaled on the first horn of the dilemma.
Davidson's circular reasoning stems from his excessive rationalism. The latter implies
that mental contents do not require discrete experiences. But this is false, according to
transcendental empiricism. For the transcendental empiricist, contentful beliefs require
experiences, and experiences require beliefs. Beliefs can be both true and justified because they
are transcendentally conditioned by experiential content. Experiential content, in turn, is
amenable to beliefs, given that it is transcendentally conditioned by conceptual capacities. The
point is that we need to reintroduce involuntary sensory impressions in order to avoid begging
the question. Yet we must conceive of these impressions as a tribunal, as entities which are
answerable to our beliefs. With a minimal empiricism in place, we can achieve a valid nonsideways-on orientation toward mental content. And then we may see things aright.
To recapitulate, McDowell depicts Davidson as aligned with Sellars in the project of
dismantling traditional empiricism. “There is a correspondence between Sellars’s attack on the
Given and Davidson’s attack on ‘the third dogma of empiricism’---the dualism of conceptual
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scheme and empirical content” (McDowell, 1995, p. 234). And McDowell endorses Davidson’s
argument from scheme/content dualism. However, he dissents from Davidson’s transcendental
argument. Davidson has shown that the second horn of the dilemma is bankrupt, but he fails to
adequately accommodate for determinate content. And so, in the final analysis, Davidsonian
coherentism succumbs to the first horn of the dilemma. Let us now turn to Evans’s philosophy
of content.

§ 1.3 Evans's Concept of Nonconceptual Content

Evans believes in the reality of an epistemologically respectable form of nonconceptual content.
According to Evans, nonconceptual content is epistemologically significant; it can justify
corresponding beliefs. It is not the case that experience is intrinsically conceptual. Experience
delivers nonconceptual content, and this content can stand in justificatory relations. “[Evans’s
concept of nonconceptual content] takes…judgments and beliefs to be rationally grounded in
nonconceptual content possessed by experience” (McDowell, 1996, p. 162; emphasis added). An
epistemologically respectable form of nonconceptual content immediately follows from Evans's
notion of an “informational system.” 5
The informational system is a receptacle of experiential information. The informational
system receives, encodes and stores three types of information: (a) perceptual information; (b)
memorial information; and (c) testimonial information. For the purposes of this study, I will
solely discuss (a). Here is McDowell’s austere description of the informational system:

5

See Evans (1982), section 5.2 ff.
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[The] informational system is a physical mechanism, connected to
its surroundings by transducers that convert physical impacts from
outside into events of the sort that the system can work on, and
perhaps by transducers that convert the system’s end products into
physical interventions in the exterior. The system knows nothing
even about the character of the immediate physical impacts on the
input transducers, or the immediate physical interventions in the
exterior that result from its operations by way of the output
transducers, let alone about the nature and layout of the distal
environment. (McDowell, 1998b, “The Content of Perceptual
Experience,” pp. 350-351)
.
More to the point, states of the informational system are explanatorily prior to conceptual
states. Evans wrote:
In general, it seems to me preferable to take the notion of being in
an informational state with such-and-such content as a primitive
notion for philosophy, rather than attempt to characterize it in
terms of belief….[T]he subject’s being in an informational state is
independent of whether or not he believes that the state is veridical.
(Evans, 1982, p. 123; Evans’s emphasis)
The content of perceptual experience, which is a product of the informational system, is
nonconceptual in an epistemologically respectable sense. It is not the case that all
epistemologically significant content must be conceptual. Evans is suggesting that there is a
biased inclination toward epistemologically privileging conceptual content. What is unjustly
dismissed is the idea that nonconceptual content is equally epistemic. Nonconceptual content
can justify corresponding beliefs. Indeed, conceptual content is based upon, or rationally related
to, the nonconceptual content of the informational system. Hence beliefs, paradigmatic
examples of conceptual contents, are rationally rooted in the nonconceptual content of
experience. In short, the content of a perceptual (or memorial or testimonial) experience is fully
contentful, even though it is nonconceptual.
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McDowell is pretty clearly opposed in principle to Evan’s informational system, since it
disconnects the interconnected relationship between sensibility and understanding, between
receptivity and spontaneity, between the space of nature and the space of reasons:
In Evans’s account of experience, receptivity figures in the guise of
the perceptual element of the informational system, and his idea is
that the perceptual system produces its content-bearing states
independently of any operations of spontaneity….So the
independent operations of the informational system figure in
Evans’s account as a separable contribution made by receptivity to
its co-operation with spontaneity. (McDowell, 1996, p. 51)
So, for Evans, receptivity does make a separable contribution to its co-operation with
spontaneity. But this contradicts McDowell's interpretation of Kant's dictum. As we saw at the
very end of section 1.1, one of McDowell’s most basic principles is that receptivity does not
make an even notionally separable contribution to its cooperation with spontaneity---quite the
reverse. McDowell writes: “Sellars’s dictum [= McDowell's interpretation of Kant's dictum]
implies that it is a form of the Myth to think sensibility by itself, without any involvement of
capacities that belong to our rationality, can make things available for our cognition”
(McDowell, 2009b, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” p. 257).
Evans offers three arguments for nonconceptual content. Each argument is supposed to
lend further credence to Evans’s nonconceptual content thesis. I will state McDowell’s response
to each argument. The first argument is “the richness argument” (Heck, 2000). Here is a vivid
expression of the argument’s phenomenological point:
Consider your current perceptual state---and now imagine what a
complete description of the way the world appears to you at this
moment might be like. Surely a thousand words would hardly
begin to do the job. And it is not just that the description would be
long: Rather, it seems hard to imagine that your perceptual state, as
it is now, has any specific articulation corresponding to the
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conceptual articulation of a particular one of the many different
Thoughts that might capture its content; and it seems at least as
hard to imagine that you now possess all the concepts that would
be expressed by the words occurring in such a description, even if
one could be framed. (Heck, 2000, p. 489; Heck’s capitalization)
The phenomenology of content is simply too rich. Propositional or conceptual categories fail to
do justice to much of the contents of perceptual experiences. For example, enormously complex
visual graduations and spatial arrangements often elude verbal description. And it is not just that
we don’t have enough time to, as it were, conceptually enumerate the phenomenological content
of a perceptual experience. It is a stronger point. The point is that visual--spatial aspects of
perceptual experiences are not conceptual. Suppose you are at the Art Institute of Chicago,
enjoying Paul Cezanne’s celebrated Basket of Apples. It seems that the content of your
experience is nonconceptual through and through. The intricacies of the painting’s disjointed
perspective, say, seem entirely nonconceptual; that is, they seem unnamable.
McDowell argues that this is a non sequitur. To wit, demonstrative concepts (e.g., “this”
or “that”) can capture the content of your seemingly nonconceptual experience. If you are
discussing the disjointed perspective of Basket of Apples with a friend, you may refer to features
of the painting’s perspective by uttering “this” or “that.” Similar remarks apply to other aspects
of the painting, such as its hue and geometrical complexity. Minimal empiricism says that
determinate and descriptive sensations can justify corresponding judgments---because sensations
are conceptual. Symmetrically, judgments can capture the contents of perceptual experience,
since the contents of perceptual experience are conceptual. So McDowell is basically offering a
transcendental argument. The necessary condition for the applicability of demonstrative
expressions is that the content of perceptual experience is conceptual. Our demonstrative
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concepts do apply to perceptual experience. Thus the content of perceptual experience is
conceptual.
The second argument turns on the well known Muller-Lyer illusion. The Muller-Lyer
illusion is supposed to show that perception is independent of judgment; for the appearance
persists, even though the subject does not judge that the appearance is as it appears. MullerLyer-type illusions seem to show that the content of perception is fundamentally different from
the content of thought. According to Evans, judgments are active exercises of conceptual
capacities. “Evans is here insisting that the active business of making up one’s mind is the
proper context in which to place conceptual capacities…” (McDowell, 1996, p. 60). Yet
perceptual illusions seem to elicit so-called non-active judgments. We immediately judge that
one line is longer than the other. The (false) judgment is passively induced by the perception.
But the idea that there are passive judgments is absurd. Judgments are nothing if not active.
Hence the best explanation of perceptual illusions is that the content of perceptual experience is
nonconceptual. In fact, without the concept of nonconceptual content, perceptual illusions
render judgments unrecognizable. Perceptual illusions serve as nice counterexamples to
McDowell’s claim that experience and judgment are internally related. The Muller-Lyer illusion
strongly suggests that there must be two kinds of contents: nonconceptual content and conceptual
content.
McDowell thinks that Evans’s second argument for nonconceptual content reveals a
“blind spot.” Specifically, Evans never considers the very real possibility that conceptual
capacities are necessarily implicated in perceptual occurrences. Again, receptivity does not make
an even notionally separable contribution to its cooperation with spontaneity. To Evans’s mind,
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if conceptual content is governed by the generality constraint, it must be exemplified in active
judgments. The informational system is pure receptivity in operation; so its content is
nonconceptual. But this ratiocination reveals a blind spot, since there is a principled distinction
between conceptual capacities operative in perception and conceptual capacities operative in
judgments. It is a formal distinction.6 The conceptual content of judgments is voluntary and
reflexive, whereas the conceptual content of perception is involuntary and passive. But they are
equally actualizations of conceptual content. They both involve the same sort of conceptual
capacities. “[E]xperience is a passive actualization of capacities whose core actualization is
active, namely their exercise in judgment” (Gaskin, 2006, p. 67; Gaskin’s emphasis). Given the
formal distinction between experiential and judgmental conceptual capacities, minimal
empiricism offers an adequate account of the Muller-Lyer illusion (and similar illusions). The
initial illusory experience just is conceptual. We don’t have to posit a theoretically suspect
notion of nonconceptual content in order to account for perceptual illusions.
The third and final argument for nonconceptual content is from animal and infant
mentation. Evans is intrigued by the fact that we share elementary perceptions with animals and
infants. He recognizes that animals and infants seem to perceive and interact with their sensory
environs. For example, an animal can successfully navigate around a room (or maze) without
hurting itself. An animal, then, must perceive rudimentary spatial relationships. So there is an
important commonality between mature adults and animals vis-à-vis elementary spatial

A formal distinction “has a real basis in the thing, but does not imply the presence of more than
one independently existing thing” (Back, 2000, p. 413). So, for example, Socrates’s animality
and rationality are formally distinct, but Socrates just is a rational animal. Furthermore, Gaskin
argues (successfully, to my mind) that Frege’s celebrated sense/reference distinction is really just
an application of Scotus’s formal distinction. See Gaskin (2004), p. 497.
6
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perceptions (or cognitive maps). And yet animals are nonpropositional creatures, quite unlike
mature adults. Therefore the content of elementary spatial perceptions cannot be conceptual. We
must accept the reality of nonconceptual content.
McDowell’s response is swift. He states:
[I]t is not compulsory to attempt to accommodate the combination
of something in common and a striking difference in this
factorizing way: to suppose our perceptual lives include a core that
we can also recognize in the perceptual life of a mere animal, and
an extra ingredient in addition. And if we do take this, there is no
satisfactory way to understand the role of the supposed core in our
perceptual lives. (McDowell, 1996, p. 64)
We need not factor out a common denominator between ourselves and animals. In fact, a
factorizing explanation is detrimental, since it neglects and obscures the conceptual content of
our perceptual experience. A factorizing explanation is simply ad hoc.
Overall, Evans’s theory of content is both good and bad. It does a good job of
accommodating the intentionality intuition, the intuition that our thoughts are about some things
rather than other things. A desideratum on a theory of content is that it ought to accommodate
the intentionality intuition. Evans dubs this “Russell’s Principle.”7 Russell’s principle states
that: “a subject cannot make a judgment about something unless he knows which object his
judgment is about” (Evans, 1982, p. 89, see note 1). Evans respects Russell’s principle and
constructs his philosophy of content accordingly. In this respect, Evans’s approach is anything
but a mere “frictionless spinning in a void,” contra Davidson. Russell's principle is directed at
securing the determinacy of thought. Unfortunately (according to McDowell) Evans’s
philosophy of content is impaled on the second horn of the dilemma. Evans’s nonconceptual

7

Cf. Evans (1982), chapter 4.
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content is really a subtle form of the Myth of the Given. In a word, so-called nonconceptual
content is “blind,” and therefore not a species of content:
If experience is pictured as input to spontaneity from outside, then
it is another case of fraudulent labeling to use the word ‘content’
for something we can even so take experience to have, in such a
way that reason-constituting relations can intelligibly hold between
experiences and judgments….
I am claiming that although Evans does take care to credit
experiences with content that does not save them from being
intuitions in a sense that entitles us to apply the Kantian tag to
them: since they are without concepts, they are blind. (McDowell,
1996, pp. 53-54)
Nonconceptual ‘content’ acts as an exogenous constraint on judgment; but as we saw earlier, this
is highly problematic. An exogenous or external constraint is a “bare presence,” but a bare
presence does not represent anything. But if it does not represent anything, it is not a type of
content, i.e., nonconceptual content is not a form of representational content. In a slogan, if there
is no conceptual integration, there is no representation. Now consider the conceptual content of
experience. The conceptual content of sense experience is amenable to conceptual integration,
for it is seamlessly integrated into active, conceptual capacities. Contrast this with the
nonconceptual content of experience. Nonconceptual content is not amenable to conceptual
integration, for it is not seamlessly integrated into active, conceptual capacities. Hence the
nonconceptual content of experience does not represent anything. It is not a species of content.
Therefore there is no epistemologically respectable form of nonconceptual content. And so
Evans’s position is necessarily committed to something like the Myth of the Given or the second
horn of the dilemma.

§ 1.4 Naturalism and Second Nature
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Naturalism is an intriguing response to the dilemma of mental content. In a nutshell, naturalism
dissolves the dilemma through undercutting its key assumption, namely, that conceptual content
is unique or of its own kind. The naturalist essentially disavows Sellars’s logical space of
reasons. For the naturalist, the space of reasons is a species of the space of nature. Now, prima
facie, this is counterintuitive. After all, the space of reasons certainly seems normative. But this
misses the point. The naturalization of content is supposed to affect a paradigm shift. Just as
Copernicus’s sun centered solar system affected a paradigm shift in astronomy, so a naturalistic
portrayal of normativity is supposed to affect a paradigm shift in our understanding of mental
content. There is nothing unique about the content of thought; it is amenable to naturalistic
description and systematization. Notice that neither Davidson nor Evans is sympathetic to a
naturalistic portrayal of the space of reasons. For Evans, conceptual content is governed by the
generality constraint, and the generality constraint is a unique condition on thought. Similarly,
for Davidson, the content of thought is governed by the “principle of charity” or the “constitutive
ideal of rationality,” and the constitutive ideal of rationality or the principle of charity is of its
own kind. Naturalism leaves something important out. Be this as it may, the generality
constraint, or the constitutive ideal of rationality---or any other kind of normative constraint, for
that matter---is both describable and systematizable in strictly naturalistic terms, according to the
naturalist. In brief, normativity is normality, and normality is a species of the logical space of
nature. As stated in section 1.1, the space of nature comprises descriptive (as opposed to
prescriptive) facts. Descriptive facts are cataloged and systematized by the natural sciences, viz.,
chemistry, physics, biology and psychology. So, since normativity reduces—or, better: quasi-
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reduces8---to normality, normativity (or the space of reasons) is rendered tractable. By “quasireduction” I mean translating the space of reasons into the space of nature.
Simply stated, most naturalists are exceedingly suspicious of so-called sui generis kinds.
Unique kinds seem to float mysteriously free of naturalistic anchoring. And this is
epistemologically, not to mention semantically, threatening. For it would appear that biological
entities are necessarily disbarred from cognitively inhabiting a supernatural realm:
It is intelligible that the resulting sense that knowledge and thought
are sui generis, by comparison with what can present itself as a
compelling conception of the natural, should generate
metaphysical anxieties about them, which crystallize in a felt threat
of supernaturalism. (McDowell, 2009a, “Avoiding the Myth of the
Given,” p. 260)
The “threat” of supernaturalism is unacceptable, for two reasons. First, it is false. Indeed
supernaturalism is comparable to believing in ghosts or witches. Second, it is an agent of
superfluous intellectual discomfort; but (according to McDowell) philosophy is supposed to
diagnose and treat intellectual distress---not create it. It is basically a reductio ad absurdum
point. If we assume that supernaturalism is true, we encounter absurdity. So it must be false that
the content of thought is sui generis. Conceptual capacities must reside wholly within the space
of nature. There is thus no dilemma of mental content.

8

I borrow the term from Crispin Wright. See Wright (2002), p. 140, see note 3. Strictly,
intentional discourse does not reduce to naturalistic discourse, because intentional discourse does
not constitute a scientific theory. Reduction proper involves at least two scientific theories. The
experimental and theoretical laws of one theory are said to reduce to the experimental and
theoretical laws of another theory. This sense of reduction is not usually used by naturalists. By
reduction, naturalists usually mean “naturalistic descriptions of intentional phenomena.” This is
different from the sense of reduction used in the philosophy of science. Hence the term quasireduction. For an elementary discussion of reduction in the philosophies of science and mind,
see Kim (1998), ch. 9.
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Quine’s (1969) “Epistemology Naturalized” is arguably the principal programmatic
statement of naturalism. According to Quine, epistemology’s emphasis on normativity is entirely
mistaken. Instead, we ought to naturalize epistemological notions, such as justification or
rationality. By “naturalize” Quine means render in descriptive terms. And whatever is
describable is capturable by the natural sciences. For instance, a justified belief is to be
understood in terms of facts pertaining to memory/learning. Scientific theories of
memory/learning tell us what a justified belief is. This sense of justification is descriptive.
Epistemological concepts can be fruitfully couched in psychological terms. We can translate
epistemology into descriptive psychology (or the space of nature). Therefore we should supplant
normative vocabulary with the nomenclature of behavioral psychology:
Epistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a
chapter of psychology and hence of natural science. It studies a
natural phenomenon, viz., a physical human subject. This human
subject is accorded a certain experimentally controlled input--certain patterns of irritation in assorted frequencies, for instance--and in the fullness of time the subject delivers as output a
description of the three-dimensional external world and its history.
(Quine, 1969, pp. 82-83)
Quine’s approach generalizes to mental content. If epistemological terminology is
translatable into naturalistic terminology, it stands to reason that the mind and its contents are
naturalizable mutatis mutandis. Especially since (for McDowell) epistemological anxieties are
epiphenomenal; the real problem is content. But mental content is not a real problem, since it is
naturalizable. Intentional or normative discourse admits of a naturalistic description and
systematization. Hence we can quasi-reduce normative discourse to descriptive theory.9

9

For a brisk presentation of the naturalization program, see Barry Loewer (1997).
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A brief digression may be in order. To repeat a theme, if the mind/world distinction
holds, the epistemic status of mental content falls prey to an “interminable oscillation” between
Davidson’s coherentism and Evans’s nonconceptual content:
…the tendency to oscillate between two unpalatable positions: a
coherentism that loses the bearing of empirical thought on reality
altogether and a recoil into a vain appeal to the Given. (McDowell,
1996, p. 108)
Equivalently:
[E]ither we must see our way to supposing that…operations of
sentient nature can stand in rational relations to thought (the Myth
of the Given), or we must accept that sensibility has no
epistemological significance at all (a radical coherentism). (ibid., p.
98)
The dilemma of mental content seems inescapable. But according to the naturalist, we can
dismount from the oscillation or “seesaw,” provided that we naturalize content. Unless we
naturalize content, our worries will persist indefinitely. Naturalism, then, is a form of
philosophical therapy. Naturalism allegedly dissolves philosophical worries. If we naturalize
content, our intellectual discontents will dissipate. Thus, since nomativity is a subset of
normality, or because the space of reasons is a subset of the space of nature, naturalism sidesteps
the dilemma of mental content.
With respect to the naturalism/anti-naturalism debate, McDowell deploys the rhetorical
device of terminological abuse. Quine's naturalism is labeled “bald naturalism.” Platonism or
anti-naturalism is dubbed “rampant platonism.” Bald naturalism is basically an extreme form of
scientism. Scientism is the thesis that all legitimate inquiry is exhausted by the natural sciences.
Bald naturalism baldly declares that the natural sciences are the touchstones of intellectual
activity. Clearly bald naturalism is too myopic. There exist perfectly legitimate fields of study
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which do not fall under the rubric of natural science. As an example, sociology is an
intellectually respectable discipline even though it is not a natural science. Rampant platonism is
antithetical to bald naturalism. Rampant platonism rampantly situates non-natural kinds within a
non-natural realm. For the rampant platonist, the content of thought is essentially non-natural.
But what does it mean to say that the contents of thoughts are directed toward a supernatural
realm? The idea is deeply mysterious at best. McDowell writes:
In rampant platonism, the structure of the space of reasons, the
structure in which we place things when we find meaning in them,
is simply extra-natural. Our capacity to resonate to that structure
has to be mysterious; it is as if we had a foothold outside the
animal kingdom, in a splendidly non-human realm of ideality.
(ibid., p. 88)
Clearly rampant platonism is far too opaque. Thus neither bald naturalism nor rampant
platonism is adequate.
Characteristically, McDowell strives for a middle way. McDowell considers himself a
naturalist, but his naturalism is of a very different stripe. He refers to his position as “naturalized
plationism.” A naturalized platonism lies between bald naturalism and rampant platonism:
We should aim not to solve the difficulties of locating rational
thought and intentional activity [= the space of reasons] within the
modern naturalistic view, but to finesse them by accomplishing an
improved---‘relaxed’---conception of what should rank as natural--one which allows us to ‘take in stride’, without any sense of
eeriness or mystification, an acceptance that Spontaneity is sui
generis, by emphasizing the thought that its distinctive concepts
capture patterns in our natural way of living. (Wright, 2002, p. 141;
Wright’s capitalization and emphasis)
And:
Naturalized platonism [= liberal naturalism] is platonistic in that
the structure of the space of reasons has a sort of autonomy; it is
not derivative from, or reflective of, truths about human beings that
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are capturable independently of having that structure in view. But
this platonism is not rampant: the structure of the space of reasons
is not constituted in splendid isolation from anything merely
human. The demands of reason are essentially such that a human
upbringing can open a human being’s eyes to them. (McDowell,
1996, p. 92)10
Gaskin situates McDowell’s naturalized platonism within the traditional square of opposition:
[W]e should take it that the rampant Platonist denies both that it is
essential to us (living, biological beings) that we can have our eyes
opened by our upbringing to the demands of reasons, and the
converse, that it is essential to the demands of reason that our
upbringing can open our eyes to them. The naturalized Platonist
will then presumably assert both these conjuncts, and will
accordingly adopt a position which is the contrary, not the
contradictory, of rampant platonism. (Gaskin, 2006, p. 47;
Gaskin’s emphasis)
According to the naturalized platonist, we can naturalistically accommodate the space of reasons,
provided that we broaden the scope of the space of nature. If we equate the space of nature with
natural-scientific understanding, we limit our capacity to understand conceptual or propositional
content. But this is not to suggest that the natural sciences have nothing to offer. On the
contrary, behavioral psychology is instructive. Still, it fails to fully capture the space of
concepts. Behavioral psychology may be necessary for understanding mental content, but it is
not sufficient. It is a mistake to think that bald naturalism can provide both necessary and
sufficient conditions for content.

Strictly, Platonism proper says that the space of reasons is not in “splendid isolation” from the
space of nature. On the contrary, the space of nature is an imperfect image of the space of
reasons (or the domain of Forms). For Plato, normality metaphysically depends on normativity.
McDowell mentions in passing that: “[N]aming the position after Plato must do him an injustice”
(McDowell, 1996, p. 110). Fortunately, for our purposes, we may safely ignore this
complication.
10
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On the one hand, McDowell thinks that naturalism exhibits the right sort of motivation,
since it aims at dissolving the dilemma of mental content. For the naturalist, it is false that the
mind and the world are fundamentally distinct, because there is no mind to speak of. Everything
is “physical” or “naturalistic.” On the other hand, McDowell believes that naturalism goes about
dissolving the dilemma the wrong way. Speaking clinically, naturalism administers the wrong
sort of treatment. We should appreciate the intuition that the conceptual or propositional domain
is special. A naturalistic quasi-reduction of the conceptual utterly fails to capture this intuition.
“We can understand and exorcise the philosophical impulse [= intuition], not just repress it”
(McDowell, 1996, p. 183). Repressing epistemological and/or semantic issues is
contraindicated, so to speak:
Opting out in the sense I disparage is not just discarding the
apparent problems, but doing so without, as I do, granting force to
the distinctive intuition that---in a certain context---makes it seem
as if they are genuine: the intuition that the conceptual apparatus
that centers on the idea of objective purport belonging in a logical
space of reasons that is sui generis, by comparison with the logical
space in which the natural sciences function. When I speak of bald
naturalism as opting out, the point is to contrast the baldly
naturalist way of deconstructing those apparent problems with
mine. (McDowell, 1998d, p. 421)
Now, it is a remarkable fact that human beings are capable of responding to reasons. We
are: “[C]ontinually reshaping a world-view in rational response to the deliverances of
experience…” (McDowell, 1996, p. 114). Our “responsiveness to reasons” seems to occur
within the space of reasons. Indeed: “[P]lacing something in the space of reasons is seeing it as
an exercise of rationality, a case of responsiveness to reasons as such” (McDowell, 2002a, p.
271). This is in sharp contrast with animals. Animals are incapable of responding to reasons,
because they lack the faculty of spontaneity; their sensations are not conceptually structured.
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But if their sensations are not conceptually structured, it follows that they do not enjoy
perceptual experiences, in the strict Kantian sense:
Mere animals do not come within the scope of the Kantian thesis,
since they do not have the spontaneity of the understanding. We
cannot construe them as continually reshaping a world-view in
rational response to the deliverances of experience; not if the idea
of rational response requires subjects who are in charge of their
thinking, standing ready to reassess what is a reason for what, and
to change their responsive propensities accordingly. It follows that
mere animals cannot enjoy ‘outer experience’… (McDowell, 1996,
p. 114)
McDowell’s Kantianism states that infants and animals do not have an outer sense, because they
lack the faculty of understanding or concepts. “[A]nything that does not have concepts does not
have perceptual experience [= outer sense] either” (Brandom, 2002, p. 92). Outer sense is
possible only if the faculties of understanding and sensibility are intertwined. But animals do not
possess the faculty of spontaneity. Thus animals are incapable of an outer sense. Bluntly stated:
“Dumb animals are natural beings and no more. Their being is entirely contained within their
biological nature” (McDowell, 1996, p. 70).
This ramifies to inner sense. Since animals lack the faculty of understanding, they are
incapable of “full-fledged subjectivity.” Subjectivity or inner sense requires an interconnected
relationship between the faculties of sensibility and understanding. Because animals lack the
faculty of concepts, they are incapable of an inner sense or subjectivity. Moreover, animals are
incapable of an inner sense because they are incapable of an outer sense; conversely, they are
incapable of an outer sense since they are incapable of an inner sense. “Creatures without
conceptual capacities lack self-consciousness and---this is part of the same package---experience
of objective reality” (ibid., p. 114). Or: “In the absence of spontaneity, no self can be in view,
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and by the same token, the world cannot be in view either” (ibid., p. 114). Since animals lack an
outer sense, they ipso facto lack an inner sense. Subjectivity and outer sense are interconnected.
Instead of subjectivity, McDowell attributes a “proto-subjectivity” to animals. The
concept of proto-subjectivity is delineated in terms of Gadamer's (1975) distinction between
living in a world---i.e., subjectivity---and living in an environment---i.e., proto-subjectivity:
In mere animals, sentience is in the service of a mode of life that is
structured exclusively by immediate biological imperatives....[A]
merely animal life is shaped by goals whose control of the animal's
behaviour at a given moment is an immediate outcome of
biological forces. A mere animal does not weigh reasons and
decide what to do. Now Gadamer's thesis is this: a life that is
structured only in that way is led not in the world, but only in an
environment. (McDowell, 1996, p. 115)
Animals merely respond to biological needs. They lack the faculty of understanding. As such
they inhabit an environment, and therefore lack the capacity for subjectivity. Human beings, on
the other hand, can make decisions which are rationally responsive to their environments. As
such we reside in a world, and therefore have the capacity for subjectivity.
But this does not imply that animals do not experience inner sensations:
It would be hopeless to claim that sensations and emotional states
are there for a mere animal in the way problems and opportunities
thrown up by the environment are there for it....But in any case
nothing I have said about the inner world prevents us from
acknowledging that mere animals can feel pain and fear. (ibid., p.
120)
Further:
[N]othing in the concepts of pain or fear implies that they can get a
grip only where there is understanding, and thus full-fledged
subjectivity. There is no reason to suppose that they can be applied
in non-first person way only to something capable of applying
them to itself in a first-person way. (ibid., pp. 120-121)
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Just as with Wittgenstein’s famous beetle in the box,11 we are not saying that animals experience
something or nothing. Phenomenology dictates that we cannot know either way. The 'qualia' of
different creatures are inaccessible in the sense that we cannot subjectively experience their
qualia (Nagel, 1979). However, animals certainly seem receptive to sensations. When a steak is
given to a dog, the dog certainly appears to have very powerful gustatory experiences. Thus,
given the conceptual, phenomenological and anecdotal data, the most reasonable course of action
is to attribute a “proto-subjectivity” to animals. And then we may say that animals have quasiinner perceptual experiences.
It is important to notice that the distinction between proto-subjectivity and subjectivity
does not postulate a “highest common factor conception of experience.”12 It is not the case that
the perceptual experience of human beings and the perceptual experience of animals factor out a
common denominator. Consider pain. Without conceptual capacities, the contents of pain states
are not possible. Animals do not perceptually experience pain proper, because they lack the
capacity for subjectivity proper. They lack the faculty of understanding. Human beings do have
the capacity for subjectivity, since their inner sensations are necessarily carved by the faculty of
understanding. The capacity for subjectivity minimally presupposes a faculty of understanding.
Human beings, then, do experience pain proper. Hence the concepts of subjectivity and protosubjectivity share nothing in common.

11

See Wittgenstein (1953), sections 293 and 304.
In epistemology, McDowell is against the idea that veridical perceptual experiences and
illusory perceptual experiences share a “highest common factor.” A veridical perpetual
experience and a non-veridical perceptual experience share nothing in common, according to
McDowell. For more on this, see McDowell’s (1998c) “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge,”
section 3.
12
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What follows from these reflections is an ontological distinction between first nature and
second nature. First nature phenomena fall squarely within the space of nature. Laws of nature
exclusively subsume first nature phenomena. But mature human beings are unique in that they
enjoy both a first nature and a second nature. Second nature---although naturalistically
embodied or instantiated---does not fall squarely within the space of nature, as second nature is
sui generis. It resides within the space of reasons. So laws of nature cannot subsume second
nature phenomena. Empirical evidence for the existence of second nature comes from
developmental psychology. Developmental psychologists talk about a maturation process for
which other animals are incapable of. In addition, large canons of cultural traditions exist,
everything from poetry to puppetry, which attest to an overarching ontology of second nature.
Although puppetry and poetry are naturalistically instantiated, they are of their own kind. In the
philosophy of mind, the naturalistic fallacy is to think that human beings and their activities can
be explained and understood in terms of laws of nature, since human beings and their activities
have one foot in the space of nature, in a manner of speaking. This is a myth, because scientific
laws of nature have no application to things which are of their own kind, even though unique
kinds are naturalistic entities.
For McDowell, the paradigmatic second nature phenomenon is natural language. Natural
language is the vehicle upon which canons of tradition are transmitted:
The feature of language that really matters is this: that a natural
language, the sort of language into which human beings are first
initiated, serves as a repository of tradition, a store of historically
accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what. The
tradition is subject to reflective modification by each generation
that inherits it....But if an individual human being is to realize her
potential of taking her place in that succession, which is the same
thing as acquiring a mind, the capacity to think and act

47
intentionally, at all, the first thing that needs to happen is for her to
be initiated into a tradition as it stands. (McDowell, 1996, p. 126;
citation omitted)
Cultural traditions, human development and the space of reasons in general are exemplifications
of second nature. And their existence is preserved through natural language. Hence natural
language is the paragon of second nature.
McDowell continues:
Initiation into a language is initiation into a going conception of
the layout of the space of reasons. That promises to make it
intelligible how, beginning as mere animals, human beings mature
into being at home in the space of reasons. On this view, a shared
language is the primary medium of understanding. It stands over
against all parties to communication in it, with a kind of
independence of each of them that belongs with its meriting a kind
of respect. (ibid., p. 184, see note 3)
Our ability to respond to reasons is a function of natural language. Natural language is thus
necessarily rational. More importantly, the unique phenomenon of nature language can account
for how sheer animals---more specifically: primates---have a place in the space of reasons. The
actualization of second nature necessitates natural language. Human maturation does not make
sense independently of natural language. Second nature requires natural language. And natural
language is naturalistically instantiated.
McDowell frequently uses the German expression “Bildung” (upbringing). Bildung
seamlessly transforms our first nature into a second nature. Because the process is often
seamless: “[W]e tend to be forgetful of the very idea of second nature” (ibid., p. 85; emphasis
added). “Plain facts” from developmental psychology (say) tend to be forgotten in the course of
our philosophizing. McDowell’s use of Bildung serves as a reminder of our second nature.
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Furthermore: “[N]othing occult [or mysterious] happens to a human being in ordinary
upbringing” (ibid., p. 122):
The bare idea of Bildung ensures that the autonomy of meaning is
not inhuman, and that should eliminate the tendency to be spooked
by the very idea of norms or demands of reason. This leaves no
genuine questions about norms, apart from those that we address in
reflective thinking about specific norms, an activity that is not
particularly philosophical. (ibid., p. 95)
And:
[A]lthough the structure of the space of reasons cannot be
reconstructed out of facts about our involvement in the realm of
law, it can be the framework within which meaning comes into
view only because our eyes can be opened to it by Bildung, which
is an element in the normal coming to maturity of the kind of
animals we are. Meaning is not a mysterious gift from outside
nature. (ibid., p. 88)
McDowell’s ontology of second nature is supposed to “partially reenchant nature.” We
can never have a fully enchanted experience of nature as involving final causes or angels or
whatever. What we can do is partially reenchant nature via second nature. As the story goes,
Descartes extruded nature of enchantment. Naturalistic facts are three-dimensional objects
which you can point to on a Cartesian grid. And that’s it—there is nothing to add here. With
Descartes, the space of nature is a matter of strict external, not internal, causation involving
three-dimensional objects. “Modern science understands its subject matter in a way that
threatens, at least, to leave it disenchanted…” (ibid., p. 70). Previously, with Aristotle, nature
was inherently meaningful. Even gravity was enchanted. For better and for worse, Descartes
abolished this state of affairs. Consequently, modern philosophy is beset with anxieties
surrounding the apparent disenchantment of nature. There is a felt loss of content. McDowell’s
concept of second nature promises to infuse Descartes's space of nature with meaning. The
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content of perceptual experience is conceptual. Our upbringing or development affects a second
nature, which saturates our first nature with content or meaning. While second nature is sui
generis, it is naturalistically instantiated. There is nothing supernatural about second nature.
Thus second nature does not violate Occam’s razor. Again, we may eat our cake and have it, too:
One of McDowell’s leading ideas is that if we conceive the
receiving of an impression as what he calls “a transaction in
nature,” we can easily seem to be confined to one of two
unappealing options, either a substantial empiricism in which
judgments are implausibly grounded in impressions taken as
entities or occurrences located exterior to the space of reasons, in
the realm of law, or a Davidsonian coherentism in which
judgments are cut off from impressions, so conceived, and are
accordingly ungrounded in experience. But once we see that a
transaction in nature can be a transaction in second nature---a
transaction within the space of reasons---we can avoid having to
make that unpleasant choice. (Gaskin, 2006, p. 29)
More generally:
McDowell argues for a partial re-enchantment, one depending on
the idea that ‘second nature’ has just as much right to be included
in what is deemed to be natural as does law-governed first nature.
Second nature arises as the result of our development and
maturation as humans, such maturation being dependent upon our
biological heritage, a social environment, and relevant training.
The acquisition of a language is paradigmatically something
acquired in this way; that humans are linguistic creatures is thus
part of their second nature, as are the conceptual and rational
capacities that come along with language. (MacDonald &
MacDonald, 2006, p. xix)

§ 1.5 Conclusion
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Now let us connect the dots. As we have seen, there are three standard responses to the dilemma
of mental content: 1) Davidsonian coherentism; 2) Evans’s nonconceptual content; and 3)
naturalism. As mentioned in section 1.2, 1) is an inadequate resolution of the dilemma.
Specifically, Davidson’s transcendental argument for content begs the question, since it
presupposes what it attempts to prove, namely, that thought adheres to the intentionality
intuition. Davidson’s principle of charity is too charitable. McDowell’s notion of second nature,
however, can account for how content is already in place:
...Davidson’s mutual interpreters must come to their cognitive task
already equipped with a sense of the layout of the space of reasons,
a substantive conception of what ‘the constitutive ideal of
rationality’ requires. Now I think we should be suspicious of the
thought that we can simply credit human individuals with this
equipment, without benefit of anything like my appeal to initiation
into a shared language and thereby into a tradition. (McDowell,
1996, pp. 186-187)
Without a shared language, Davidson’s transcendental argument fails to secure determinate
content. McDowell is opposed to Davidson’s individualistic approach to mental content.
Individualism is the idea that thought and/or language can be understood individualistically. The
concept of a shared language is diametrically opposed to individualism. In section 1.3, it was
argued that 2) was plagued with epistemological giveness. More precisely, nonconceptual
content is nonpropositional, but this entails that nonconceptual content is epistemologically
dubious. So Evans’s nonconceptual content fails to resolve the dilemma. Finally, in section 1.4,
we saw that 3) provides an incorrect dissolution of the dilemma of mental content. Conceptual
content is sui generis, but a naturalistic dissolution does not acknowledge this fact.
McDowell’s minimal empiricism is a dialectical exploration of the dilemma of mental
content. That is, minimal empiricism engages with the dilemma via philosophical dialectic.
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Each horn of the dilemma has been exhaustively examined, and an attempted dissolution was
revealed as defective. McDowell’s dissolution is different. “McDowell recommends his own
view as the only way to avoid these three unsatisfactory alternatives” (Brandom, 1996, p. 245).
Minimal empiricism is the fourth (but not final) response to the dilemma of content: It escapes
between the horns of the dilemma. The content of thought is both rationally and causally
constrained; in other words, the content of perceptual experience is conceptual. Human beings
possess a second nature. McDowell’s minimal empiricism, therefore, constitutes a meditation on
a dilemma.
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2

Gaskin’s Minimalist Empiricism: A Critique

§ 2.1 Preliminary Remarks

Gaskin’s (2006) Experience and the World’s Own Language is a sophisticated interpretation and
critique of McDowell’s minimal empiricism. It is composed of three parts. The first part
(Chapters I-III) provides a critical discussion of McDowell’s minimal empiricism. Gaskin argues
that McDowell's account of judgment prevents the subject from directly experiencing the world.
Additionally, Gaskin claims that McDowell's alleged individualism and intellectualism interferes
with the subject directly experiencing the world. The second part (Chapter IV) is concerned with
McDowell’s treatment of animal and/or infant mentality. A chief criticism (if not the chief
criticism) of minimal empiricism is that it distorts animal and infant experience. Minimal
empiricism says that infants and animals do not enjoy perceptual experience, since they lack
concepts. Recall the rigid Kantian sense of perceptual experience touched on in section 1.4.
Without the application of concepts, there is no perceptual experience. But this seems false.
Animals and infants do seem to enjoy perceptual experience, even though they are
nonconceptual creatures. More precisely, Gaskin claims that McDowell unintentionally provides
a noumenal account of animal and infant mentality. But this undermines his goal of establishing
a rational relation between mind and world in experience, at least for animals and infants.
McDowell's noumenal account of animal and infant experience renders their perceptual
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experience indirect, as their experience is mediated through things-in-themselves. The last part
(Chapters V-VI) offers a critical interpretation of McDowell’s philosophy of language. Gaskin
argues that McDowell's philosophy of language does not provide a sound semantic framework,
given that it is committed to things-in-themselves. But this also undermines the goal of
achieving a direct relation between mind and world in perceptual experience, since mind and
world are now indirectly related via a noumenal realm. Gaskin's minimalist empiricism is
supposedly free from these purported deficiencies with McDowell's minimal empiricism. Let us
begin with a few of Gaskin’s initial characterizations of minimal empiricism.
According to Gaskin, minimal empiricism is primarily a transcendental account of mental
content. “In [McDowell’s] hands empiricism becomes a doctrine about the possibility of
content” (Gaskin, 2006, p. 2; Gaskin’s emphasis). Content is possible if and only if minimal
empiricism is the case. More specifically: “[T]he existence of a subject conceived [of] as an
empirically uncontaminated locus of [non-empirical] thought is, for McDowell, not a conceptual
possibility” (ibid., p. 5). Empiricism is a necessary condition for content, but it is not sufficient--as we saw with Evans’s concept of nonconceptual content. McDowell’s minimal version of
empiricism, on the contrary, allegedly acts as both a necessary and sufficient condition for
content.
Very well, but what does McDowell mean by “experience?” According to Gaskin, there
are two competing conceptions of experience: (1) the interface conception, and (2) the conduit
conception. (1) is used by traditional or classical empiricists; (2) is employed by McDowell’s
minimal empiricism. The interface conception of experience posits three relata: world,
experience and judgment. It conceives of experience as an interface or intermediary squarely
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situated between world and judgment. Gaskin refers to this as a “complex model of empirical
content.” The conduit conception of experience is simpler than the interface conception of
experience, since the conduit conception of experience posits just two relata: world and
judgment. The conduit conception of experience conceives of experience “not as a further
relatum in this picture but as the relation connecting the two posited relata” (ibid., p. 11;
Gaskin’s emphasis). Experience is a relation comprising two relata: judgment and world.
Judgment and world form a union within the realm of sensory experience. Consequently,
experience does not fall short of the world. “McDowell wants us to conceive of experience,
when all goes well, as a kind of openness to the world, ensuring that the mind’s contact with the
world is direct…” (ibid., p. 10). For McDowell, experiences are transparent. Gaskin refers to
this conduit picture of the relation between thought and world as a “simple model of empirical
content.” Speaking metaphilosophically, the complex model approaches content from within a
sideways-on framework, whereas the simple model approaches content from within a nonsideways-on framework.
Gaskin is especially interested in what McDowell calls “the order of justification.” By
“order of justification” Gaskin means that which primarily confers epistemic justification to
some given mental content. He presents what I will refer to as the “dilemma of justification”; it
is a minor variation on the dilemma of mental content. The dilemma is: Either experience is
ultimate in the order of justification or the world is ultimate in the order of justification. The
complex model of content, with its commitment to empiricism, tells us that experience is
ultimate in the order of justification. The simple model of content tells us that the world is
ultimate in the order of justification. Now, if experience is ultimate in the order of justification,
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we become ensnared in skepticism, since our so-called knowledge of the external world is
rendered essentially indirect. If, on the other hand, the world is ultimate in the order of
justification, we seem to abandon empiricism. But we cannot make sense of content unless some
form of empiricism is the case. Thus neither model of content is satisfactory. Something is
amiss.
Fortunately, we may dissolve the dilemma of justification; but only if we logically
proceed from the complex model of content to the simple model of content. The suggestion is
that, if the simple model of content is not rooted in the complex model of traditional empiricism,
there is no point in referring to the simple model of content as a form of empiricism. The simple
model of content or minimal empiricism must exhibit some crucial aspect of traditional
empiricism. After all, minimal empiricism is supposedly in the tradition of empiricism proper.
The idea is that we must begin with an integral element of traditional empiricism---namely, that
mental content must be rooted in sensory experience---and arrive at a minimal empiricism. If we
can finesse the deduction of minimal empiricism from traditional empiricism, we may say that
the experienced world is ultimate in the order of justification. “What is ultimate in the “order of
justification,” we might say, is not the world just as such, nor experience just as such, but the
experienced world” (Gaskin, 2006, p. 17; Gaskin’s emphasis).1 According to the simple model of
content, the experienced world is ultimate in the order of justification. And then the dilemma of
justification dissipates.

1

Similarly, Gregory McCulloch (2002) claims that minimal empiricism is the thesis that worldly,
external content is intensional or phenomenological. McCulloch dubs this “phenomenological
externalism.”
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The deduction of the simple model of content depends on McDowell’s transcendental
argument for minimal empiricism. “The supposed entitlement to move [dialectically] from the
complex to the simple model of empirical content is earned…by a transcendental argument
which McDowell offers in several places” (ibid., p. 65). Let us now turn to an examination of
this argument.

§ 2.2 Judgment and Perceptual Experience: McDowell's Transcendental Argument for Minimal
Empiricism

McDowell’s dialectical maneuver turns on whether or not his transcendental argument is sound.
The conclusion of the argument is: There is no perceptual experience without judgment and there
is no judgment without perceptual experience. “[T]he faculties of spontaneity (judgment) and
receptivity (perception) are interdependent” (Gaskin, 2006, p. 66). The argument is: Neither
judgment nor perception is possible unless they are interdependent. Judgment and perception are
not only possible, they are actual. Therefore they are interdependent. The argument is valid.
And the argument entitles the dialectical move, because:
[I]f experience, as that figures in the complex model, is essentially
structured by conceptual capacities involved in judgment, and if
(empirical) judgments are answerable to the deliverances of
experience, so conceived, that seems to license the claim that
experience mediates between world and judging subject not as an
intermediary or interface, blocking the subject’s direct view of the
world, but as a conduit, securing the subject’s answerability, in
empirical judgment, to the way the world is. (ibid., p. 68)
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According to Gaskin, austere empiricism makes use of the traditional empiricists' concept of
experience, but it extrudes that concept of its complexity. Experience is a relation comprising
two relata: mind and world. It is not itself a third relatum. This is a simple model of content.
McDowell's transcendental argument is a deduction of the simple model from the complex
model of content, because, given that judgment and experience are interconnected, it necessarily
follows that perceptual experience acts as a conduit rather than an interface. Mind and world are
directly related in perceptual experience. So McDowell will have established content via a
simple model if and only if his transcendental argument is sound.
McDowell's transcendental argument is not sound, according to Gaskin. First, the
argument assumes that judgment, or the faculty of spontaneity, is characterizable in terms of
freedom. A spontaneous faculty is presumably a “free” faculty. But this presumption is a
mistake, according to Gaskin. Indeed the motivation for the transcendental argument is rooted in
this assumption, for if judgment is spontaneity in operation, it requires external constraint.
Moreover, McDowell’s mistaken characterization of judgment generates an equally mistaken
characterization of outer perceptual experience, one which implicitly adopts an interface
conception of experience. Let us take each difficulty in turn.
According to Gaskin, McDowell’s argument presupposes that judgment is a freely
adopted attitude toward sense experience. The idea is that:
Not only are we free, by virtue of our possession of a faculty of
spontaneity, to make up our minds what to think; it is also the case
that we are under a “standing obligation” to do so. [McDowell] is
at some pains to stress that, after experience has presented the
subject with an appearance, the subject both can and must decide
whether “to take the experience at face value.” He is impressed by
the existence of visual illusions, such as the Muller-Lyer illusion,
which continue to present their illusory appearance after the
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subject has decided not to take their appearance at face value: such
cases serve as a warning against a naïve identification of
appearances with the judgments we can form on the basis of those
experiences….Hence even if one has not actively reflected on the
credentials of a given judgment, the fact that one forms one’s
judgments under a standing obligation to be prepared, if necessary,
to scrutinize their credentials has the effect of fixing on the subject
what we might, borrowing a piece of legal terminology, call
constructive responsibility for the judgment in question. (ibid., pp.
69-70; Gaskin’s emphasis)
Judgment is spontaneity in operation; it is voluntary activity. Judgment is also worthy of
accountability. Our judgments are deliberate responses to perceptual experiences. And we can
be held accountable for our deliberate responses to stimuli. So the picture is this. First there is a
perceptual experience. Then there is a freely adopted judgment toward the perceptual experience
in question. And then there is a “standing obligation” to critically assess one's freely adopted
judgment. With the Muller-Lyer illusion, there is an initial perception. Then there is a
corresponding judgment that one of the two lines is longer than the other. But this judgment is
false. The lines are equal in length. And we are epistemologically (and perhaps morally)
obligated to recognize this fact. Furthermore, McDowell’s notion of judgment is connected to
his “responsiveness to reasons” slogan. Our responsiveness to reasons, our capacity to judge, is
a function of our freedom and responsibility (which is a function of a shared language).
To Gaskin’s mind, this is all wrongheaded. First of all, freedom pertains to action, not
thought. Thoughts or judgments are merely elicited from corresponding experiences. Our
freedom resides in our ability to act on the basis of a given judgment:
[McDowell] ought to have taken the line that experiences wring
judgments, and not merely inclinations to apply concepts in
judgment, from the subject (regardless of whether the former is an
implication of the latter or not). In general, McDowell’s persistent
identification of what freedom we enjoy with freedom to make
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judgments is surely a mistake: our freedom, insofar as we have it,
is freedom not to judge on the basis of experience but to act on that
basis; it is not as subjects of experience, and as thinkers who can
base judgments on our experience, that we enjoy freedom, if and to
whatever extent we do, but as agents. (ibid., p. 72; Gaskin’s
emphasis)
We cannot decide how to judge, since experiences elicit judgments. Our freedom resides in our
ability to act according to the deliverances of our judgments. This is the correct understanding of
judgment, according to Gaskin. It is not the case that experiences induce dispositions to form
judgments. On the contrary, experiences elicit judgments.
If the faculty of judgment is understood in terms of freedom, it follows that perceptual
experiences provide us with “mere opportunities to know” which a subject may freely accept or
reject (according to Gaskin). Perceptual experiences induce dispositions to form judgments.
Perceptual experiences, then, are akin to testimony. Now a testimonial account of perceptual
experience is surely an emissary account. If experience acts as a piece of testimony, then
experience is, in effect, an emissary. It is testifying to the fact that things are thus and so. But an
emissary understanding of perceptual experience is an interface conception of experience rather
than a conduit conception of experience: “McDowell is of course officially hostile to the idea
that experience might function as a mere emissary. But his…assimilation (in effect) of the case
of experience to that of testimony…show[s] that his rejection of the emissary model of
experience is at best half-hearted. McDowell (often) assimilates experience to testimony” (ibid.,
p. 79). And: “[R]eceiving testimony, unlike having an experience, is genuinely being faced with
an intermediary, an emissary from the world, and not with the relevant bit of the world itself”
(ibid., p. 86).
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A non-veridical perceptual experience, as with the Muller-Lyer perceptual illusion, is an
instance of false testimony, according to Gaskin. A veridical perceptual experience is, on the
contrary, an instance of accurate testimony. So: “[I]f perceptual experiences only provide us
with opportunities to know---opportunities that we are free to accept or reject---then experience
assumes the guise of a mere emissary: a provider of something akin to testimony. And if this is
right, then experience does, indeed, seem to serve as an intermediary rather than as a conduit”
(Dodd, 2007, p. 1115). McDowell inadvertently treats the Muller-Lyer perceptual illusion as an
interface between judgment and the freedom to critically assess one's judgment. Hence
McDowell’s account of perceptual experience, which is parasitic on his understanding of
judgment, is an interface account, in which case he is not offering a simple model of content.
Accordingly, Gaskin has a different interpretation of perceptual illusions:
In epistemologically peripheral cases such as that presented by the
Muller-Lyer illusion, we should say that the (incorrect) judgment
which the experience constrains us to form is, or can be (in the
knowing subject), canceled by a second-order judgment, itself
constrained by further experiences. There is no call to
accommodate such cases by opening, quite generally, a
deliberative gap between experience and judgment. (Gaskin, 2006,
p. 75)
The Muller-Lyer perceptual illusion constrains us to form a false judgment. Call this a first-order
judgment. But we may form a correct judgment regarding the content of the perceptual illusion.
The correct judgment is that the content of our experience is illusory. Call this a second-order
judgment. Now a first-order judgment and a second-order judgment are equally determined by
perceptual experiences. All empirical judgments must be informed by sensations. However, we
can decide to act on the content of a first-order judgment via a second-order judgment.
“[Gaskin] is strongly committed to denying that there is any freedom involved in exercising the
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capacity for judgment. If freedom comes in anywhere, according to Gaskin, it is in action”
(Bridges, 2007, para. 18). We should not characterize judgment in terms of freedom, given that
freedom is relevant to action theory, not the philosophy of mind. “[W]e should say that the space
between experience and judgment is not a locus of freedom: the formation of beliefs and
judgments based on experience is, contrary to McDowell’s official doctrine, not voluntary”
(Gaskin, 2006, p. 74). Judgments are like sensations; we just have them. Gaskin's hierarchical
understanding of judgment can accommodate for perceptual illusions without placing freedom
between judgment and experience. The world and the correct second-order judgment are directly
related in the Muller-Lyer perceptual experience. This secures a simple model of content.
McDowell's emissary account of judgment should be replaced, since it generates a complex
model of content.
Now this might seem to render perceptual experiences as pieces of testimony.
Experiences are emissaries which a subject may freely accept or reject. But then perceptual
experience is an interface rather than a conduit. However, the doctrine of disjunctivism implies
that there is no epistemologically relevant common denominator between perceptual experiences
which are revelatory and perceptual experiences which are not. There is no epistemologically
relevant common denominator between accurate and inaccurate testimony. So equating freedom
with judgment, and the concomitant notion of perceptual experiences as testimonial, is entirely
consistent with a simple model of content. That is, the thesis of doxastic responsibility does not
entail a complex model of content; rather, the thesis is fully consistent with a simple model of
content.
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Furthermore, Gaskin thinks that McDowell overlooks the idea that experiences elicit
judgments. But it seems that McDowell pretty clearly recognizes that perceptual experiences
elicit judgments---even though his concept of judgment is elucidated in terms of spontaneity. As
we saw in section 1.4, McDowell has a hierarchical picture of judgment. First there is a
perceptual experience, then there is a judgment, and then there is a “standing obligation” to
critically assess one's first-order judgment. Doxastic responsibility emerges as a collection of
second-order judgments. This is very similar to Gaskin's picture of judgment. The only
difference is that Gaskin thinks second-order judgments are involuntary. Freedom is a function
of action, not judgment. But this idea is problematic, for it seems that a second-order judgment
just is an action. There may be a subtle distinction between bodily actions and judgmental
actions, but they both merit the term “action.” And if this right, then judgments are not mere
differential responses to stimuli.
Given these difficulties with Gaskin's position, I conclude that McDowell's account of
judgment and outer perceptual experience does not adversely affect the soundness of his
transcendental argument. Mind and world are directly related in outer perceptual experience.
That is, the simple model of content holds for outer perceptual experience.
What about inner perceptual experience? Here things are more nuanced. For we can
conceive of an external world existing apart from our external sensations and perceptions; but
matters are different with inner sense. With inner sense, a subject’s awareness of his or her
internal world is not distinct from the internal impressions themselves. We are not aware of an
internal world existing apart from internal sensations and perceptions. Given this fact, it seems
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that our knowledge of the internal world is infallible, since it seems that we are infallibly aware
of internal sensations and perceptions.
According to Gaskin, McDowell appeals to Russell’s principle of acquaintance in order
to account for inner perceptual experience. Russell's principle of acquaintance states that: “I am
acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e., when I am
directly aware of the object itself” (Russell, 1911/2004, p. 165). We are directly acquainted with
the internal world via inner perceptual experience.
Now there are two kinds of direct acquaintance: epistemological and metaphysical. As
far as I know, the distinction is not explicitly drawn by either McDowell or Gaskin. The
epistemological notion of direct acquaintance says that we infallibly know the contents of our
sensations. So, for example, if it seems to me that my leg itches, then, infallibly, I know that it
seems to me that my leg itches. One is immediately justified in believing that a felt sensation
seems to be the case. This is an epistemological point about sensations; it is a Cartesian
principle. There is no appearance/reality distinction with respect to sensations, since we are
directly acquainted with our own sensations. Gaskin maintains that McDowell uses the
epistemological sense of Russell's principle of acquaintance.
There are fatal difficulties with the epistemological version of Russell's principle of
acquaintance. First, as Wittgenstein’s private language argument teaches us, inner mental states
are not infallibly known by the subject of inner mental states.2 One way of stating the conclusion
of the private language argument is that all mental states are necessarily amenable to empathetic

2

See Wittgenstein (1953), §§ 243-271.
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understanding.3 Wittgenstein’s private language argument is directed against Russell’s principle
of acquaintance and similar principles which deny that there is an appearance/reality distinction
vis-à-vis sensations. Even pain states elude infallibility. The apparent immediacy and privacy of
pain states is an illusion. “I can be wrong not only about whether or not I am in pain, but also
about whether or not it seems to me that I am in pain” (Gaskin, 2006, p. 85). One can be wrong
about whether one is in the throes of real pain, as when it is psychogenic. In addition, one can be
wrong about whether one is experiencing psychogenic pain. More generally: “[W]hat has
escaped [McDowell] is the fact that…fallibility attaches to my capacity to know my own
meaning” (ibid., p. 86; Gaskin’s emphasis). We do not know (with certainty) the meanings of the
words we use.4 An epistemological rendition of the principle of acquaintance utterly fails to
appreciate this datum. Hence McDowell fails to account for inner perceptual experience via a
simple model of content.
Yet there is a metaphysical sense of direct acquaintance, which Gaskin seems to
overlook. The metaphysical sense of direct acquaintance is not committed to epistemological
certainties. Although we are directly acquainted with internal objects, this does not entail that we
have infallible knowledge of internal objects. While it is true that we cannot conceive of internal
objects existing apart from internal impressions, our inner perceptual experience can be illusory.
It appears that McDowell implicitly recognizes this metaphysical sense of direct acquaintance
when he writes. “[O]ne can be under the illusion of standing in a relation to an object that would
count as acquaintance, the impression being illusory because there is no such object”

“Empathy is the capacity to think and feel oneself into the inner life of another person” (Kohut,
1984, p. 82).
4
See Saul Kripke (1982).
3
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(McDowell, 1998c, “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space,” p. 232). This remark
logically follows from McDowell's disjunctivism. The doctrine of disjunctivism applies to inner
perceptual experience as equally as outer perceptual experience. An inner perceptual experience
is either epistemologically revelatory or it is not. We are as fallible about the internal world as
we are about the external world---although we are directly acquainted with both worlds via
perceptual experience. So the metaphysical interpretation of direct acquaintance allows for a
disjunctive understanding of inner perceptual experience. Furthermore, the metaphysical version
of Russell's principle accounts for how the internal world and judgment are directly related in
inner perceptual experience.
Moreover, if one is directly acquainted with an internal object via an inner perceptual
experience, one can refer to their inner perceptual experience by using a demonstrative
expression. A subject can state that one is experiencing “this” inner perceptual experience or
“that” inner perceptual experience. Now all uses of demonstrative expressions are either correct
or incorrect. So, although we are directly acquainted with the internal world, this does not entail
that our inner perceptual experience is infallible. On the contrary. And none of the standard
critiques of the epistemological notion of direct acquaintance apply to the metaphysical notion,
since the metaphysical sense of direct acquaintance has no truck with infallibility. Therefore the
simple model of content holds for inner perceptual experience (as well as outer perceptual
experience).
In any case, the purported deficiencies with McDowell’s transcendental argument share
an illegitimate commitment to the internalist doctrines of individualism and intellectualism, to
which we now turn.
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§ 2.3 Individualism and Intellectualism

As stated in section 1.1, a causal relation between mind and world is merely external or
exogenous. As such it is merely symptomatic and therefore lacks epistemological legitimacy. A
causal relation does not preserve a direct relation between mind and world. Contrast this with a
rational relation between mind and world. A rational relation is internal or endogenous. As such
it is criterial or definitional and is therefore epistemologically legitimate. It secures a direct
relation between mind and world. But, according to Gaskin's interpretation of McDowell, a
rational relation obtains only if the tenets of individualism and intellectualism hold:
[T]he rational connection [between mind and world] must
both obtain at the level of the individual’s experience and
judgment (individualism), and be available to introspection
and verbal articulation by the individual for whom an
experience serves as a reason for a judgment
[intellectualism]---that in order to have an experience
which justifies a judgment one must be able to state, with
understanding, what the justification is. (Gaskin, 2006, pp.
93-94, see note 85)
For Gaskin's McDowell, individualism and intellectualism are necessary for a conduit
conception of experience or the simple model of content. If there is an epistemological or
rational relation between mind and world, if the content of a perceptual experience justifies a
judgment about that perceptual experience, two conditions must be satisfied. First, the rational
relation must obtain at the level of the individual’s experience and judgment. The content of a
perceptual experience can justify a corresponding judgment only at the level of an individual's
perceptual experience and judgment. This is the thesis of individualism. Second, a subject of
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perceptual experience must be able to specify, with introspective and verbal understanding, how
the content of a perceptual experience justifies his or her corresponding judgment. Perceptual
experience is thus permeated with intellectual faculties. This is the thesis of intellectualism.
Dodd states:
Gaskin…makes a convincing case for McDowell’s being
committed to an individualistic, intellectualistic construal
of the thesis that experience rationally constrains judgment:
a construal that has it that the said rational connection
“must obtain at the level of the individual’s experience and
judgment…, and be available to introspection and verbal
articulation by the individual for whom an experience
serves as a reason for a judgment.” (Dodd, 2007, p. 1115;
citation omitted)
Unfortunately, both individualism and intellectualism are antithetical to a simple model
of content, according to Gaskin. With individualism, the individual subject essentially mediates
the relation between mind and world. But if this is right, then mind and world are no longer
directly related in experience, as the individual subject is now acting as an interface rather than a
conduit. The ontology of mind and the ontology of world are related via an individual subject.
But this generates an undesirable complex model of content:
[I]n the context of the individualism in [McDowell's]
position...that, official intentions notwithstanding, the
individual appearings which figure pivotally in the “order
of justification,” as McDowell construes that, are epistemic
intermediaries... (Gaskin, 2006, p. 108)
And:
[I]t follows that, by insisting that each individual subject
establish, or actualize, the “order of justification” at the
point of his or her individual experiential engagement with
the world, McDowell in effect (and unintentionally, of
course) traps the individual subject behind experiential
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proxies which...are not guaranteed simply to disclose the
world. (Dodd, 2007, pp. 104-105)
With intellectualism, the subject’s verbal and introspective understanding essentially
mediates the rational relation between mind and world. The rational relation between mind and
world is effected by intellectualized perceptual experience. Hence the subject's verbal and
introspective understanding acts as a third relatum. But this is not a conduit picture of perceptual
experience. Therefore McDowell's transcendental argument is inadvertently committed to a
complex model of content.
Moreover, individualism and intellectualism are internalist doctrines. Roughly,
internalism says that mental content is a function of internal states relative to an individual's
intellectual capacities. Gaskin's explicit opposition to the internalist doctrines of individualism
and intellectualism lends itself to a thoroughgoing externalistic approach. He writes: “[S]hould
we, as theorist, follow McDowell in putting an internalist construction on these individual
experiences, or should we instead look favourable on a position which combines some form of
(no doubt minimal) empiricism with externalism? I shall endorse the latter option” (Gaskin,
2006, p. 111). Roughly, externalism says that mental content is, at least in part, a result of
external social and physical facts. Externalism jettisons the onerous doctrines of individualism
and intellectualism, and thereby vouchsafes a simple model of content.
Now, although Gaskin eschews McDowell's alleged individualistic and intellectualistic
interpretation of the conceptual content of perception, he grants that the content of perception is
conceptual:
The key point is this: from the agreed fact that experience is
essentially conceptual in the modest sense---that is, that it has a
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propositionally structured content expressible in language (that it
has a content of the schematic form: that such and such is the
case)---it does not follow that it is conceptual in the richer sense
that its conceptual content (modestly understood) is necessarily
available to a critical and reflective faculty possessed by the
subject of the experience. (ibid., p. 118; Gaskin’s emphasis)
Both Gaskin and McDowell are against Evans’s notion of nonconceptual content. It is false that
the content of perception is nonconceptual. They supposedly differ in that Gaskin is opposed to
an individualistic and intellectualistic interpretation of the conceptual content of perception.
Instead, Gaskin offers an externalist or “modest” account of the conceptual content of perception.
(Gaskin’s modest account of the conceptual content of experience is employed to account for
animal/infant experience. See section 2.5 below.)
Be that as it may, McDowell would willingly accept this analysis. As mentioned in
section 1.5, McDowell's minimal empiricism is opposed to individualism. For McDowell,
understanding necessarily involves a “shared language.” And a shared language is possible only
if there is a long-standing community. More exactly, the concept of a shared language is
understood in terms of the notion of a “fusion of horizons”:
Understanding...is always the fusion of [historical] horizons
which we imagine to exist by themselves....In a tradition
this process of fusion is continually going on, for there old
and new continually grow together to make something of
living value, without either being explicitly distinguished
from the other. (Gadamer, 1975, p. 273)
Understanding is a fusing of horizons. A fusing of horizons is where a past canon of traditions
interpenetrates a present canon of traditions. The present tradition is a result of its fusion with
the past tradition. Conversely, the past tradition is a result of its fusion with the present canon.
This interpenetration proceeds indefinitely. Thus understanding is mediated by a historically
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conditioned community, not an individual. Understanding occurs within a communal
framework, not outside of that framework. This is a reminder or rediscovery of a truistic fact
from hermeneutics. Gaskin's entire study seems to miss this very important feature of
transcendental empiricism. Now obviously the notion of a fusion of horizons is not possible if
individualism is the case. The very idea of a fusion of horizons entails anti-individualism. So
Gaskin's charge of individualism must be wrong.
Gaskin might object as follows. Horizons can be fused only if there are individual
horizons which exhibit understanding. Thus the transcendental condition for a fusion of horizons
is a single horizon. An individual horizon precedes and underpins historical horizons.
This sort of objection seems inaccurate, for it presupposes the validity of a sideways-on
metaphilosophical approach. The idea that an individual's horizons underwrite a community's
horizons is a sideways-on maneuver, because it assumes that there exists a cosmic exile
perspective which miraculously provides for communal understanding. Gaskin's objection
assumes that an individual's horizons transcend the community's horizons, and that this somehow
yields communal understanding. The assumption is that an individual can step outside of a
communal framework and deliver understanding for the community at large. But this is not how
understanding occurs within a hermetical framework. In fact, from a hermetical perspective, this
'understanding' of understanding has things completely backwards. Furthermore Gaskin's
transcendental empiricism prohibits him from approaching philosophical matters from sidewayson.
What about the charge of intellectualism? Well, recall that McDowell's minimal
empiricism adopts a non-sideways-on metaphilosophical approach to philosophical issues. This
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metaphilosophical stance is an indispensable pillar of transcendental empiricism in general.
Now the metaphilosophical orientation of minimal empiricism aims inter alia to dissolve
philosophical dichotomies. And it seems that the externalism/internalism dichotomy in the
philosophy of mind is a dichotomy, if anything is. This kind of dichotomy from the philosophy
of mind is the result of assuming a sideways-on stance toward philosophical issues. Sidewayson metaphilosophical orientations grapple with philosophical issues under the assumption that
mind and world are distinct. The externalism/internalism dichotomy tumbles out of this
assumption. Internalism claims that mental content is the result of a mind, whereas externalism
asserts that content is a product of the world. If we assume a sideways-on metaphilosophy, the
tenets of externalism and internalism become irreconcilable.
McDowell's metaphilosophy suggests that externalism and internalism are not mutually
exclusive; rather, they are interconnected. Intellectual capacities are determined by external
facts, and external facts are determined by intellectual capacities. In other words, the world's
intellectualized conceptuality is determined by a subject's intellectual capacities; and a subject's
intellectual capacities are determined by the conceptually intellectualized world. As we saw in
section 1.1, McDowell claims that the logical space of nature, or the world, and the logical space
of reasons, or intellectualized conceptuality, are intertwined. Hence a subject's intellectual
faculties do not act as an interface, since the world itself is inherently conceptually
intellectualized. So even assuming that McDowell's transcendental argument is covertly
intellectualistic, this interdependent picture preserves a direct relation between mind and world.
Although there is an element of internalism within McDowell's philosophy, this does not entail a
complex model of content. To the contrary, McDowell's intellectualism is entirely consistent
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with a simple model of content. Therefore, contrary to Gaskin's claim, intellectualism does not
affect the soundness of McDowell’s transcendental argument for the simple model of content.

§ 2.4 Animal and Infant Mentation

McDowell’s alleged individualistic and intellectualistic constraints on content supposedly distort
animal and infant mentality: “These [internalist] requirements [= individualism and
intellectualism] have unacceptable implications for infant and animal mentality” (Gaskin, 2006,
pp. 94-95). Because animals and infants cannot individually verbalize and reflect on the contents
of their experiences, two things immediately follow. First, infants and animals do not have an
outer sense, because they cannot articulate and reflect on the contents of their so-called outer
perceptual experiences. Second, animals and infants do not have an inner sense, because they
lack the conceptual capacities for subjectivity proper. In short, animals and infants do not
partake of perceptual experience in the rigid Kantian sense. McDowell’s transcendental
argument claims that content is not possible unless the faculties of receptivity and spontaneity
are interconnected. So, since animals and infants lack a faculty of spontaneity, there is no
content to their perceptual experience. A “chunk of brute receptivity” is insufficient for the
purpose of securing content. In other words, animals and infants do not fall within the scope of
McDowell’s transcendental argument. Reverting to previous terminology, infants and animals
possess a first nature, but they lack a second nature. The content of their experience is not
conceptual in McDowell’s individualistic and intellectualistic sense. Now, as we saw in section
1.4, first nature and second nature belong to the same naturalistic genus. Creatures with a first
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nature, and creatures with a second nature, are both perceptually sensitive to their environments.
Animals and infants can 'see' objects or 'feel' sensations. But infants and animals cannot see that
an object is present or feel this pain sensation. These are propositional states, and propositional
states are enjoyed only by mature human beings or creatures with a second nature. So, speaking
philosophically, there are two types of outer perceptual experience, and there are two types of
inner perceptual experience.
But, according to Gaskin, McDowell holds that we cannot meaningfully talk about
nonconceptual outer and inner perceptual experience, for they are dark. Intuitions without
concepts are blind. Hence the so-called contents of infant and animal experience are Kantian
things-in-themselves. But if they are Kantian things-in-themselves, the idea that animal
experience belongs to the same genus as mature adult experience is worthless; for things-inthemselves do not belong to any genus. Thus McDowell is debarred from talking about cats
seeing milk (say), even in a limited sense. Infants and animals are not in the domain of
McDowell’s transcendental argument. However, we do seem to successfully talk about animals
and infants perceiving an external and internal world. Recall the idea from section 1.3 that
animals seem to perceive extremely elementary visual--spatial relations. But how? What is
going on here?
Somewhat surprisingly, Gaskin claims that infants and animals do fall
within the scope of McDowell’s transcendental argument. Gaskin offers the
following solution to our perplexity:
Infants and animals, we might say, do indeed have conceptual
capacities actualized in their sensory consciousness, and to that
extent are in the target area of the transcendental question….They
do not themselves possess the conceptual capacities which are
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actualized in their sensory consciousness, but there is another route
which they can exploit to achieving the needed actualization of
conceptual capacities in their sensory consciousness. For infants
and animals can benefit (transcendentally) from the fact that we
mature human subjects possess the requisite conceptual capacities:
our conceptual capacities are actualized in their sensory
consciousness. (ibid., pp. 138-139; Gaskin’s emphasis)
More concisely:
That a dog [say] is incapable of articulating or reflecting upon its
experiences is no bar to assigning those experiences conceptual
content, modestly understood: it suffices to justify that assignment
that we can sensibly make “that”-clause ascriptions such as, ‘The
dog sees that the dish is empty’. (Bridges, 2007, para. 24;
Bridges’s emphasis)
The content of a dog’s perception is conceptual in the sense that we can see that a dog sees food.
This is supposed to be a “modest” sense of conceptual content. We can begin to understand how
animals and infants enjoy mentality, provided that we construe the conceptual content of their
experience in a modest or transcendental manner. Transcendentally speaking, the content of
animal/infant experience is conceptual:
A dog’s entitlement to feel pains (or be in any other experiential
state with conceptual content) depends on the possibility of
formulating in language correct characterizations of its mental
states. Since dogs do not themselves possess the requisite
conceptual powers to formulate these characterizations, they in
effect depend for their entitlement to mentality on the possible
existence of other creatures, who do possess those powers. But
that dependence is only on the possibility of such existence, not its
actuality: that is what is meant by saying that the dependence is
merely transcendental. Dogs could feel pains, taking this as a fully
conceptual state in which an object is present in a canine
consciousness, even if there did not actually exist any humans or
other subjects with the requisite conceptual powers to classify
objects of canine experience in language. (Gaskin, 2006, p. 144)
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For Gaskin's McDowell, canine pain is not actually conceptually structured. But if it is not
actually conceptually structured, it is an intuition without a concept, in which case it is a Kantian
thing-in-itself, in which case it is false that canines feel pain. However, given Gaskin’s
transcendental solution, we do not have to settle for this skewed view. The mere possibility of
assigning propositional content to canine experience is entirely sufficient. Canine pain is
conceptual in the sense that it can be propositionally expressed by someone. Therefore:
[I]nfants and animals can “have objects in view” and have “bits of
the world perceptually manifest to them as materials for a world
view”; that they can live their lives “in a world,” and not merely
“in an environment”; that when a dog feels pain or in another such
“inner” state, the pain or other sensation is indeed “a matter of an
object for the dog’s consciousness.” In the sense in which we have
an “inner world”---a world of felt sensations---dogs have such a
world too. (ibid., p. 148)
It appears that Gaskin misinterprets McDowell's account of animal/infant mentation.
Animals and infants cannot articulate the contents of their perceptions. Nevertheless, this does
not unintentionally imply that the contents of their experiences are noumenal. There are reasons
for thinking this is the case.
First, with respect to outer experience, it was noted that animals seem to perceive
elementary visual--spatial relationships; and these perceptions engender self-preserving actions.
A rat is able to move around a maze without hurting itself. (Cf. Section 1.3.) And these
observations do not depend on the claim that the content of animal experience is conceptual in a
“modest” or transcendental sense. This follows from the fact that McDowell's transcendental
argument for content has no application to animals. Still, McDowell acknowledges the
observation that animals sense and perceive an environment and act accordingly. So it would
seem that the contents of a rat's outer perceptual experiences are not noumenal.
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Second, with respect to inner perceptual experience, it seems that animals and infants do
experience or perceive something akin to pleasure and pain; and these perceptions induce actions
or behaviors. An infant's response or behavior to a painful stimulus is, at least in part, a result of
its sensation of pain. The behavior of crying is not merely a response to a painful stimulus; it is
also a response to a sensation of pain. But the contents of the sensation cannot be articulated by
the infant, even in principle. Similarly, an infant's laughter is a response to a sensation of
pleasure, even though the infant cannot state the contents of his or her sensations. And
McDowell acknowledges these appearances, too. Granted, animal/infant inner (and outer)
perceptual experience is not propositional or conceptual. An infant's sensation of pain is not
identical with a mature adult's sensation of pain, since McDowell's transcendental argument does
not apply to infants. However, it seems false to claim that an infant's perceptual experiences are
entirely empty.
I think Gaskin is overlooking McDowell's concept of “proto-subjectivity.” As witnessed
in section 1.4, the concept of proto-subjectivity is (among other things) non-committal. With the
concept of proto-subjectivity, we are not saying that animals/infants have sensations or not. At
best we may attribute a proto-subjectivity to animals and infants. Infant/animal mentality is
'contentful' in a first nature sense. It is neither contentful nor nothing. Call it “proto-content.”
Our subjectivity or inner sense allows us to approximate to an understanding of an animal's
'subjectivity' through the notion of 'proto-subjectivity'. Analogously, our conceptual contents
allow us to approximate to an understanding of first nature content via the notion of 'protocontent'. Now if infant/animal perceptual experiences are neither something nor nothing, then
they cannot be noumenal, for the noumenal just is nothing. In accordance with the very concept
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of proto-subjectivity, we are not entitled to make the claim that animal/infant experience is
noumenal. So there is nothing noumenal about the concept of proto-subjectivity. And if this is
the case, then Gaskin's critique of McDowell's account of animal and infant mentation is just
false.
Barring these reservations, what is potentially worse is that: “There is a symbiosis,
hitherto unnoticed either by McDowell himself or…any of his critics, between a construal of
infant and animal experience to which he is unintentionally committed [namely, that the contents
of their experience are noumenal] and a thesis in the philosophy of language which he willingly
espouses” (ibid., p. 174). McDowell’s unwittingly noumenal account of animal and infant
mentation is symbiotically related to his thesis in the philosophy of language, namely, that
concepts do not belong to the realm of reference, for this thesis has the unintended affect of
rendering objects noumenal. How? The more basic question is, What is McDowell’s philosophy
of language, and how does it relate to his minimal empiricism? Gaskin claims that we should
supplant McDowell’s semantic theory with a transcendental version of linguistic idealism. What
is Gaskin’s linguistic idealism, and how does it relate to his minimalist empiricism? Let’s now
turn to complete answers to these questions.

§ 2.5 Sense, Reference and Kantian Things-In-Themselves: Elements of Gaskin’s
Linguistic Idealism
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According to Fregean semantic theory, concepts are functions. An argument or object either
satisfies the concept in question or it does not, and this yields a corresponding truth-value.5
Consider the concept “red.” The concept of redness is understood in terms of the function
“R(x).” The latter is either true or false, for any given value for “x.” Relational concepts such as
“love” are understood in terms of the two-place function “Lxy.” “x loves y” is either true or
false, for any given values for x and y. All concepts are to be understood along these lines.
Concepts are functions.
Additionally, objects are purely referential or extensional entities. And since objects are
entirely referential, they cannot satisfy a concept unless concepts are themselves referential.
Hence concepts must reside at the level of reference:
[T]o put the point in Fregean terms, we must say that the object in
question has to be thought of as falling under a concept, where the
latter kind of entity is to be conceived, as Frege did conceive it, as
a denizen of the level of reference and not at the level of sense.
(Gaskin, 2006, p. 177)
Concepts are static. By “static” I mean that an object either satisfies the concept in question or it
does not. The static nature of concepts allows us to say that concepts are referential.
Still, concepts are not objects. Frege draws a distinction between objects and concepts.
Objects are complete or “saturated.” Concepts are different. Concepts are predicative entities.
As such, they are incomplete or “unsaturated.“ “A concept...is predicative. On the other hand, a
name of an object, a proper name, is quite incapable of being used as a grammatical predicate”
(Frege, 1997, p. 182, see note 6). And: “The two parts into which a mathematical expression is
thus split up, the sign of the argument and the expression of the function, are dissimilar; for the
See Frege’s (1997) seminal “Function and Concept,” “On Sinn and Bedeutung,” “[Comments
on Sinn and Bedeutung]” and “On Concept and Object.”
5
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argument is a number, a whole complete in itself, as the function is not” (ibid., p. 134). So,
although both concepts and objects reside within the realm of reference, they are distinct entities.
Gaskin contends that McDowell adopts a different position. For Gaskin's McDowell,
concepts reside at the level of sense, not reference. Gaskin writes:
[McDowell] regularly talks of exercising, using, deploying and
exploiting concepts, language which is inappropriate to a Fregean
understanding of what concepts are: for concepts at the level of
reference cannot be exercised or deployed, but merely grasped. He
talks of our standing obligation to “refashion concepts and
conceptions”: but concepts at the level of reference cannot be
refashioned; they are simply there, like Fregean objects, for
subjects to grasp or not. (A purported refashioning of a Fregean
concept would change the concept.) (Gaskin, 2006, p. 176;
Gaskin’s emphasis)
McDowell’s conception of concepts is dynamic. Concepts are fluid as opposed to static. They
are continually refashioned; they indefinitely evolve or devolve, according to our uses of them.
So concepts are amenable to change, according to McDowell.
Unfortunately, McDowell’s notion of concepts places objects outside the realm of the
conceptual, according to Gaskin. And this entails that objects are, in effect, Kantian things-inthemselves or “bare presences.” According to Gaskin, McDowell should follow modern
semantic tradition and locate concepts at the level of reference; otherwise the objects of the
world are rendered noumenal:
In seeking to utilize Fregean sense to effect the needed connection
between thought and world---that is, in seeking to exploit the fact
that objects of thought are necessarily thought about in some way,
in order to ensure that object-directed thinking is conceptually
structured---McDowell confines the conceptual to the level of
sense, leaving objects [or the world], taken as entities at the level
of reference, out in the cold as Kantian things-in-themselves.
(ibid., p. 177)
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Now, according to Gaskin, McDowell's account of concepts is symbiotically related to his
account of animal and infant mentation. McDowell's account of infant and animal experience is
unintentionally noumenal, because the contents of their experience fall outside of the conceptual.
Animals and infants fall outside of McDowell’s transcendental argument. They reside within an
environment, not a world. The same sort of thing holds with respect to McDowell's treatment of
concepts. Since concepts reside at the level of sense rather than reference, objects fall outside of
the realm of sense; they fall outside of the realm of the conceptual. But if this is the case, then
objects are unintentionally noumenal.
More globally, McDowell's treatment of concepts is extremely problematic for his
metaphilosophical orientation (according to Gaskin):
For if the conceptual is being located at the level of sense, and if,
what seems to be a corollary of this, objects in the realm of
reference are intrinsically noumenal with respect to the conceptual,
and given that experience is essentially a conceptually structured
phenomenon, there will be a clear sense in which experience does
not function as a conduit to objects---at least, not to objects as they
intrinsically are---but as a means of processing whatever input we
may (incoherently, of course) conceive as emanating from objects,
which taken in themselves are no more than “bare presences,” to
yield a conceptualized output. When objects are conceived as
noumenal in this sense, experience cannot but be conceived as an
interface between minds and objects, for there is no such thing as
confronting noumenal objects directly. (ibid., p. 187)
Further:
For if objects are not joined---and “structured”---by concepts in the
realm of reference, then those objects are “banished from the
precincts of the conceptual,” and our thinking can only fall short of
them. The very idea of thinking about an object becomes
problematic because such object-directed thought would require
thought to be carried beyond the boundary enclosing the realm of
concepts. (Dodd, 2007, p. 1116; citation omitted)
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Ironically and tragically, then, a non-sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation leads to a
sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation, according to both Gaskin and Dodd. If mind and
world form a union in the realm of sense, the realm of reference (or the world) is no longer
bound by the conceptual. Indeed, the realm of reference falls outside the conceptual as
something which impinges on the conceptual. So the very metaphilosophical orientation
McDowell wanted to avoid arises in virtue of his own metaphilosophical orientation.
Gaskin’s proposed solution is this. Frege was right, as against McDowell, to locate
concepts at the level of reference. But Frege’s conception of concepts did not go far enough:
Frege’s “advance” on McDowell is certainly to be welcomed,
because the locating of concepts at the level of reference is a
necessary condition of overcoming an unacceptable Kantian
transcendental idealism; but it is not a sufficient condition. Unless
the concepts located at the level of reference structure and
characterize the objects located at the same level, there will be no
prospect of overcoming an intolerable idealism. To overcome that
idealism we need first to identify the world with the level of
reference and not, as on McDowell’s Fregean approach, with the
level of sense, and secondly we need to populate the level of
reference with the right kind of entity---propositionally structured
combinations of objects and concepts or properties (including of
course relational concepts or properties). (Gaskin, 2006, p. 202)
If concepts are not referential entities, then they cannot be saturated with objects. But objects do
satisfy their corresponding concepts. Hence concepts must reside at the level of reference, not
sense. Unfortunately, however, Frege’s account of concepts is yet another unacceptable form of
Kantian transcendental idealism; for the realm of reference is not conceptually structured. The
idea is that, if the objects of the world are not conceptually structured, then they are mere quasicollections of Kantian thing-in-themselves. But this is a version of an untenable Kantian
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transcendental idealism. However, if objects are propositionally structured combinations, it
follows that they must be conceptual. And then the objects of the world become intelligible.
Now a semanticist or theorist of meaning aims to account for how meaning is possible.
Meaning is possible only if a speaker, listener, writer or reader can understand an indefinite
number of sentences from a finite stock of terms and syntactical rules. So linguistic meaning is
essentially compositional. This is a truism from semantics. Moreover, meaning is a function of
reference. If a sentence does not refer to anything, it is not about anything. But if it is not about
anything, it does not mean anything. So, to Gaskin’s mind:
[I]n order to devise a theory with the requisite deductive power--in order to model what is often called creative language use, the
ability of speakers to form and understand, an indefinite number of
novel sentences on the basis of finite training---the semanticist
must discern structure in the object-language sentences [or the
referents of sentences]… (ibid., p. 205; Gaskin’s emphasis)
Gaskin’s interesting claim is that the referents of sentences necessarily exhibit propositional
structure. Senses determine referents, not vice versa. The world is permeated with senses.
Hence the referent of any given sentence is not a Fregean truth-value; rather, it is a Russellian
proposition:
[S]entences are referring expressions: a thesis driven by a
conception of reference as “the semantic relations which the
[meaning-] theorist [for a language L] posits to model the semantic
properties of sentences and their parts.” With this premise in
place, Gaskin goes on to claim that, since the aim of such a
meaning-theorist is to provide a compositional meaning theory for
L (i.e. something which tells us what understanding each
expression of L consist in), understanding an expression of L must
consist in thinking of (i.e. being acquainted with) its referent. And
what this means is that the referent of a sentence---acquaintance
with which is both necessary and sufficient for understanding the
sentence in question---must be a (Russellian) proposition rather
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than a truth-value. (Dodd, 2007, p. 1118; Dodd’s emphasis; citation
omitted)
If the referent of a sentence is a Russellian proposition rather than a truth-value, the world, in a
sense, speaks its own language. This is, in essence, Gaskin's linguistic idealism. Linguistic
idealism is the claim that reality is essentially linguistic. Nothing exists outside of a linguistic
framework:
Sentences, whether true or false, refer to unified combinations of
objects and properties. Here we have a doctrine that rehabilitates
the much maligned notion of the world’s own language, for,
according to Gaskin, “the locating of propositions at the level of
reference surely provides a sense in which the world itself speaks,
it speaks the propositions---true and false---which inhabit the realm
of reference.” (ibid., p. 1116; Dodd’s emphasis; citation omitted)
And:
Following ancient tradition rather than Frege’s radical
departure from that tradition, McDowell locates concepts at
the level of sense rather than at the level of reference. But
this…is a mistake. Correcting it requires us to follow Frege
in his location of concepts at the level of reference, but also
to go beyond Frege and locate not only concepts but also
propositions at that level; and doing so requires us, I
suggest, to take seriously an idea which McDowell
mentions only to reject, that of objects as speaking to us “in
the world’s own language.” (Gaskin, 2006, p. vii)
To cite just one concrete example, water speaks the language of chemistry. It “says,” in effect,
that it is H2O. Similar remarks apply mutatus mutandis to the other objects and subjects of the
world. Every object and subject of the world---indeed the world itself---attests to some
incredibly complex chemical structure. And understanding a complex chemical structure
essentially depends on linguistic capacities. Gaskin’s linguistic idealism is the cornerstone of his
minimalist empiricism.
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Notice that Gaskin’s linguistic idealism is a transcendental form of linguistic idealism.
The propositional structure of the world does not depend on actual languages; rather, it depends
on the possibility of expression in some language. “[T]he world’s ‘testimony’ is delivered not in
an empirical language, as testimony strictly so called is, but in its own language, which…is not
one empirical language among others, but the transcendental basis of all empirical languages”
(ibid., p. 227). Further: “The world is propositionally structured; but it does not have any
particular syntax” (ibid., p. 229). Gaskin’s transcendental version of linguistic idealism is in
alignment with his transcendental account of animal/infant mentality, which is in alignment with
his interpersonal or relational account of content.
To my mind, there are serious problems with Gaskin's linguistic idealism. First, I think
Gaskin’s critique of McDowell’s philosophy of language is guilty of a straw man fallacy. It
seems that the alleged noumenal problem with McDowell's philosophy of language is a product
of Gaskin's unbridled imagination. For one thing, McDowell's philosophy of language does not
incorporate notions from Kant's transcendental idealism, since McDowell is not a Kantian
transcendental idealist. He is a Hegelian transcendental idealist; that is, McDowell agrees with
Hegel; the notion of a transcendental object makes no sense. And the notion is incoherent; for, to
assert that things-in-themselves are unknowable is to assert something that we know about them,
namely, that they are unknowable---but this is plainly incoherent. McDowell explicitly states: “I
would like to conceive this work [Mind and World] is as [sic] a prolegomenon to a reading of the
Phenomenology [of Spirit]…” (McDowell, 1996, p. ix). McDowell's prolegomenon to Hegel
basically embraces transcendental idealism as a working metaphysical framework while
jettisoning things-in-themselves. (For more on this, see section 3.2.) So McDowell's (partial)

85
Hegelianism prevents him from entertaining the so-called notion of things-in-themselves. Hence
McDowell would and should reject the noumenal categories which Gaskin unabashedly applies
to his philosophy of language.
Second, it seems that Gaskin misses an important distinction between two senses of the
word “conceptual.” There is a difference between the orthodox understanding of concepts as
predicates and the heterodox understanding of concepts as that which belong to the realm of
Fregean sense. McDowell explicitly draws this distinction when he forcefully states: “If we
want to identify the conceptual realm with the realm of thought, the right gloss on 'conceptual' is
not 'predicate' but 'belonging to the realm of Fregean sense'. (The stupid idea that those come to
the same thing is unfortunately still widespread.)” (McDowell, 1996, p. 107). Gaskin clearly
assumes that “predicative” and “belonging to the realm of Fregean sense” refer to the same thing.
Indeed his noumenal critique crucially depends on this assumption. But the assumption is false.
Frege's discovery that concepts are predicates has to with the nature of concepts, not the world.
The world is conceptual in that it belongs to the realm of Fregean sense. And yet the world is
clearly not predicative in nature. Hence the two meanings of the word “conceptual.”
Now if by “conceptual” McDowell means predicative, then his heterodox account of
concepts does unintentionally render objects noumenally. But this is not what McDowell means
by conceptual. By “conceptual” McDowell means the realm of Fregean sense, and this realm
contains everything that is the case. Consequently, his notion of the conceptual does not render
objects as things-in-themselves.
McDowell's concept of the conceptual may be expressed in terms of his notion of de re
Fregean senses. The latter are demonstrative modes of presenting singular referents or objects.
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Objects, in turn, possess de re senses. Thus there is an isomorphic relation between objects and
de re senses. Content and concept are interconnected. McDowell writes: “[A de re sense is] not
a specification that is intelligible independently of the object specified; the presence to the mind
of the object itself enters into any understanding of these demonstrative modes of presentation”
(McDowell, 1998c, “Intentionality De Re,” p. 265). More concisely: [A]n irreducibly de re
propositional attitude is one whose content would not be thinkable if the relevant object did not
exist” (ibid., p. 274). More completely:
In the right circumstances, namely, that one is having a visual
experience, the experience itself can enter into determining a mode
of attention or directedness [or de re sense] that one might
indicate...by 'this visual experience'. This is not a specification that
is intelligible independently of the object specified; the presence to
the mind of the object itself enters into any understanding of these
demonstrative modes of presentation. (ibid., p. 265)
As a lesson in the history of analytic philosophy:
It is time philosophers stopped taking it for granted that the
notion of singular sense is a half-baked forerunner of the
Theory of Descriptions, and started considering the
possibility that the fineness of grain that Frege was
basically concerned to register can be had with senses that
are not independent of the objects they present. (ibid.,
p. 269, note 15; McDowell's capitalization)
Russell's theory of descriptions tried to show that proper names are disguised definite
descriptions. And definite descriptions (according to Russell's analysis) are non-referring
expressions, because non-referring expressions are unsaturated concepts. But it would appear
that proper names are directly referring expressions. It seems that a proper name directly refers
to its referent. However, direct reference must be mediated by modes of presentation or de re
senses. Otherwise the referent would be opaque. McDowell claims that there is a distinction
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between the way an object is presented and a set of definite descriptions which characterize the
object in question. The former is captured through demonstrative expressions, and clearly
demonstrative expressions are different from definite descriptions. They are different modes of
conceptualization.
The de re notion of “conceptual” is obviously independent of the predicative sense of
conceptual, given that de re senses necessarily involve the objects of the world. Gaskin
presupposes that these two senses of conceptual refer to the same thing. But they do not. Hence
Gaskin's nouemenal critique falls on deaf ears.
Moreover, recollect that McDowell's philosophy of language is symbiotically related to
his account of animal/infant mentation, according to Gaskin. The contents of animal experience
are noumenal, given McDowell's heterodox account of animal/infant mentation. Symbiotically,
the realm of reference of the world falls outside the realm of the conceptual, given McDowell's
heterodox account of concepts. In the last section I argued that Gaskin provides a
misinterpretation of McDowell's account of animal and infant experience. But if the noumenal
problems are symbiotically related, and one problem is not a genuine problem, it follows that the
other problem is not a genuine problem, either. This is the logical structure of all symbiotic
relationships.
Finally, from methodological considerations alone, semantic notions and metaphysical
notions should operate on separate planes. Semantics, although theoretical, is primarily
concerned with understanding the uses of languages. It is permissible for a semanticist to
analyze the uses of a language in terms of sense, reference, concept, object, compositionality, etc.
But it is impermissible for a semanticist to analyze these semantic notions in terms of reality “as
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it is in-itself.” Semantic notions such as concept, object, sense and reference are not
metaphysical notions; but Gaskin’s entire critique conflates these two different types of entities.
Metaphysical notions such as “reality as it is in-itself” have no place in semantics. And yet
Gaskin treats concepts from semantics as if they were bona fide metaphysical notions from the
18th century. With the methodological distinction between semantics and metaphysics in place,
the idea that objects are noumenal in relation to the conceptual loses much of its meaning.
The apparent allure of Gaskin’s philosophy of language is a result of misplacing distinct
conceptual kinds. It is an ill-conceived exercise in what Rorty referred to as “impure philosophy
of language.” I submit that Gaskin’s entire semantic edifice is unnecessary for the project of
understanding content via transcendental empiricism.

§ 2.6 Conclusion

The putative benefits of a minimalist empiricism are threefold: (i) a retention of the conduit
conception of experience; (ii) an elucidation of the metaphysics of infant and animal experience;
and (iii) a correct semantic framework.
As for (i), I argued that McDowell’s conduit conception of experience holds with respect
to both outer and inner perceptual experience. Gaskin's criticisms of McDowell's account of
judgment and perceptual experience are wrong. Furthermore, I do not see how McDowell’s
transcendental argument for the simple model of content is implicitly committed to the doctrine
of individualism. McDowell's Gadamerian “fusion of horizons” principle is thoroughly antiindividualistic. Gaskin seems to neglect Gadamer's contribution to McDowell's philosophy.
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With respect to intellectualism, I argued that, even if McDowell's transcendental argument tacitly
employs intellectualism, this need not engender a complex model of content. As to (ii), I argued
that, contrary to Gaskin's accusation, McDowell's account of animal/infant experience is tenable.
Finally, as far as (iii) goes, I argued that Gaskin’s critique of McDowell’s semantic theory is
exceedingly uncharitable and misplaced. Consequently, Gaskin's daunting semantic theory is
superfluous. Therefore minimalist empiricism does not act as a “constructive foil” to
McDowell's minimal empiricism. In other words, minimalist empiricism does not dissolve the
dilemma of mental content.
Gaskin's criticisms of minimal empiricism fail to appreciate the scope and significance of
McDowell's metaphilosophical orientation. McDowell's non-sideways-on metaphilosophy
automatically rules out Kantian transcendental idealism, because noumenal entities are products
of a sideways-on metaphilosophy. Things-in-themselves are nonconceptual entities which
impinge the boundary of appearances; and appearances are things which are constrained by
conceptual categories. In addition, McDowell's metaphilosophy would immediately dispense
with the idea that there is an interface between judgment and perceptual experience, as this is a
sideways-on approach. Thus Gaskin's own version of transcendental empiricism must be
fallacious, since it stems from a fundamentally incorrect interpretation of McDowell's
transcendental empiricism.
My aim in this chapter has been to show what is not wrong with McDowell's minimal
empiricism. In this vein, it has been a defense of McDowell against Gaskin's criticisms. The
question becomes, assuming McDowell's metaphilosophy, what, if anything, is wrong with
minimal empiricism?
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3

Does Minimal Empiricism Dissolve the Dilemma of Mental Content?

§ 3.1 Two Varieties of Conceptual Content

Both Gaskin’s minimalist empiricism and McDowell's minimal empiricism are versions of
transcendental empiricism. Transcendental empiricism says that there are two conditions for
mental content. First, the content of thought must be determined by sense impressions. Mental
content must be anchored in sensations. This is a minimal condition on content, and it is
supposed to satisfy the intentionality criterion for mental content. At the same time, sensations
must be conceptual. Otherwise transcendental empiricism is just another rendition of the Myth
of the Given. This is the second condition for content. Impressions or sensations must be
conceptual. The claim is that these two conditions dissolve the dilemma of content. There is no
issue of content, according to transcendental empiricism. To think that there is a 'problem' with
content is to engage in constructive philosophical theorizing which is anathema to the
transcendental empiricist. An adequate dissolution acts as an important reminder of an important
set of truistic facts, facts which show us that there is no issue of mental content.
In the last chapter, I argued that Gaskin's minimalist empiricism is inaccurate. Gaskin
emphasizes the second transcendental condition to the exclusion of the first transcendental
condition; but both conditions are equally necessary. Because minimalist empiricism neglects the
first transcendental condition for content, it is impaled on the first horn, along with Davidsonian
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coherentism. Indeed, minimalist empiricism could be viewed as a “mere frictionless spinning in
the void.” So transcendental empiricism qua minimalist empiricism is unsuccessful. But what
about McDowell’s minimal empiricism? Does it actually dissolve the dilemma of mental
content? A brief review is in order.
First of all, as stated in section 1.1, traditional empiricism represents the second horn of
the dilemma of mental content. The second horn of the dilemma says that content is causally, not
rationally, induced. But if this is the case, content is simply a brute reflex. A causal relation
between mind and world is hardly sufficient for content; indeed, the idea that it is sufficient is the
Myth of the Given. “Perceptual judgment cannot in the end be warranted simply by its origin in
a disposition; causal constraint is not enough” (Brandom, 1996, p. 249; Brandom's emphasis). In
section 1.3, we saw that Evans’s concept of nonconceptual content is necessarily Given. Evans's
notion of nonconceptual content is not constituted by rational or articulate or discursive relations,
and so it is an inarticulate or meaningless or arbitrary dropkick to the head, so to speak.
Therefore Evans's notion of nonconceptual content does not grasp the horns of the dilemma of
content; it does not resolve the dilemma of content. The real problem with Evans's philosophy of
content, however, is that it adheres to an untenable sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation.
Sideways-on orientations typically sever the interconnected relationship between the Kantian
faculties of sensibility and understanding. The deliverances of sensibility occur along the
boundary of conceptuality. But this yields the Given, the epistemologically troubled notion of a
nonconceptual or nonpropositional sensation.
As mentioned in section 1.2, the problem with Davidson qua coherentist is that
Davidson's transcendental argument for intentionality “comes too late.” Its conclusion, viz., that
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beliefs are largely true or individuated or determinate, begs what is at issue. So it fails to meet
the first transcendental condition for content. Consequently, Davidsonian coherentism is
impaled on the first horn of the dilemma of content. The first horn of the dilemma says that, if
content is purely rational, then it is epistemologically indeterminate. Davidson's hyperrationalistic account of content is a mere frictionless spinning in the void, because Davidson's
transcendental argument does not vouchsafe determinate content. And so Davidsonian
coherentism (along with Evans's concept of nonconceptual content) does not grasp the horns of
the dilemma of content; it does not resolve the dilemma of content. Nonetheless, Davidson's
non-sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation is proper. With Davidson’s cherished
Convention T, the used sentence (or metalanguage sentence) and the mentioned sentence (or
object language sentence) are internally related; so the relation dispenses with representations.
The same can be said for the relation between mind and world. Mind and world are internally or
endogenously or rationally related in experience. This is the second transcendental condition for
content. “When we say, and mean, that such-and-such is the case, we---and our meaning---do
not stop anywhere short of the facts; but we mean: this---is---so” (Wittgenstein, 1953, section 95;
Wittgenstein’s emphasis). Our meanings are not mediated by representations. Reality is
transparent. (In fact, this is precisely the point of McDowell's direct realism. See below.)
Minimal empiricism neither succumbs to the first horn nor the second horn of the
dilemma of content, for it supposedly combines the best of both Evans’s and Davidson’s
philosophies of content, and thereby dissolves the dilemma. Content is both causally and
rationally constrained. Sensations are conceptual. Mature human beings enjoy a second nature.
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In more recent papers, McDowell argues that there are two kinds of conceptual contents.
I think the purpose of the distinction is to acknowledge that not all content is propositional or
linguistic. There exists a type of content which is not propositional---yet it is essentially
conceptual. McDowell dubs it “intuitional content.” So there are two kinds of conceptual
contents: propositional content and intuitional content. Here is a concise statement of the
distinction: “[I]ntuiting is not discourse, even in the extended sense in which judging is.
Discursive content [= propositional content] is articulated. Intuitional content is not”
(McDowell, 2009b, “Avoiding the Myth of the Given,” p. 262). By “discursive” content
McDowell means content which depends on inferential capacities. These capacities reside
within the space of reasons. Judgments which are responsive to reasons exemplify discursivity.
Propositional content is linguistically articulated. Intuitional content is not linguistically
articulated. Intuitional content can be usefully thought of as visual--spatial content. It certainly
seems to be different from propositional content.
Now, although intuitional content is not actually articulated, it has the capacity for
articulation. Intuitional content can be articulated. In fact, this conceptual possibility is the
transcendental condition for intuitional content. So, while intuitional content is
nonpropositional, it is a species of conceptual content, because it is determined by conceptual
capacities. The grammatical structure of intuitional content is visual--spatial, but its logical
structure is conceptual. Hence the two varieties of conceptual contents. More compactly:
If intuitional content is not discursive, why go on insisting it is
conceptual? Because every aspect of the content of an intuition is
present in a form in which it is already suitable to be the content
associated with a discursive capacity, if it is not---at least not yet--actually so associated….The unity of intuitional content reflects an
operation of the same unifying function that is operative in the
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unity of judgments, in this case actively exercised. That is why it
is right to say the content unified in intuitions is of the same kind
as the content unified in judgments: that is, conceptual content.
We could not have intuitions, with their specific forms of unity, if
we could not make judgments, with their corresponding forms of
unity. We can even say that the unity providing function is
essentially a function for discursive activity, a power to judge. But
its operation in providing for the unity of intuitions is not itself a
case of discursive activity. (ibid., p. 264)
The idea is that, in principle, one could sententially articulate the content of an intuitional
presentation. Without this possibility, intuitional content would not be unified. But intuitional
contents are unified presentations. So intuitional content is conceptual in a transcendental sense.
McDowell grants that there are two kinds of unitary presentations. One kind is discursive; the
other kind is non-discursive. However, both intuitional content and propositional content
“contain” unified claims. And, according to McDowell, all unified presentations presuppose the
space of concepts. He writes: “[I]ntuitions belong together with judgments in this respect: what
makes their objective purport possible is that they have categorical unity. To put a Kantian
thought in a contemporary idiom, the content of intuition is of the same general kind as the
content of judgments” (McDowell, 2009b, “Conceptual Capacities in Perception,” p. 127). A
unified presentation entails the space of concepts, for content without concept is blind. And
blind 'content' is certainly not unified or determinate. Hence, although intuitional content is not
explicitly discursive, it is a species of conceptual content, since its content is unified.
Another way of understanding the distinction between propositional content and intuitional
content is in terms of Aristotle’s passive/active distinction. “[O]stensible seeings 'contain' their
claims in a distinctive way, one that distinguishes them from other conceptual [better:
propositional] episodes; they 'contain' their claims as ostensibly visually imposed or impressed
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on their subject” (McDowell, 2009b, “Sellars on Perceptual Experience,” p. 12; McDowell's
emphasis; citation omitted). Both intuitional content and propositional content contain unified
claims, but intuitional content is passively etched on the mind, whereas propositional content is
actively conceptualized by the mind. The passivity of intuitional content is connected to the
faculty of sensibility. The latter passively receives sensations. Sensations are not actually
linguistically articulated. Its claims are passively received by a knowing subject. Contrast this
with judgments. Judgments are actively articulated by a knowing subject. They are products of
the faculty of understanding. However, as we saw in section 1.1, receptivity is necessarily
implicated in spontaneity. There is no genuine distinction between the faculties of sensibility and
understanding, as they are interdependent. Thus the passive faculty of sensibility is necessarily
conceptual. And so, again, while intuitional content is different from propositional content,
intuitional content is actually a form of conceptual content.
But what exactly accounts for the unity of intuitional presentations? What about the
claim that the “logical togetherness” of visual--spatial contents is of the same kind as the unity of
judgments? What exactly does McDowell mean by logical togetherness? What about the idea
that, although intuitional content is non-discursive, it is transcendentally conditioned by
propositional content which is intrinsically discursive?
McDowell's account of the unity of intuitional contents is Kantian. McDowell writes:
The point is simply that it does not take cognitive work for
objects to come into view for us. Mere synthesis just
happens; it is not our doing, unlike making judgments,
deciding what to think about something. This is quite
consistent with holding that objects come into view for us
in actualizations of capacities that are fully conceptual,
capacities whose paradigmatic mode of actualization is in
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the exercise of cognitive responsibility that judging is.
(McDowell, 2009b, “The Logical Form of an Intuition,” p. 35)
Objects are seen or come into view through the “mere synthesis” of the manifold of sensations.
The mere synthesis of intuitional content is unconscious. It simply occurs without our conscious
awareness. As such the conceptual content of sensations is passive, unlike the conceptual
content of judgments.
Now the mere synthesis of intuitional content is bound by the faculty of imagination.
The faculty of the imagination is a special faculty because it schematizes purely sensory and
purely conceptual entities. As such it acts as a mediator between two totally separable kinds of
faculties. It seems like for McDowell's Kantian view the faculty of imagination is partially
conceptual, in which case it follows that intuitional content is a species of conceptual content. In
fact, the interdependence of the faculties of sensibility and understanding is a product of the
faculty of imagination. The faculty of imagination allows for the application of completely
conceptual categories to sensory kinds. This yields contentful categories. Sensory objects, in
turn, are determinate and meaningful because of conceptual categories. Moreover, this 'activity'
simply happens. It is not a result of reflective deliberations. Hence Kant's “blind but
indispensable function of the soul.”
McDowell's thoughts are in accord with Sellars's regarding the unity of visual--spatial
contents. Sellars wrote: “[P]erceptual consciousness involves the [unconscious or passive]
constructing of sense-image models of external objects. This construction is the work of the
imagination responding to the stimulation of the retina....The most significant fact is that the
construction is a unified process. The complex of abilities is a unified process. The complex of
abilities included in this process is what Kant calls 'productive'...imagination” (Sellars, 1978, sec.
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26). Furthermore: “[T]he phrase 'cube of pink (from a certain point of view)' refers both to an
actual feature of the image-model and a component of the conceptual center of the demonstrative
thought” (ibid., sec. 38; Sellars's emphasis). And yet: “[T]he image-model does not have
grammatical [or propositional] structure” (ibid., sec. 39). The unity of intuitions involves both a
surface structure and a deep structure. The surface structure is the image. The deep structure is a
demonstrative expression, which is conceptual. The thought here is that the surface structure of
intuitional content is transcendentally conditioned by conceptual capacities. In summation:
[F]or Kant intuitions are complex demonstrative thoughts
which have implicit grammatical (and hence categorical)
form. [A]n intuitional representation...contains in embryo
the concept of a physical object now, over there, interacting
with other objects in a system which includes me. It
embodies a proto-theory which contains perceivers of
objects in that world. (ibid., sec. 49; Sellars's emphasis)
There are at least two difficulties with McDowell's Kantian account of the unity of
intuitions. First, the account is vague, because it depends on a deeply mysterious faculty: the
faculty of imagination. The so-called faculty of imagination is nebulous, for how exactly does a
faculty neatly intertwine two seemingly opposed faculties? The faculty of sensibility is
essentially passive; it passively receives sensory impressions. The faculty of understanding is
essentially active; it actively entertains concepts. How exactly does the faculty of imagination
seamlessly combine these two very different faculties in such a way as to yield a threedimensional perceptual experience? The feat remains unexplained and is perhaps inexplicable.
McDowell owes us an exacting explanation of how the purported accomplishment of the faculty
of imagination is both possible and actual. Unfortunately, his minimal empiricism does not
provide an answer to this question. But if his minimal empiricism does not provide an answer to
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this pressing question, we are left without an adequate explanation of the unity of intuitions.
Within the framework of minimal empiricism, Kant's faculty of imagination is merely posited
and therefore unaccounted for.
Moreover, since McDowell's transcendental condition for experience is itself very
unclear, this calls into question whether there even are transcendental conditions for experience.
The idea that there are transcendental conditions for experience is obviously a guiding
assumption of transcendental empiricism. Mental content is not possible unless experience is
transcendentally conditioned by rational and causal constraints. Content necessarily depends on
the tribunal of experience, which is causally given to a subject. Unfortunately, McDowell's
transcendental account of perceptual experience is unclear, since it depends on the nebulous
faculty of the imagination. In fact, it may be the case that there are no transcendental conditions
for experience, as Hume's philosophy suggests. Thus the most important question from modern
philosophy persists, How are the categories schematized in such a way as to justify empirical
knowledge?
Second, the simpler account of mental content is that intuitional content is different in
kind from propositional content. Instead of one kind of content, there are two kinds of contents.
To be sure, this seems absurd. Nevertheless, it is simpler to recognize two kinds of contents
rather than one kind, because in the latter case we have to posit three faculties instead of two.
And as we have just seen, the relations among these three facilities appear unnecessarily
complex. In addition, an account of these two kinds of contents need not revert to Kant's
faculties of sensibility and understanding. It is not as if these two kinds of contents would be
ungrounded without Kantian speak. Now Occam's razor tells us that ceteris paribus the simpler
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explanation is probably more correct than the complex explanation. The elementary probability
calculus says the same thing. Therefore there are probably two kinds of contents instead of one
kind of content. McDowell's procrustean distinction between intuitional contents and
propositional contents is questionable.
A big problem for minimal empiricism is that it never specifies how a unifying function
can be non-discursive. Sure, both intuitional contents and propositional contents exhibit unity,
and the understandable intuition is that one reduces to the other. But this intuition has to be
shown, not just assumed or “intuited.” McDowell merely stipulates that propositional content
and intuitional content are bound by the same unifying function. But this stipulation is hardly
obvious. In fact, it would be very surprising if this stipulation were the case. It seems that there
are at least two fundamentally different kinds of unified mental contents.

§ 3.2 Direct Realism and Linguistic Idealism

There are two interconnected metaphysical consequences to McDowell's minimal empiricism.
The first metaphysical consequence is the doctrine of direct realism. McDowell's direct realism
claims that mind and world are directly related in perceptual experience. Perceptual experience
provides us with direct access to the world and other minds. There does not exist a “veil of
perception.” McDowell wrote: “[O]ur access to environmental objects in perception is direct”
(McDowell, 1998c, “Intentionality De Re,” p. 274).
Indirect realism is a metaphysical consequence of traditional empiricism. Indirect
realism claims that there are representations which mediate our access to an external and internal
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reality. Now, either direct realism is the case or indirect realism is the case. Assume indirect
realism. If indirect realism is the case, the Given immediately follows, as we have repeatedly
seen. Thus the metaphysical doctrine of indirect realism has intolerable, or nearly absurd,
epistemological consequences. Therefore direct realism must be the case. What is more, the
metaphysical doctrine of direct realism has acceptable epistemological consequences.
Specifically, direct realism avoids the Given by substituting a conduit conception of experience
for an interface conception of experience. A conduit conception of sensory experience secures a
direct connection between mind and world. Traditional brands of empiricism fail to understand
how mind and world are directly related in experience. For traditional empiricists', the external
or nonconceptual world casually impresses itself on the conceptual subject. Consequently,
traditional empiricism posits something Given---a representation---which supposedly bridges the
gap between conceptuality and nonconceptuality. But this sort of account of mental content
entails skepticism. We can never know, for certain, whether our representations are truly
isomorphic to the states of affairs they purport to represent.
What follows from McDowell’s direct realism is a version of linguistic idealism.
Linguistic idealism is the thesis that reality is fundamentally linguistic or propositional or
conceptual. Gaskin writes: “[O]ur access to any sector of the world is essentially linguistic”
(Gaskin, 2006, p. 87, see note 67). What is striking is that the entailment is bidirectional.
Linguistic idealism entails the thesis of direct realism; and direct realism entails the thesis of
linguistic idealism. This is surprising, since direct realism and linguistic idealism are usually
opposed to one another. Nonetheless, McDowell insists that we can secure a direct connection
between mind and world only if perceptual experience is conceptual. If mind and world are
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directly related in perceptual experience, then the content of experience itself must be infused
with mind-like attributes, viz., conceptuality. Conversely, the content of perceptual experience is
conceptual only if there is a direct connection between mind and world. Hence linguistic
idealism is the case only if mind and world are directly related in perceptual experience. This
harmonizes with McDowell's system of interdependencies.
More to the point, a causal and rational relation between mind and world requires this
metaphysical biconditional, for the causal and rational relations between mind and world are
themselves interconnected. Mind and world are causally connected via direct realism; and mind
and world are rationally connected via linguistic idealism. This metaphysical interconnection
yields mental content.
(Actually, this has a Hegelian ring to it, at least in accordance with one influential
interpretation of Hegel:
…absolute true knowledge, in which the real and the ideal
coincide. But [Hegel] says that, in finding oneself in possession of
the Truth---that is, of the ‘Science’ or ‘System’---one must not
forget their origin, which is not coincidence, but opposition and
interaction of the independent real and ideal. (Kojeve, 1969/1980,
p. 153; Kojeve’s capitalization)
Absolute true knowledge (for Kojeve's Hegel) involves the unification of the real and the ideal.
However, before absolute knowledge, the independent real is distinct from the ideal. We can
hash this Hegelian idea out in terms of sense and reference. Before “absolute true knowledge,”
mind and world are referentially distinct. At the consummation of absolute knowledge, however,
mind and world form a union within Fregean sense. Now, unfortunately, Hegel's notion of
absolute knowledge is yet another Archimedean aspiration. Absolute knowledge is a synoptic
achievement; but synoptic achievements are unattainable. However, we can dislodge this
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Archimedean inclination, without jettisoning Kojeve's Hegelian principle. Minimal empiricism
thus “domesticates Hegelianism.”1)
McDowell’s linguistic idealism is closely associated with Sellars’s doctrine of
psychological nominalism. Rorty reported:
As Sellars says…: all awareness of sorts, remembrances, facts,
etc., in short all awareness of abstract entities---indeed, all
awareness of even particulars---is a linguistic affair. This doctrine,
which he called ‘psychological nominalism’, entails that Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume were wrong in thinking that we are ‘aware of
certain determinate sorts…simply by virtue of having sensations
and images’. (Sellars, 1956/1997, p. 4; Rorty’s emphasis; citation
omitted)
Traditional empiricism is false, for it missed Sellars’s point. Sellars's point is that awareness of
sensations and perceptions is necessarily conceptual or linguistic or propositional. Traditional
empiricists' thought that awareness of sensations and perceptions was an entirely nonconceptual
affair. But it is not. On the contrary, Kant's critical philosophy demonstrated that the knowing
subject actively imposes conceptual structure onto sensations and perceptions. This is a
transcendental condition for sensations and perceptions. McDowell basically accepts Sellars’s
claim. And if Sellars's claim is correct, then experience is conceptual. This is the thesis of
psychological nominalism and linguistic idealism.
There are two types of linguistic idealism: strong and weak. Gaskin’s minimalist
empiricism is a strong version of linguistic idealism; it is an unmodified version of Sellars's
psychological nominalism. Strong linguistic idealism claims that awareness of content is
necessarily propositional. Gaskin's strong linguistic idealism is implicated in his location of
propositions at the level of reference. The world speaks its own language. In effect, Gaskin
1
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takes McDowell's “unboundedness of the conceptual” slogan to its logical conclusion. But he
should not take it to its logical conclusion, as we saw in section 2.4. Even if the content of
perception is propositional in Gaskin's “transcendental” sense, this does not entail a strong
version of linguistic idealism. Just because we can articulate, say, a whale's perceptual
experience in propositional terms, it does not follow that a whale's perceptual experience is
propositional in a transcendental sense.
Weak linguistic idealism is the assertion that there is a distinction between intuitional
content and propositional content; and yet both are forms of conceptual content. We have
witnessed the difficulties confronting Gaskin's strong linguistic idealism. And in the last section
I presented reasons for doubting that there is a genuine distinction between intuitional content
and propositional content. So neither strong nor weak linguistic idealism is correct.
(Incidentally, one might wonder whether there is a corresponding distinction between strong
direct realism and weak direct realism? No. Direct realism does not admit of degrees. You are
either a direct realist or you are not.)

§ 3.3 Minimal Empiricism vis-à-vis Phenomenology

Why phenomenology? There are at least two good reasons. First, Hubert Dreyfus, a prominent
phenomenological existentialist, has recently critiqued McDowell's minimal empiricism.
Second, Dreyfus's phenomenology represents a distinct alternative to the dilemma of mental
content. He allegedly resolves, not dissolves, the dilemma by taking the second horn---but the
second horn is conceived from a non-sideways-on perspective, so it is not Given in McDowell's
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objectionable sense. Dreyfus maintains minimal empiricism's non-sideways-on metaphilosophy,
but he does not go so far as to say that all content is conceptual. There is an epistemologically
respectable form of nonconceptual content, provided that it is placed within a non-sideways-on
framework. McDowell assumes that if there are two kinds of contents, they must interact from
sideways-on. But this does not necessarily hold. It is perfectly consistent to claim that there are
two kinds of contents which are related from within a non-sideways-on framework.
Dreyfus offers nothing less than “a phenomenological analysis of the nonconceptual
embodied coping skills we share with animals and infants” (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 47). For Dreyfus,
mental content is determined by embodied copying. We are embodied agents, coping with a
world saturated with relevance (or meaning). In order to successfully cope with a contextual
situation, one must “know how” to finesse it, as it were. In contemporary epistemology, “know
how” is typically distinguished from “know that.”2 Knowing that something is the case requires
conceptual capacities, whereas knowing how to do something demands nonconceptual
capacities. For example, if one successfully drives his or her car to work, one knows how to do
it. It is not the case that, in order to know how to drive to work, a person must know that they
drive to work. This would not make sense. Certainly one knows that one drives to work, but this
knowledge is conceptually dependent on knowing how to drive to work. This is just one
quotidian example. For the phenomenologist, know how is ubiquitous. Indeed, know how
generates know that, not vice versa: “[I]f you strip away relevance and start with context-free
facts [= conceptual content], you can't get relevance back. Happily, however, we are, as Martin
Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty put it, always already in a world that is organized in

2

The distinction originates with Gilbert Ryle. See his landmark (1949/1984).

105
terms of our bodies and interests and thus permeated by relevance” (ibid., p. 49; Dreyfus's
emphasis).
Know how involves nonconceptual capacities. When these nonconceptual capacities are
actualized, we have an instance of nonconceptual content. For example, riding a bicycle requires
nonconceptual capacities. Once the capacity is actualized, the action of riding a bicycle is an
instance of nonconceptual content. One knows how to ride a bicycle, and this knowledge is prior
to knowing that one can ride a bicycle. In other words, nonconceptual content is prior to
conceptual content.
Notice how this dovetails with Piaget's theory of cognitive development. For Piaget,
formal operational development is rooted in sensorimotor development. Similarly, for Dreyfus,
propositional content is rooted in nonconceptual content. For both Piaget and Dreyfus, content
of any kind begins with motor intentionality.
The phenomenological notion of nonconceptual content more or less reduces to the
crucial notion of embodied coping. The content of embodied coping is very similar to the
content of sensorimotor development. An infant is embodied in an environment. Consequently,
the infant has to learn how to cope with his or her environment. Furthermore, the notion of
embodied coping is constructed within a non-sideways-on metaphilosophy. With embodied
coping or Heideggerian “being-in-the-world,” there is no room for two relata (mind and world),
much less a third relatum. Here is Charles Taylor's (2002) synopsis of the phenomenologists'
point:
We are able to form conceptual beliefs guided by our surroundings,
because we live in a pre-conceptual engagement with these which
involves understanding. Transactions in this space are not causal
processes among neutral elements, but the sensing of and response
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to relevance. The very idea of an inner zone with an external
boundary can't get started here, because our living things in a
certain relevance can't be situated 'within' the agent; it is in the
transaction itself....The understanding is in the interaction; it can't
be drawn on outside of this, in the absence of the relevant
surroundings. (Taylor, 2002, p. 114)3

This passage contains three claims. First, conceptual content depends on embodied coping or
nonconceptual content. Conceptual content is just the tip of the iceberg, so to speak. Second,
nonconceptual content is meaningful, since it is the result of a relevant transaction. Third, the
notion of embodied coping discards the subject/object dichotomy, because embodied coping is a
unitary phenomenon. These three claims collectively resolve the dilemma of mental content.
Nonconceptual content is given to us, but it is meaningful because it is saturated with relevance.
In other words, the second “horn” of the dilemma is not in fact a horn. For it is false that, if
content is given, it must be epistemologically problematic.
According to Dreyfus, McDowell's minimal empiricism is guilty of what he refers to as
the “Myth of the Mental.” Here is an evocative statement of the Myth of the Mental: “For
McDowell, mind is everywhere the pure given is not, that is to say, 'all the way out'. Precisely
because the myth of the pure Given is dead, we must understand our experience as conceptually
permeated through and through. Thus, like a vulture, the Myth of the Mental feeds off the
carcass of the Myth of the Given” (Dreyfus, 2005, p. 57; Dreyfus's emphasis). Dreyfus grants
McDowell's objections to the Given, but this need not entail that the content of perceptual

3

It should be mentioned that some of these phenomenological facts are encapsulated in
contemporary relevance theory, which was initiated by Paul Grice. See his pathbreaking
(1957/2001) “Meaning” and (1975/2001) “Logic and Conversation.” McDowell's relation to
Grice's conversational implicatures is strained and complex. It is beyond the parameters of this
dissertation.
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experience is conceptual. To think that there is such an entailment is to substitute the Myth of
the Mental for the Myth of the Given. Hence there must be something to the idea of
nonconceptual content. Not Evans's notion of nonconceptual content---which is a form of the
Myth of the Given---but a phenomenological notion.
Ironically, minimal empiricism is the result of a false dichotomy. This is ironic because
minimal empiricism is supposed to dissolve dichotomies. Dreyfus states: “A 'bare Given' and the
'thinkable' are not our only alternatives. We must accept the possibility that our ground-level
coping opens up the world by opening us to a meaningful Given---a Given that is nonconceptual
but not bare” (ibid., p. 55; Dreyfus's emphasis). Minimal empiricism asserts that all content is
either conceptual or Given. But there is a third way. There exists a meaningful kind of
nonconceptual content which is Given. “[T]he Given needn't be understood as bare. It can be
pure in the sense of nonconceptual, and yet...still have motivating content” (ibid., p. 58;
Dreyfus's emphasis).
Dreyfus's concept of nonconceptual content is elucidated in terms of “affordances.” An
affordance is an aspect of the world which allows a subject to act on it. It affords an opportunity
for action. These actions are initially nonconceptual, given that they are incapable of
conceptualization. Infants and animals cannot conceptualize the motivating content of an
affordance, even though the content of the affordance is meaningful. Consider an infant learning
to use his or her elbows in order to move his or her body forward. An infant's motor behavior,
which is a result of sensations and perceptions, is a rational response to his or her environment.
And yet the content of these sensations and perceptions cannot be conceptualized.

108
Additionally, Dreyfus's conception of perception is holistic. He states: “We directly
perceive affordances and respond to them without beliefs and justifications being involved.
Moreover, these affordances are interrelated and it is our familiarity with the whole context of
affordances that gives us our ability to orient ourselves and find our way about” (ibid., p. 59).
An “affordance” is meaningful only within the context of an interrelated package of other
affordances. As such its content is inherently holistic. Conceptual content, on the other hand, is
not holistic; it is particulate or individuated or determinate. Just think of Frege's context
principle. Roughly, Frege's context principle asserts that conceptual content is meaningful only
within the context of a determinate sentence.
So, to repeat, it turns out that conceptual content does depend on nonconceptual content.
And this dependence is epistemologically decent. In fact, this dependence is epistemologically
necessary, for perceptual experience and perceptual beliefs would not be possible unless
embodied coping were the case:
Minimally, nothing could be a percept without a
surrounding sense of myself as perceiving agent, moving in
some surroundings, of which this bit of yellow is a feature.
If we try to think all this orientation away, then we get
something which is close to unthinkable as an experience, 'less
even than a dream', as Kant puts it. (Taylor, 2002, p. 112)
A distinct yellow percept presupposes a holistic context of interrelated affordances. Distinct
perceptual experiences do exist, as demonstrated by yellow percepts. Therefore there must exist
a holistic context of interrelated affordances. Thus a phenomenological account of content is
transcendental, just like minimal empiricism. The transcendental condition for determinate
content is a holistic context which comprises interlocking affordances. Nonetheless, Dreyfus's
and McDowell's transcendental accounts are extremely different. A phenomenological account
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of content is transcendental in the sense that content is not possible unless embodied coping is
the case. Minimal empiricism's account of content is transcendental in the sense that content is
not possible unless content and concept are interconnected.
Now according to Dreyfus, embodied coping or nonconceptual content is something we
share with animals and infants. What makes our perceptual experience sui generis is our
capacity for conceptual or analytical thought. Dreyfus acknowledges that mature, human
perceptual experience is imbued with conceptual content. But he heavily qualifies this fact:
[A]nalytic attention brings about a radical transformation of
the affordances given to absorbed coping. Only then can
we have an experience of objects with properties, about
which we can form beliefs, make judgments and justify
inferences. At the same time, however, this transformation
covers up the nonconceptual perception and coping that
made our openness to the world possible in the first place.
(Dreyfus, 2005, p. 61)
Conceptual content is a function of our capacity for analytical thought. Still, analytical thought
presupposes that we are “always already” coping with an embodied context. Alternatively,
formal operational thought presupposes the actualization of sensorimotor capacities.
Dreyfus considers a McDowellian objection to his phenomenological account of content
and presents a quick response. Consider a chess master:
[T]here must be one structure in common to situations that
reliably solicit one type of tactical response, and another to
those situations that reliably solicit another. It seems that
one ought to, at least in principle, be able to articulate this
structure in terms of reasons. But all we have a right to
conclude from our phenomenology of expertise is that there
must be some detectable invariant features in what J.J.
Gibson calls the ambient optic array and that human
beings and animals can learn to respond to them. These
features, although available to the perceptual system,
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needn't be available to the mind. (ibid., p. 54; Dreyfus's
emphasis)

The tactical responses of a chess master are rational responses to a holistic affordance, even
though he or she cannot specify those responses in propositional terms. A chess master rationally
responds to an “ambient optic array,” which is perceptual in a nonconceptual sense. An ambient
optic array is meaningful. It is saturated with relevance, but it is not propositional, even in
principle. Thus, because of contextual considerations, there is a genuine distinction between
perception and conception, between content and concept. The content of perceptual experience
is not conceptual, but it is relevant---and this relevance cannot be linguistically articulated, even
in principle.
McDowell claims that Dreyfus's response is not satisfactory, since “detectable invariant
features” would not be available to a perceptual system unless those features were themselves
conceptual. Dreyfus's response to the McDowellian objection begs the very question against the
transcendental empiricist. In fact, McDowell argues that there is no Myth of the Mental, because
embodied coping is conceptual. More specifically, the Myth of the Mental is rooted in what
McDowell dubs the “Myth of the Disembodied Intellect.” It is a myth to think that bodily or
motor content is distinct from conceptual content. In keeping with McDowell's interdependency
thesis, bodily and conceptual content are interconnected. They both belong to Sellars's space of
reasons. “[Phenomenlogists] tackle the phenomenology of embodiment in the context of the
assumption I have attacked, that the phenomenology of embodiment must be kept free of
involvement on the part of conceptual rationality” (McDowell, 2009a, “What Myth?” p. 322).
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But the phenomenology of embodiment is necessarily conceptual. This follows from
McDowell's concept of second nature:
[W]hy should we accept that embodied coping skills are,
just as such, nonconceptual? If they are not, Dreyfus has no
ground for his claim that to find mind everywhere in a
distinctly human perceptual engagement with the world is
to fall into a myth. I do not have to ignore embodied
coping; I have to hold that, in mature adult human beings,
embodied coping is permeated with mindedness. And that
is exactly what I do hold. (ibid., p. 309)
Coping with a contextual situation is inherently conceptual. We could not successfully cope with
a contextual situation unless the situation were itself conceptual. In order to successfully cope
with a contextual situation, one must bring to bear discursive capacities. Dreyfus's
phenomenological account of content misses this important point.
Invoking Gadamer's distinction between being oriented toward the world and merely
inhabiting an environment, McDowell writes:
Dreyfus dismisses the thesis that mind is pervasive in a
distinctively human life as myth, on the ground that the
thesis cannot be combined with a proper phenomenology of
embodied coping skills and a proper placement of
embodied coping skills in an account of our orientation
towards the world. But I have been arguing that this is
wrong. Acknowledging the pervasiveness of mind in a
distinctive human life is consistent with appreciating
these phenomenological insights.
This is nicely illustrated by Gadamer's...distinction
between being oriented towards the world and merely
inhabiting an environment. (ibid., p. 317)

An animal's life is merely embodied; it merely inhabits an environment. An animal has a first
nature but lacks a second nature. A distinctively human life is both embodied and rational. A

112
human being is freely oriented toward the world he or she inhabits. A person enjoys a second
nature.
Now Dreyfus accepts Gadamer's distinction, but he thinks that the distinction lends
further support to his phenomenological account of content, rather than McDowell's:
[C]onsider the case of Chuck Knoblauch. As second
baseman for the New York Yankees, Knoblauch was so
successful he was voted best infielder of the year, but one
day, rather than simply fielding a hit and throwing the ball
to first base, it seems he stepped back and took up a 'free,
distanced orientation' towards the ball and how he was
throwing it---to the mechanics of it, as he put it. After that,
he couldn't recover his former absorption and often--though not always---threw the ball to first base
erratically---once into the face of a spectator. (Dreyfus,
2007a, p. 354)
Chuck Knoblauch's baseball career illustrates Gadamer's concept of being freely oriented toward
the world. Instead of inhabiting his environment, Knoblauch freely chose to distance himself
from his environment. Consequently, his conceptual capacities interfered with his nonconceptual
capacities. So the Myth of the Mental is not rooted in the Myth of the Disembodied Intellect,
since conceptual content clearly depends on embodied coping. Therefore the Myth of the Mental
holds:
McDowell says that reflection just makes explicit the
conceptual content one was already implicitly acting on in
coping (and the implicit 'I think' attached to it). But
reflection must introduce some other sort of content. If it
was the same sort of content as before reflection, there
would be no way to explain why Knoblauch performs so
well under one condition and so poorly in the other. (ibid.,
p. 360)
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Knoblauch's conceptual capacities disrupted his nonconceptual capacities. If nonconceptual
content were not distinct from conceptual content, this would not have occurred. But it did.
Thus conceptual content is materially distinct from nonconceptual content or embodied coping.
Dreyfus concludes that:
[A]bsorbed bodily coping, its motor intentional content,
and the world's interconnected solicitations to act provide
the background on the basis of which it becomes possible
for the mind with its conceptual content to think about and
act upon a categorically unified world. (ibid., pp. 360-361)
McDowell rejoins:
[T]he sad case of Chuck Knoblauch is no problem for me.
Knoblauch has an ability to realize a certain practical
concept (the concept of throwing efficiently to first base).
But he lost his ability because he started thinking about 'the
mechanics', about how throwing efficiently to first base is
done. The effect was that throwing efficiently to first base
stopped being a basic action for him. The most this case
could show is that when mindedness gets detached from
immersion in activity, it can be the enemy of embodied
coping (to echo Dreyfus's wording). It cannot show that
mindedness is not in operation when one is immersed in
embodied coping. When Knoblauch still had the bodily
skill that he lost, his mindedness was in operation in
exercises of his skill. His throwing efficiently to first base
was his realizing a concept of a thing to do....When
Gadamer talks of a 'free, distanced' orientation, he is not
talking about an attitude that is contemplative as opposed to
practically engaged. (McDowell, 2009a, “Response to Dreyfus,”
pp. 325-326)
Knoblauch chose to freely distance himself from his embodied coping. Knoblauch's choice was
a result of his mind, but his subsequent actions were fully embodied. After his choice was
implemented, he began incorrectly coping with his world. So while Knoblauch's freedom was a
product of his mind, his freedom necessarily displayed itself in his faulty bodily behavior. His
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embodied coping became pathological. But if this is the case, then McDowell is not fallaciously
separating the mind from the body. The choices of the mind cannot be principally distinguished
from the actions of the body. Thus McDowell’s minimal empiricism is not guilty of the Myth of
the Mental. McDowell concludes that:
We should not start with the assumption that mindedness,
the characteristic in virtue of which I am the thinking thing
I am, is alien to unreflective immersion in bodily life. If we
let our conception of mindedness be controlled by the
thought that mindedness is operative even in our
unreflective perceiving and acting, we can regain an
integrated conception of ourselves, as animals, and---what
comes with that---beings whose life is pervasively bodily,
but of a distinctively rational kind. (ibid., p. 328)
An “integrated conception” of humanity affirms that body and mind are interdependent. These
affirmations follow from the ontological thesis that we possess a second nature.
Dreyfus's response:
[The] pervasiveness claim [i.e., the claim that perceptual
experience is conceptual]...seems to be based on a category
mistake. Capacities are exercised on occasion, but that
does not allow one to conclude that, even when they are not
exercised, they are, nonetheless, 'operative' and thus
pervade all our activities. Capacities can't pervade
anything. So, to describe the status of concepts that are
somehow “operative” even when they are not
“experienced” as operative, McDowell introduces the
technical term “conceptuality.” But without any
phenomenological description of what it is like for our
absorbed coping to be pervaded by conceptuality, it is not
clear what meaning we should give to this term. (Dreyfus,
2007b, p. 372; citation omitted)
A “capacity” is not “operative.” As it is only a capacity. It has the potential to be operative, as
when we actually exercise judgments. But it is wrong to think that conceptual capacities are
somehow mysteriously operative in perceptual experience. To think this thought is to commit a
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category mistake. We can meaningfully talk about conceptual capacities which are operative in
judgments, but we cannot meaningfully talk about conceptual capacities which are 'operative' in
perceptual experience. But if this is correct, then McDowell is guilty of intellectualizing
perceptual experiences---and his intellectualism is a result of a category mistake. Thus the Myth
of the Mental still holds.
McDowell would respond by insisting that conceptual capacities are actually operative in
perceptual experience. Yes, there is a distinction between that which is operative and that which
is a capacity. The latter is possible; the former is actual. But conceptual capacities actually are
operative in perceptual experience. Hence perceptual experience is pervaded with conceptual
capacities. No category mistake is committed. And so Dreyfus's accusation of the Myth of
Mental is false.
This is all well and good, however, it seems that McDowell's response does not
sufficiently appreciate the vastness of context. According to phenomenology, all perceptual
experiences are contextual in Dreyfus’s holistic sense. Even the simplest perceptual experiences
are holistic entities, as with red patches. The perceptual experience of a red patch presumably
incorporates the geometry of the red patch, the gradations of redness, the amount of light on the
red patch, its nearness to the perceiver's body, its background, its foreground, etc. Assume that
these aspects can be fully captured by language, either with definite descriptions or
demonstrative expressions. In addition to these features, the perceptual experience of a red patch
is also determined by the perceiver. The perceptual experience of a red patch involves the
perceiver's own conscious and unconscious judgments; it involves the perceiver's history of
perceptions and sensations; it involves the perceiver's temperament, personality, motivations,
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talents, skills, physical appearance, intelligence, political affiliation, etc. And these multifaceted
factors are determined, in part, by a cultural tradition for which the perceiver participates in. The
entire transaction is truly non-enumerable.
The context makes the perception possible. And since aspects of the perception are not
enumerable, even in principle, it follows that important elements of perceptual experiences are
nonconceptual.
To think that an entire contextual situation can be articulated is to assume something like
an Archimedean perspective, a perspective which is outside a given context. It is the thought that
one can transcend one's context and conceptually enumerate all of its elements. But this
presumes a prohibited sideways-on metaphilosophical approach. It assumes that there exists an
a-conceptual perspective from which one can conceptualize all aspects of the holistic context of a
given perception. However, this assumption is not only false, it neglects the Heideggerian point
of “being-in-the world.” With the concept of being-in-the world, there is no room for removing
oneself from one's embodied coping. Perceptual experiences are not transcendentally
conditioned by judgments or concepts. Rather, they are transcendentally conditioned by
embodied coping, elements of which do not admit of conceptualization.
For McDowell, embodied coping basically reduces to conceptual content. McDowell
grants that perception is a function of the entire context from which the content of the perception
is embedded. Yet he thinks that the surrounding context can be completely conceptualized. But
the surrounding context cannot be completely conceptualized, as we have just seen. This is not
to say that none of the perceptual content embedded in a holistic context is conceptual. Many
elements of a context are conceptual. And Dreyfus acknowledges this. But it is false to think
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that all aspects of a holistic context are conceptual. This is a hasty generalization. McDowell's
minimal empiricism becomes ad hoc in the face of Dreyfus's phenomenological results. I
conclude that McDowell is guilty of the Myth of the Mental. It is a myth that perceptual
experiences are either conceptual or nothing to us. To believe otherwise is to intellectualize
perceptual experiences. Dreyfus's accusation of the Myth of the Mental says in effect that
McDowell is guilty of intellectualism. However, as stated in section 2.3, an intellectualized
account of perception produces an intermediary between mind and world, in which case
McDowell's minimal empiricism does not establish a direct realism.
Dreyfus's phenomenology reminds us of the centrality of context with regard to mental
content. Context undergirds both content and concept. This fact is a result of phenomenological
analyses of experiences. A phenomenological analysis of experience reveals an astonishingly
complex and holistic occurrence, aspects of which are nonconceptual if not ineffable.

§ 3.4 Sensation, Perception and Belief

Since minimal empiricism asserts that direct realism is the case if and only if linguistic idealism
is the case, it is actually a form of Kantianism. Here is a statement of McDowell's version of
Kantianism, which is expressed in term of Wittgenstein’s early philosophy:
The form of thought is already just as such the form of the world.
It is a form that is subjective and objective together….Here we
have, at least programmatically, an idealism that does not diverge
from common-sense realism. Given its claim to match common
sense, it is appropriate that the slogan that expresses this idealism
“The world is everything that is the case” should be truistic…not
an expression of some contentious metaphysics. (McDowell,
2009b, “Conceptual Capacities in Perception,” pp. 143-144)
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Common sense realism maintains that we have unproblematic knowledge of an external world.
This claim from common sense realism would be false unless idealism were the case. More
specifically, we have unproblematic or direct knowledge of an objective world only if subject
and object, or mind and world, share the same logical form. Both mind and world partake of
conceptual content. Thus linguistic idealism is an exposition of the thesis of direct realism. The
very first sentence of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is not some grand metaphysical claim; it is a
semantic claim (according to McDowell). It is articulating the content of the concept “world.” It
is explicating what we mean by an independent world. Our common sense notion of the world is
clarified in terms of semantic facts. (Debatably, Wittgenstein's early and later work is philosophy
of language without metaphysics.)
Earlier in the same section, McDowell writes:
Any idealism with a chance of being credible must aspire to being
such that, if thought through, it stands revealed as fully cohering
with the realism of common sense. Kant, for instance, has that
aspiration for his transcendental idealism….However, because of
the way he treats the forms of our sensibility, he fails to entitle
himself to that claim. In his picture, the world as we experience it
seems, in respect of its apparent spatial and temporal organization,
to be a mere reflection of self-standing features of our subjectivity.
So the aim at a coincidence with realism fails. (ibid., p. 141)
Kantian transcendental idealism, with its commitment to a noumenal realm, does not achieve a
correspondence between common sense realism and idealism. Common sense realism is surely
not the belief that there is a noumenal reality external to an empirical reality. So Kant's idealism
is anything but an explication of common sense realism. But a “credible” form of idealism must
logically imply common sense realism. If an idealistic philosophy does not imply common sense
realism, it is just childish metaphysics.
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Put another way, McDowell embraces Strawson’s Kant: “I am not sure that Strawson’s
Kant is really Kant, but I am convinced that Strawson’s Kant comes close to achieving what Kant
wanted to achieve” (McDowell, 1996, p. viii).4 Strawson's Kant is Kantian philosophy without
things-in-themselves, and Strawson's Kant allows Kantian philosophy to achieve a vindication
proper of common sense realism. Kantian idealism can coincide with realism---but only if we
extrude the incoherent notion of noemena. Still, common sense reality is transcendentally
conditioned by the categories and pure intuitions.
Most brands of realism assume that idealism can be avoided, but only if phenomenal
content is underwritten by noumenal 'content'. The latter supposedly acts as a transcendental
object underwriting phenomenal content. Yet so-called noumenal 'content' is nonsensical, for
noumenal 'stuff' is, by definition, contentless. It cannot serve a useful purpose in a philosophical
theory of content. What is more, noumenal content is unnecessary for common sense realism,
since weak linguistic idealism entails common sense realism (and vice versa). (These reflections
reinforce my critique of Gaskin's critique of McDowell's philosophy of language, since Gaskin's
critique presupposes that McDowell's philosophy of language smuggles in noumenal speak. The
fact of the matter is: things-in-themselves are repellent to McDowell.):
McDowell does not of course deny any of the common-sense
thoughts about observation. Indeed, it is part of his project to
establish them. But he thinks he can only do so by firmly placing
the facts about butter, cars and cats “within” the conceptual sphere.
More precisely, it is the very things that Mary knows---that the
butter is in the fridge and so on---that are to be enfolded in the
sphere or space of concepts. (Blackburn, 2006, p. 207)

4

For Strawson's Kant, see Strawson (1966).
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There is no gap between perceptual beliefs and perceptual experiences, as they are both
conceptual kinds. Beliefs possess propositional content. They exhibit active conceptual content.
Perceptions, on the other hand, are intuitional. They possess passive conceptual content. So
there are two species of the same genus. This is the thesis of McDowell's direct realism. But
notice if perceptual beliefs are directly related to perceptual experiences, then it must be the case
that perceptual experiences are themselves direct or immediate. Thus it would appear that
McDowell's direct realism entails that perceptual experience is immediate.
Here is a statement of McDowell's direct realism:
I [do] not mean to imply that experience yields premises
for inferences whose conclusions are the contents of
perceptual beliefs. On the contrary, I think experience
directly [or immediately] reveals things to be as they are believed
to be in perceptual beliefs, or at least seems to do that. But it is
hard to make that cohere with supposing experiences have
the same kind of content as beliefs....
Taking experience to comprise intuitions, in the
sense I have explained, removes this problem. It
should not even seem that the way intuitions entitle
us to beliefs involves an inferential structure. If
an object is present to one through the presence to
one of some of its properties, in an intuition in
which concepts of those properties exemplify a unity that
constitutes the content of a formal concept of an object,
one is thereby entitled to judge that one is confronted by
an object with those properties. The entitlement derives
from the presence to one of the object itself, not from a
premise for an inference, at one's disposal by being the
content of one's experience. (McDowell, 2009b, “Avoiding the
Myth of the Given,” pp. 270-271)
Beliefs based on experiences are not inferential derivations, since the content of judgments and
the content of intuitions are both bound by the same unifying function. And this unifying
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function is thoroughly conceptual. This is indeed a simple model of content. Mind and world
are directly related in perceptual experience, which itself is presumably direct.
McDowell also expresses his direct realism in terms of the space of rationality:
I have connected responsiveness to reasons as such, and hence
conceptual capacities, with reasoning. That is to put the relevant
notion of rationality in the context of a notion of inference,
understood broadly enough to cover acting in consequence of
practical reasoning as well as coming to believe something in
consequence of theoretical reasoning….
But my aim was to spell out how the idea of rationality is in
play when we explain perceptual beliefs in terms of experience.
And here the notion of inference gets no grip. When one acquires
beliefs in this way, one comes to believe that things are as one’s
experience reveals, or at least seems to reveal, that things are. The
content that the explanation attributes to the experience is the same
as the content of the belief explained, not a premise from which it
would make sense to think of the subject as having reached the
belief by an inferential step. (McDowell, 2009b, “Conceptual
Capacities in Perception,” p. 131)
Our ability to respond to reasons is a function of our ability to infer one belief from another
belief. That is, our capacity to act within the space of reasons is a function of our capacity to
rationally infer one judgment from another. Beliefs based on reason are deductively inferential.
Beliefs based on perceptions are different. Beliefs based on perceptions are immediate as
opposed to inferential. It may seem that perceptual beliefs are inferences from perceptual
experiences, but this is not the case. There is no inference from an impression to a perceptual
belief, since impressions and beliefs are equally conceptual. Again, this is a consequence of
McDowell's direct realism.
Moreover, McDowell claims that his direct realism is part and parcel of empiricism in
general:
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[There is] a respectable empiricist ancestry…, according to which
what is “given” in a sensation of a green light flashing is just that,
a green light flashing. The sensory states enjoyed by a perceiver
themselves already have intentional content, and the sense in
which perceptual beliefs are grounded in sensation is that they
derive their intentional content from the intentional content of the
sensory states they are based on. That, on this view, is what
believing one’s senses is. No inference is involved, and there is no
intermediary. We just accept what the senses conjointly give.
I think this is just the shape an acceptable empiricism must
have….It is precisely to provide for the thought that perceptual
experience can directly open us to the world that I claim we must
see experience as an actualization of conceptual capacities,
capacities that belong to our special character as rational animals.
(ibid., p. 140)
A “respectable empiricist” denies that we initially have an immediate experience of a flashing
green light, and then infer a belief about the content of the experience. To the contrary,
perceptual beliefs are immediate. Perceptual beliefs are not conclusions logically derived from
perceptual experiences, because there is no logical inference from perceptual experiences to
perceptual judgments.
More broadly, minimal empiricism's non-sideways-on metaphilosophical orientation
implies that perceptual beliefs and perceptual experiences are directly related. Otherwise there is
an unacceptable gap between mind and world.
Now it might seem that Berkeley’s understanding of perceptual experience is markedly
distinct from McDowell's. For Berkeley, perceptual experience itself is inductively inferential.
According to Berkeley, it is not the case that we immediately perceive a three-dimensional
world. While sensations are immediate, perceptions are not. A two-dimensional sensation is
immediate, but three dimensional perceptions are not, as we will see presently. Sensations, then,
are different in kind from perceptions. McDowell’s direct realism, however, depends on the
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claim that perceptual experience is itself immediate. But since perceptual experience is not
immediate, McDowell's direct realism must be false. Before adjudicating this matter, what can
be said for Berkeley’s seemingly opposed picture?
Several things. First, let's quickly consider the psychology of perception. The latter
strongly suggests that perceptual experience itself is inferential. According to the psychology of
perception, we infer a third dimension from the two dimensions of sight to our three-dimensional
perceptual experience. Sight provides the two dimensions of height and width. “[W]hat is
immediately seen is a two-dimensional spatial arrangement of light and colour” (Armstrong,
1960, pp. 6-7). And our tactile modality provides the third dimension of volume. These two
distinct sensory modalities are interwoven, yielding a three-dimensional perceptual experience.
Three-dimensional perceptual experiences seem immediate only because the process of
integrating these two sensory modalities is an unconscious learning process.
Or consider the classic thought experiment from the philosophy of perception. Imagine a
blind man who can distinguish a cube and a sphere by his sense of touch. Then imagine that the
blind person gains sight. Without touching the object, would he still be able to distinguish a
cube from a sphere by his newfangled sense of sight? No. The blind man would not have a
perceptual experience of a cone. He would have to learn how to perceive cones. It would take
him a very long time to integrate his visual sensations and his tactile sensations in such a way as
to perceptually experience cones. (It might not even be possible.) The point is that the blind
man would have to learn how to perceive three-dimensional objects. And this shows that our
perceptual experiences are inferences from visual sensations. We do empirically infer a third
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dimension from our visual sensations. We unconsciously associate sensations in such a way that
perception becomes possible.
Although the phenomenology of perceptual experience suggests that three-dimensional
perceptions are immediate, this is empirically false. Berkeley wrote: “[T]he ideas of space,
outness, and things placed at a distance, are not, strictly speaking, the objects of sight...”
(Berkeley, 1709/1910, p. 33). Distance and volume essentially depend on our sense of touch,
which is closely associated with our sense of sight. Visual sensations do not suffice for threedimensional perceptual experiences. Hence our senses of sight and touch reveal profoundly
different aspects of the same object. “[T]here is an important sense in which visible and tangible
qualities “of the same thing” are never strictly qualities of the same thing, but qualify two
different objects which, because they are closely connected together (but not by any spatial
relation), we speak of as one single thing” (Armstrong, 1960, p. 34). Hence perceptual
experience is empirically inferential as opposed to immediate. But if this is right, then
McDowell's direct realism is wrong, since McDowell's direct realism depends on the claim that
perception itself is immediate.
Furthermore, if we take empiricism to its logical conclusion, we must say that perceptual
experience itself is acquired or learned. According to empiricism, beliefs are a product of
experience. As such beliefs are acquired. In turn, perceptual experience itself is acquired or
learned. We learn how to perceive a three-dimensional world. “[T]he reason we make [the]
immediate passage from seeing a certain [object] to thinking that there is an object at a certain
distance...need be no more than previous experience of the conjunction of [visible objects and
tactile objects]” (ibid., pp. 17-18). Berkeley’s empiricism predicts that this is the case, and the
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psychology of perception provides some confirmation of Berkeley’s theory of vision. Armstrong
stated that: “Empirically, Berkeley’s theory has been confirmed” (ibid., p. 62).
Now recall the metaphysical interpretation of Russell's principle of acquaintance from
section 2.2. In a metaphysical sense, we are directly acquainted with our sensations. But we are
not metaphysically directly acquainted with our perceptions, according to Berkeley.
McDowell might object as follows. Berkeley claims that idealism and common sense
realism are conceptually interdependent. But common sense realism says that perceptual
experiences are immediate, whereas Berkeley's inferential view of perception implies that
perceptual experiences are not immediate. So how is Berkeley's inferential view of perception
consistent with his alleged defense of common sense realism?
I think that there is a distinction between direct realism and common sense realism.
Common sense realism claims that sensations are immediate---and they are. This is in
accordance with the metaphysical interpretation of direct acquaintance. But common sense
realism need not think that three-dimensional perceptual experiences are immediate. In fact,
common sense realism recognizes a difference between having a two-dimensional sensation and
perceiving a three-dimensional object. For the common sense realist, sensations are immediate,
but perceiving a three-dimensional object is not. McDowell's direct realism, however, entails
that three-dimensional perceptual experiences are immediate. But this is incorrect as a matter of
fact.
In any case, I do not think Berkeley’s discoveries regarding the nature of perception
undercut McDowell's account of the immediate relation between perception and belief. First of
all, notice that Berkeley’s sense of inference is very different from the sense of inference used in
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logic. The inference is inductive, not deductive. The third dimension of volume does not
necessarily follow from tactile and visual premises. Three-dimensional perceptual experiences
are inferential in an inductive sense. We inductively infer a third-dimension to our perceptual
experience. But McDowell's direct realism is not denying this. McDowell is denying that there
is a deductive inference from perception to belief. McDowell's direct realism is asserting that
there is an immediate or direct relation between beliefs and experiences, given that they are both
conceptual. Whether or not perception itself is inductively inferential is beside McDowell's point
that beliefs are not deductive inferences from perceptions. Berkeley’s account of perception has
nothing to do with the idea that perception and belief are tokens of the same conceptual type, and
are therefore directly related. In short, even if perception itself is inductively inferential, this
does not affect McDowell's transcendental claim. McDowell's transcendental account of the
direct relation between perception and judgment is untouched by Berkeley’s empirical
conjectures pertaining to the sensory mechanisms involved in perception itself.

§ 3.5 Conclusion

Minimal empiricism does not dissolve the dilemma of mental content. There are a couple of
difficulties confronting minimal empiricism. First, McDowell's account of the conceptual content
of intuitions is spurious. His account is buttressed with a distinction between propositional
content and intuitional content. Both species of content allegedly fall under the rubric of
conceptual content. That is, both are bound by the “same unifying function.” They differ in that
one is unified in a discursive manner, whereas the other is unified in a non-discursive manner.
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But this postulation seems either false or imprecise. In addition, Dreyfus's critique of minimal
empiricism is onto something. It appears that minimal empiricism is guilty of the Myth of the
Mental. But if McDowell's minimal empiricism is guilty of the Myth of the Mental, he is
offering an intellectualized account of perception. But if McDowell is inadvertently committed
to intellectualism, his attempt at attaining a direct relation between mind and world fails. Hence
minimal empiricism’s interrelated metaphysical consequences---namely, weak linguistic idealism
and direct realism----are problematic. But if the metaphysical consequences of a philosophical
theory of content are problematic, the prima facie plausibility of the theory is immediately called
into question. There is also an issue about whether or not perception itself is immediate. In
accordance with Berkeley’s teachings, I argued that perception is not immediate. But if
perceptual experience is not immediate, it may appear that McDowell's direct realism is doubly
false, since McDowell's direct realism must assume that perceptual experience is immediate. I
argued that McDowell can accept Berkeley's theory regarding the sensory ingredients of
perception while maintaining that perception and belief are immediately related in a
transcendental sense. It might seem that Berkeley’s position undercuts McDowell's direct
realism, but it does not. Berkeley’s empirical account of perception itself is irrelevant to
McDowell's transcendental account of the relation between perception and belief. It turns out
that McDowell's direct realism does not depend on the claim that perception itself is empirically
immediate. In fact, Berkeley’s understandings serve to illuminate McDowell's position with
respect to the empirical nature of perceptual experience. Nonetheless, there is a contemporary
approach to perception which does undermine McDowell's version of direct realism, along with
another central tenet of transcendental empiricism---to which we now turn.
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4

Transcendental Empiricism, Disjunctivism and Perceptual Psychology

On McDowell's account, the well known doctrine of “disjunctivism” is a transcendental
condition for transcendental empiricism. Without a vindication of disjunctivism, there is no
transcendental empiricism to speak of. Why? How? What exactly is disjunctivism, and why is
it so important for transcendental empiricism?
Here is McDowell's canonical description of disjunctivism:
[A] disjunctive conception of perceptual appearance: perceptual
appearances are either objective states of affairs making
themselves manifest to subjects, or situations in which it is as if an
objective state of affairs is making itself manifest to a subject,
although that is not how things are. Experiences of the first kind
have an epistemic significance that experiences of the second kind
do not have. They afford for knowledge of objective states of
affairs. (McDowell, 2009a, “The Disjunctive Conception of
Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument,” p. 231,
see note 9)
A veridical perceptual experience affords knowledge of objective states of affairs. The objective
state of affairs presented by the veridical perception directly manifests itself to the subject. A
non-veridical perception is not epistemologically significant. It offers the appearance of direct,
objective knowledge. But this offer is illusory. Moreover, for McDowell's disjunctivism,
perceptual experience is differentiated in terms of epistemological significance. A veridical
perceptual experience is epistemologically significant. A non-veridical perceptual experience is
not.
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McDowell's concept of “epistemic significance” is obviously crucial for his distinction
between veridical perceptual experience and non-veridical perceptual experience. So what does
McDowell mean by epistemic significance?
I think we can understand what McDowell means by epistemic significance in terms of
an epistemological example. As an epistemological example, there is nothing epistemologically
in common between the perceptual experience of Descartes’s bent stick in a pool of water and
the perceptual experience of a stick which is actually bent in a pool of water. The appearances
are identical, but the disjunctivist claims that there is nothing in common between the two
perceptual experiences, since the first perceptual experience is epistemologically significant,
whereas the second perceptual experience is not, although it appears to be. The veridical
perceptual experience affords direct, objective knowledge of a bent stick in a pool of water. The
non-veridical perceptual experience appears to afford direct, objective knowledge; but this is an
optical illusion. The stick is not actually bent.
According to Gaskin, the disjunctivist asserts that:
[W]hen I seem to see (to put it neutrally) that such and such is the
case, my mental state is either one of really seeming that such and
such is the case, or of merely seeming to do so. That disjunctive
characterization is held to be fundamental: it does not supervene on
a more basic characterization in terms of a “common core” of
experience, supplemented in the veridical case by some relational
fact about the subject’s placing in his or her environment. That is,
the left-hand disjunct is not to be conceived as constructed out of
the right-hand disjunct together with some such relational fact.
(Gaskin, 2006, pp. 95-96; Gaskin’s emphasis)
A disjunctive understanding of perceptual experience is conceptually prior to a “common core”
conception of perceptual experience. However, the common core conception of experience, or
what McDowell calls “the highest common factor conception of experience,” states (roughly)

130
that: “[W]e are confronted, in experience, not directly with features of the world, but with mere
proxies for such features, “inner” appearings [= representations] whose status and content are not
dependent on the veridicality or otherwise of the associated experiences…” (ibid., p. 95). The
highest common factor conception of experience says that perception is essentially
representational. Both a veridical perception and a non-veridical perception purport to represent
states of affairs. So both kinds of perceptions do share something in common, namely, a
representational state. This is an expression of an interface conception of experience. The
interface conception of experience says that a perception is a representation which acts as an
interface between mind and world. With a veridical perceptual experience, mind and world are
mediated by an accurate representation. With a non-veridical perceptual experience, mind and
world are mediated by an inaccurate representation.
Contrast this with McDowell's disjunctivism. For McDowell's disjunctivism, experience
does not act as an interface between mind and world, since the highest common factor of
conception of experience is epistemologically empty. According to McDowell's disjunctivism,
perceptual experience is essentially nonrepresentational. Neither veridical nor non-veridical
perceptions are representational. Either a perception directly affords objective knowledge of
facts, or it does not. Fundamentally, there are no representations involved in either kind of
perception. This is a conduit conception of experience. Either a perceptual experience acts as a
conduit between mind and world, or it does not. So, again, for the disjunctivist, a veridical
perceptual experience and a non-veridical perceptual experience share nothing epistemologically
in common with one another. “One mind has a bit in it (the referent of the “that” clause,
construed as telling of the fact that is ‘within’ the mind) and the other does not. Their minds are
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unlike, as unlike as a nest with an egg in it and a nest without one” (Blackburn, 2006, p. 213).
The two minds are different in terms of epistemologically significant content. One mind is
directly related to an external (or internal) object; the other mind is not. In footnote 12 to
McDowell's “The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental
Argument” he states: “The essential thing is that the two sides of the disjunction differ in
epistemic significance...” (McDowell, 2009a, p. 232).
A consequence of disjunctivism is that perceptual experience need not involve internal
representations. On the contrary, veridical perceptual experiences are diaphanous, just as truth is
diaphanous. We need not postulate representations, since there is a distinction between
presentation and representation. Perceptual experience presents us with empirical facts; it need
not represent empirical facts. For McDowell's disjunctivism: “[E]xperience is intrinsically or
fundamentally 'presentational'....This is the doctrine that an experience could not be what it is did
it not present things to us as being one way or another” (Blackburn, 2006, p. 213).
Disjunctivism, then, represents an alternative to representationalism.
For the purpose of understanding the nature of perceptual experience, we should opt for
disjunctivism rather than representationalism (according to McDowell). The former can account
for our direct, immediate access to the objective world; the latter cannot. Representationalism or
the “highest common factor” conception of experience can only establish an indirect relation
between mind and world. McDowell's disjunctivism promises more than this:
If we adopt the disjunctive conception of appearances, we have to
take seriously the idea of an unmediated openness of the
experiencing subject to 'external' reality, whereas the
'highest common factor' conception allows us to picture an
interface between them. (McDowell, 1998c, “Criteria,
Defeasibility, and Knowledge,” p. 392)
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Furthermore: “Without the 'highest common factor' conception of experience, we can leave the
interface out of the picture, and the traditional [epistemological] problems lapse” (ibid., pp. 393394). The traditional problems of epistemology, e.g., the problem of the external world and the
problem of other minds, are a result of an interface conception of experience. If the relation
between mind and world is mediated by representations, it becomes epistemologically
problematic as to how we know external (and internal) objects, or how we know whether another
person is experiencing a certain mental state. The disjunctive conception of experience jettisons
these problems, as its “good” disjunct provides immediate, direct access to the external world
and other minds. Again, a veridical perception is epistemologically significant.
Tyler Burge (2005) offers a more specific formulation of disjunctivism:
Disjunctivism makes two closely related negative claims. It claims
that there is never an explanatorily relevant mental state type in
common between (and specific to) a veridical perception and a
referential illusion. And it claims that there is never a mental state
type in common between (and specific to) perception of an object
and perception of a would-be duplicate substitute for the object
that would, in the context, perceptually indiscernible to the
perceiver....Disjunctivism makes these claims because it
holds that the particular environmental objects (or lack of
objects) that are involved in perception are essential to
type-identifying all explanatorily relevant perceptual state types
and perceptual belief types. (Burge, 2005, p. 25)
Disjunctivism is very important for transcendental empiricism. There are two reasons.
First, disjunctivism claims that a veridical perceptual experience affords direct knowledge of
external objects. A non-veridical perceptual experience does not, yet it appears to. Thus the
thesis of disjunctivism is pivotal for the direct realism of transcendental empiricism. Indeed,
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without disjunctivism, there is no direct realism. If disjunctivism is false, then McDowell's
direct realism must be false, too.
Second, recall from section 1.4 and section 2.4 that there is nothing epistemologically in
common between the content of our perceptual experience and the content of an animal's
perceptual experience. The content of our perceptual experience is conceptual. The content of
an animal's perceptions are proto-conceptual. An animal's perceptions reside within the space of
nature, not the space of reasons. Animals are merely first nature creatures. The 'contents' of their
perceptions are nonconceptual. In fact, since the content of an animal's perceptions is
nonconceptual, we are not even entitled to the thought that an animal can enjoy contentful
perception. What follows from this is that an animal cannot have justified beliefs which are
based on their 'perceptions'. The point is that animals do not partake of a disjunctive conception
of perception, given that their perceptions are not conceptual. On the other hand, the content of
human perceptual experience is conceptual, and McDowell's disjunctivism supposedly offers an
adequate explanation of our special kind of perceptual experience. The ontology of second
nature is mapped by the disjunctive account of perception. Therefore disjunctivism is an
absolutely critical foundation of transcendental empiricism.
Burge has employed contemporary perceptual psychology in order to argue against
McDowell's disjunctivism. In some ways, Burge's account of perceptual experience and mental
content is pretty straightforward. For Burge, content is a result of an interaction between a
perceptual system and its environment. He writes: “Perceptual anti-individualism holds that the
nature of perceptual beliefs are constitutively associated with relations, including causal
relations, between capacities in the perceptual system and aspects of the physical environment”
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(ibid., p. 1). The capacities of a perceptual system are representational capacities. However, the
physical environment determines the contents of these representations. Hence antiindividualism. Burge continues: “I believe that perceptual anti-individualism provides the only
acceptable framework for understanding conditions under which perceptual representation is
possible. Perceptual anti-individualism is embedded in the practice of the empirical psychology
of perception” (ibid., p. 9). Burge claims that his version of anti-individualism accords with
perceptual psychology, since the latter is committed to representations which are caused by the
external environment. We need to postulate representations of the perceptual system in order to
make sense of mental content. However, McDowell is an anti-representationalist of sorts.
McDowell's anti-representationalism follows from his rejection of the highest common factor
conception of experience, along with his disjunctivism. Indeed, as we have just seen,
McDowell's disjunctivism jettisons representations in its account of content. McDowell's antirepresentationalism claims that the environment determines mental content.
Representationalism, on the other hand, claims that representations of the environment determine
mental content. Thus, for McDowell, representationalism and anti-individualism are
incompatible concepts. For Burge, however, anti-individualism and representationalism are
compatible concepts.
Burge presents a helpful thought experiment to illustrate the proximality principle and its
incompatibility with McDowell's disjunctivism. Imagine that there is an object which a subject
sees. Then imagine that the subject is told to close his/her eyes and during this time a very
similar yet different object is put in its place. The subject incorrectly believes that he or she is
seeing the original object. Finally, imagine that the subject is told to close their eyes again and
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during this time a hologram produces the original object. Once again, the subject incorrectly
believes that he or she is seeing the original object. According to the disjunctivist, the perceptual
experience is either of the first kind, the second kind, or the third kind. There is nothing
epistemologically in common among the three kinds because they involve three different
referential kinds. For the disjunctivist, this thought experiment represents three different kinds of
perceptions. The first kind of perceptual experience is veridical, whereas the other two are nonveridical perceptual experiences. And the non-veridical perceptions are different from each
other. The first non-veridical perception is of a duplicate object. The second non-veridical
perception is of a hologram.
Burge thinks that this disjunctivist understanding is badly misleading. As a matter of
course, these perceptual experiences are token distinct. They differ with respect to the referents
involved. But the perceptual experiences are not type distinct. They are of the same kind. For
the perceptual experiences incorporate virtually the same kind of proximal stimulations. What is
common among the three perceptual experiences is the proximal stimulation. Consequently,
there is a common denominator to perceptual experience. Burge states: “Disjunctivism
derives...from conflating type and token elements in individuating mental states and their
associated representations” (ibid., p. 34). Thus disjunctivism runs contrary to perceptual
psychology, in which case disjunctivism is a mistaken philosophy of perception:
Disjunctivism is incompatible with the Proximality Principle,
which is basic to nearly all scientific study of
perception.
Given that different distal causes can yield proximal
stimulation that is relevantly the same, perceptions of
entities in the distal environment is fallible. The
Proximality Principle, together with this empirical fact,
entails that the same type of perceptual state can be

136
veridical or non-veridical, perceptually referential and nonreferential. (ibid., p. 27)
Moreover, Burge argues that disjunctivism is unmotivated. We do not need to be
disjunctivists in order to secure a direct relation between mind and world. McDowell's version
of anti-individualism is unnecessary for direct realism. Burge writes:
The usual motivation [for disjunctivism] is a concern to insure that
we make 'direct' perceptual contacts with the world. The doctrine
was originally an overreaction to veil-of-perception of views of
the British empiricists.
The veil-of-perception view holds that the primary
objects of perception are internal mental items---or other nonenvironmental items. The primary referents are sense data or
phenomenal qualities in the mind. On such a view, experience of
the physical world is held to be indirect, both in not being the first
object of perceptual reference and in being the product of an
epistemically evaluable inference from more fundamental objects
of perception.
The veil-of-perception view is certainly mistaken.
It fails to understand that the representational content
of perceptual representations is fixed by the function of the
perceptual system in providing information about and aiding
interaction with the physical environment. (ibid., p. 29-30)
According to Burge, disjunctivism is a response to the epistemologically problematic notion of a
“veil-of-perception.” The latter is essentially a representational account of perception. There is
a veil (or representation) which blocks our immediate access to the world. According to
disjunctivists, the only alternative to this unattractive state of affairs is disjunctivism. That is,
there is either a disjunctive account of perception or a veil account. But Burge claims that there
is another option. According to Burge, perceptual psychology's proximality principle can
account for the direct relation between mind and world. He writes:
Perceptual representation does not produce a 'veil of ideas',
because the first objects of perceptual reference are physical
entities in the environment. This is a sense in which perceptual
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representations are 'directly' about the environment: They are
referentially non-derivative....
Perception is 'directly' about the environment in a further,
corollary sense: It is non-inferential. Perceptual representations
are the products of a complex set of transformations that begin
with registrations of light arrays. Registrations are not
perceptions....[And] [n]one of these transformations begins with
the perceptions of, or as of, anything more basic than those
physical entities in the environment. (ibid., p. 30; Burge's
emphasis; citation omitted)
When a representational perception is veridical, it directly relates to an external object.
That is, when the representational information provided by a perceptual system in fact stands in
the right causal connection with the environment, then the information has been directly
provided to the subject. The representational information is “referentially non-derivative.” A
veridical perception must stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the three-dimensional
external world. For the very idea of a veridical representational perception depends on the
concept of isomorphism. That is to say, the concept of veridicality presupposes that the veridical
perception actually corresponds to that which is represented. Moreover, the concept of
isomorphism depends on the concept of veridicality. A three-dimensional perception and a threedimensional object are isomorphic only if the perceptual representation is veridical. Veridical
perceptual representations, then, directly inform an agent of his or her environment. Hence
Burge's representational account of perception is direct. Veridical representations of a perceptual
system directly relate to the world. In turn, this direct relation allows a subject to successfully
interact with their environment. Burge's direct realism is epistemologically significant, since it
entails that a subject can correctly interact with their environment.
To recapitulate, anti-individualism and representationalism are compatible concepts,
contrary to McDowell's anti-individualism. Furthermore, according to Burge, the proximality
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principle demonstrates that there is a common factor between veridical and non-veridical
perceptions. Finally, the representionalism propounded by the proximality principle secures an
epistemologically significant direct realism.
McDowell (2010) has responded to Burge's critique. First, McDowell argues that
although there is a sub-personal commonality between animal and human perceptual experience,
there is no personal commonality. Human experience and animal experience involve different
types of perceptual states. They are not just token distinct. For McDowell, perceptual
psychology is only talking about sub-personal mechanisms. But personal states are what matter
for content. Content is a result of the perceptual states of an individual perceiver. The content of
human perceptual experience is conceptual. Animal perceptual experience is not. Although the
registration of sensory input is the same, the perceptual content is different in kind. What we
share with animals is a first nature, which is (among other things) a sub-personal registration of
sensations. But, again, the results of these registrations are widely distinct.
In addition, perceptual psychology is consistent with disjunctivism, according to
McDowell. Perceptual psychology is not denying that there is a distinction between animal
experience and human experience on a personal level. On the contrary. Animal perceptual
experience is not imbued with a second nature. Perceptual psychology is merely talking about
sub-personal states of animal perception and human perception (which are the same)---but this
has no bearing of the right kind on perceptual states which are saturated with conceptual
meaning. Sub-personal accounts of 'content' lack the necessary conceptual structure that
McDowell is at pains to stress. Therefore there is nothing epistemologically in common between
the content of an animal's perception and the content of a human's perception. Although the
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sensory contents of animal perception and human perception are the same, the characters of these
contents are widely distinct. So, although the proximality principle empirically obtains,
McDowell's transcendental empiricism is talking about two different kinds of mental states, in
which case perceptual psychology is consistent with McDowell's transcendental point.
“[Burge's] implicit principle here---same content, same state---seems remarkably insensitive to
the possibility that it might matter who or what is in a state” (McDowell, 2010, p. 250).
More generally, McDowell argues that the 'content' of perceptual systems is distinct from
the content of individual perceivers. The content of individual perceivers can be
epistemologically significant. But the content of perceptual systems cannot be epistemologically
significant:
The conceptual framework in which talk of perceivers
operates is in many ways very different from the conceptual
framework in which talk of perceptual systems operates....
[F]or [a] state of a perceptual system cannot have the
epistemic significance of a perceptual experience that
consists in having an aspect of objective reality perceptual
present to one. (ibid., p. 250)
An animal's perceptions are mere products of their perceptual systems. As such, they are
incapable of having an aspect of objective reality perceptually present. That is, their perceptions
lack epistemological significance. A mature human being, on the other hand, is capable of
having aspects of objective reality perceptually present. As such human perception is
epistemologically significant. Consequently, sub-personal accounts of content do not establish
an epistemologically significant direct realism. A direct relation between mind and world occurs
only at a personal level. But, again, perceptual psychology is only reporting on sub-personal
mechanisms. Sub-personal mechanisms are necessary for understanding the contents of an
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individual perceiver, but they are hardly sufficient. And they certainly do not establish an
epistemologically significant direct realism.
What is potentially worse, a sub-personal account of information processing is
problematic, according to McDowell:
The [sub-personal] equipment [does not] processes
information about arrays of light into information about the
presence of [external objects]. The equipment hardly
processes information at all...but rather simply reacts to any
small moving speck. (McDowell, 1998b, “The Content of
Perceptual Experience,” p. 348; emphasis added)
According to McDowell, Burge's sub-personal understanding of the concept of information is
nonconceptual, and therefore epistemologically problematic. A viable concept of information
essentially depends on conceptual content. Information without concepts is blind; and concepts
without information are empty. In fact, it is a stronger point. The point is that there is no
information without concepts. Content and concept are interconnected. This is another way of
stating McDowell's direct realism.
Nonetheless it seems that Burge could reasonably claim that sub-personal mechanisms do
process contentful information as a matter of fact. Sensory information need not be conceptually
structured in order to be meaningful. Perceptual psychology's proximality principle tells us that
sensory information is not conceptual. And yet its description of nonconceptual sensory
information assumes that this information is meaningful. Although this sensory information
cannot be articulated, it is meaningful in virtue of the fact that is amenable to a meaningful
conversion by a perceptual system. That is, sensory information must be contentful, since it is
converted into contentful perceptual experience which can be articulated. In consequence, it is
not the case that Burge's notion of sub-personal mechanisms processing information is
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epistemologically problematic. McDowell's transcendental empiricism implies that the concept
of information must be conceptual; otherwise it is blind. But according to Burge, McDowell's
assertion is a philosophical dogma, for McDowell appears oblivious to the fact that although
sensory information is nonconceptual, it is contentful.
Be that as it may, assuming that sub-personal mechanisms do process sensory
information, there remains a potential problem:
The sub-personal account of a sensory system, which treats it as an
information-processing device that transmits its informational
results to something else inside an animal, cannot adequately
characterize what its sensory systems are for the animal (as
opposed to what they are...for the internal parts that receive the
results of the information-processing): namely, modes of
sensitivity or openness to features of the environment [better:
world]---not processors of the information, but collectors of it.
(ibid. pp. 349-350)
Burge's proximality principle describes the processing of sensory information. But the
processing of sensory information does not deliver direct perceptions of the world. The reason is
this. McDowell thinks that there is an important distinction between the processing of
information and the collecting of information. The activity of processing information does not
act in the capacity of directly opening a subject to its world. The processing of sensory
information occurs for a perceptual system that is not specifically designed to stand in direct
relations to the world. This holds for animals and infants. The collection of information, on the
other hand, does act in the capacity of directly opening a subject to his or her to the world. The
collecting of sensory information occurs for a perceptual system that is aimed at perceptual
openness to the world. This holds for human beings. Thus, collecting sensory information is
geared toward epistemologically significant perceptions. The perceptions of a human perceptual
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system, which initially collects sensory information, can yield a direct relation between mind and
world. In short, perceptual psychology’s notion of sensory information processing does not yield
a workable direct realism. But if this is correct, then Burge's form of anti-individualism neither
secures a direct realism nor provides a meaningful account of mental content. McDowell's
understanding of a human perceptual system, which utilizes the concept of collecting sensory
information, does provide for an adequate direct realism. Therefore McDowell is not “ignorant”
of perceptual psychology. The so-called results of perceptual psychology do not disprove
transcendental empiricism.
To sum up, according to McDowell, the proximality principle is merely speaking of subpersonal mechanisms. Sub-personal mechanisms may be the same for human beings and
animals, but the contents of these two kinds of mental states are very different. One kind can be
epistemologically significant; the other kind cannot. Also, McDowell has argued that the
distinction between the contents of perceptual systems and the contents of perceptual states of
individual perceivers renders perceptual psychology irrelevant to McDowell's disjunctivism.
Finally, a sub-personal account of content does not account for the fact that persons are collectors
of information; but this notion is necessary for a direct realism. Burge's sub-personal account of
content, then, is not a workable theory of direct realism.
Burge's (2011) rejoinder addresses McDowell's objections. Burge begins by responding
to McDowell's claim that there is no common factor of experience between animal and human
perception. Recall that McDowell argued that although there is a sub-personal commonality
between animal perception and human perception, but there is no personal commonality.
According to McDowell, perceptual psychology is merely reporting on sub-personal mechanisms
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of perceptual systems. These reports are irrelevant to McDowell's disjunctivism, for McDowell’s
disjunctivism is primarily concerned with the personal contents of individual perceivers. At this
most important level of perception, there is nothing in common between humans and animals.
Burge argues that, contrary to McDowell's understanding of perceptual psychology: “[It]
is simply a mistake to hold that none of the perceptions in a perceptual system are perceptions by
an individual....[Perceptual psychology's] methodology depends on attributing to the individual
perceptions that are integrated in the individual's perception and in the individual's carrying out
his, her, or its basic activities (Burge, 2005, p. 45, Burge's emphasis, see note 51). Most of the
perceptions produced by an individual’s perceptual system serve the individual perceiver. And
an individual's perceptions depend on the operations of his or her sub-personal perceptual
system. So there is no sharp distinction between sub-personal perceptual content and personal
perceptual content. More specifically:
I claim that necessarily and constitutively, some perceptions in an
individual's perceptual subsystem are perceptions by the
individual....And I claim that all perceptions, including any that
are not strictly attributable to the individual, serve perception by
the individual. Fundamentally, it is the individual that perceives.
(Burge, 2010, p. 369)
Perceptual psychology is interested in the perceptual states of individual psychologies. It
is not interested in physiological mechanisms purely for their own sake---although these
mechanisms do yield perceptual states of individual perceivers. In other words, perceptual
psychology is not physiology; it is psychology. Its methodology is geared toward explaining
how individual perceiver's in fact perceive. And the science of perceptual psychology tells us
that the perceptions of individuals are a result of unconscious operations of an individual's
perceptual system. Burge concludes that:
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Perceptual psychology attempts to explain the formation of
perceptual states, conceived as representational states. Explanation
adverts to detailed laws or law-like patterns of transformations that
yield specific kinds of perceptual states. The principles governing
formation laws (or law-like patters) make reference not only to
non-perceptual types of sensory states but also to perceptual states
marked by representational contents. That is, the explanations take
the representational states as participants in the formation
process....Thus reference to perceptual states with representational
content that sets veridicality conditions and that constitutes
perceivers' perceptions of the environment help ground
explanation [of mental content] in the science. (ibid., pp.
394-395)
More completely:
The science takes perceptual systems to be systems of states,
including perceptual states, of perceivers---states that are fruitfully
studied as members of a unit. For example, the system of
perceptual states that are initiated through registration of light
stimulation in the retinas of the eyes is fruitfully studied as a unit.
Similarly, for the auditory system of perceptual states. These
systems interact; there are cross-modal influences that are also
fruitfully studied. Moreover, there are amodal systems that take
input from the various systems associated with the perceptual
modalities---vision, hearing, touch, and so on---that are fruitfully
studied as units. (Burge, 2011, p. 68)
Further:
Commonly, the units or systems are taken to be groups of states of
a single perceptual modality. However, it is obvious that none of
these systems or groups of perceptual states can ultimately be
understood in complete isolation from the others. In fact, crossmodal relations and amodal representational states are among the
most intensely studied topics in current perceptual psychology.
One might take vision, touch, and hearing to participate in a multimodal perceptual system. (ibid., p. 69)
According to Burge, both animals and human beings (unconsciously) integrate their senses of
sight and touch (and perhaps hearing) in such a way as to generate a three-dimensional
experience. Perceptual psychology explains three-dimensional perpetual experience by studying
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the “cross-modal” relations among sight and touch. These cross-modal relations yield a threedimensional perceptual experience. Animals and humans both enjoy three-dimensional
perceptions. Thus animal and human perception is of the same kind, since both are a result of
the same kind of cross-modal relations as adduced by perceptual psychology’s notion of a
perceptual system. A perceptual system provides information about shapes, for individual
perceivers:
The perceptual states in perceptual systems are, one and all,
perceptual states that are individual perceiving and misperceiving.
There is no difference in conceptual framework of the sort that
McDowell invokes....The science's attributing conscious perceptual
states to individual perceivers does not involve claiming that
perceptual systems are aware of the environment. Perceptual
systems are just groups of states of the perceiver. The perceiver
is the only one that is aware of or conscious of anything.
Perceivers are aware of the environment through having conscious
perceptual states (experiences) that represent the environment....No
one claims that perceptual systems---groups of perceptual states--are aware of anything. Individuals are perceptually aware of
particulars and features in the environment. Their having this
awareness consists in their being in the conscious perceptual states
that occur in perceptual systems---the groups of states described
and theorized about in perceptual psychology. (ibid., pp. 69-70;
citation omitted)
McDowell argued that the conceptual frameworks of disjunctivism and perceptual psychology
are different. The latter is exclusively concerned with perceptual systems, whereas the former is
concerned with perceptual states of individual perceivers. Hence perceptual psychology is
irrelevant to McDowell's disjunctivism. And recall that McDowell claimed that his disjunctivism
is talking about the contents of human perception. Perceptual psychology, on the other hand, is
merely talking about the 'contents' of perceptual systems. McDowell thought that his
disjunctivism and perceptual psychology were operating within different conceptual frameworks.
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But Burge has just demonstrated that there is no principled distinction between perceptual
systems and perceptual states of perceivers. That is, there is no difference in the conceptual
frameworks which McDowell envisages. Perceptual psychology is relevant to McDowell's
disjunctivism, because perceptual psychology shows that McDowell's disjunctivism cannot be
true.
Therefore, at the most important level of perception, the content of human perception is
the same as the content of an animal's perception. Both animals and humans register proximal
stimulations, which are then rendered as perceptual states of the organism in question. The
proximality principle applies to all animals with perceptual capacities. And the principle tells us
that the kinds of perceptions formed by widely different animals are fundamentally the same.
But this is deeply damaging to McDowell's notion of second nature; for McDowell's ontology of
second nature depends on the claim that human perception is sui generis.
I think Burge's critique and rejoinder are sound. First, the belief that there is a common
factor between adult perceptual experience and infant/animal perceptual experience does cohere
with the science of perceptual psychology. Perceptual psychology reports that an animal's
perceptual experience of a ball shares something in common with our perception of a ball. The
proximality principle offers a scientific account of how there is a common factor of perception.
There is thus no reason to offer a counter-intuitive disjunctive understanding of perceptual
experience. In addition, perceptual psychology recognizes that an animal can have warranted
beliefs regarding the ball. For example, an animal can correctly believe a ball is near to it or far
from it; the animal can believe it is rolling toward it, etc. In a given context, if an animal's
perceptual system delivers a veridical perceptual experience, then the animal's corresponding
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perceptual belief is thereby warranted. The exact same thing can be said for human beings.
Hence there is an epistemological commonality between animal perception and human
perception. And this belies McDowell's disjunctivism.
Second, it appears that disjunctivism is unmotivated. Disjunctivism is motivated by the
desire to establish a direct relation between mind and world. But Burge's version of direct
realism is sufficient. McDowell claimed that Burge's direct realism is another version of the
myth of the Given. The information provided by the perceptual system is not conceptually
structured, in which case Burge's direct realism is not epistemologically significant. However, I
argued that Burge does not have to accept this accusation. (Cf. pp. 140-141.)
What about McDowell's objection that Burge's sub-personal account of content does not
acknowledge that persons are collectors of sensory information as opposed to processors of
sensory information? And what about McDowell's concomitant claim that collecting sensory
information sets the stage for perceptual openness to one's world? McDowell seems to assume
that a philosophically adequate direct realism must involve the concept of collecting sensory
information.
But this assumption is not necessarily correct. Perceptual psychology describes how
mind and world are directly related in perception, even though it makes use of the concept of
processing nonconceptual sensory information. This sensory information gives rise to
representational perceptions via the workings of a perceptual system. And this would not be
possible unless sensory information were itself contentful. Moreover, perceptual representations
are either veridical or non-veridical. A veridical perception directly relates a subject to his or her
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environment. This, in turn, allows subjects to correctly interact with their environments. And
this picture yields an epistemologically significant direct realism.
Hence, McDowell's distinction between processing information and collecting
information is unfounded, because the concept of processing sensory information and the
concept of an epistemologically direct realism are compatible concepts. Furthermore, a direct
realism that is supported by scientific evidence is certainly preferable to a direct realism which is
not supported by scientific evidence, as with McDowell's disjunctivism.
Finally, McDowell's insistence on the distinction between sub-personal mechanism and
personal content seems wrongheaded. Since perceptual psychology can adequately account for
an individual's mental contents, and since perceptual psychology is a sub-personal account of
content, there is no reason to uphold the distinction. According to perceptual psychology, an
individual perceiver processes sensory information and then (unconsciously) converts this
sensory information into representational perceptions. This accomplishment is a product of the
perceiver's perceptual system. More importantly, the perceiver's perceptions are both direct and
epistemologically significant. McDowell's transcendental empiricism is sometimes too a priori.
Nothing from science can dissuade the transcendental convictions of McDowell's minimal
empiricism. Burge states: “[Disjunctivism] is a doctrinal and methodological aberration.
Philosophical progress will continue to pass it by” (Burge, 2011, p. 71).
It should be mentioned that at a certain point in the dialogue, McDowell offers analyses
of perceptual experience, perceptual belief, warrant, defeasibility and indefeasibility. McDowell
argues that because Burge does not accept the reality of indefeasibly warranted perceptual
beliefs, Burge's direct realism cannot be correct. For McDowell, there is no epistemologically
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significant direct realism if perceptual warrant is defeasible. According to McDowell, an
epistemologically significant direct realism must involve the epistemological notions of a
veridical perceptual experience and a corresponding perceptual belief that is indefeasibly
warranted. Otherwise the rational relation between mind and world is arbitrary. However, this
alleged epistemological issue is beside the point. The important point is that perceptual
psychology has shown that humans and animals do factor out a common denominator of
perception. The common factor is the proximal stimulation. And this empirical fact is
independent of McDowell's epistemological remarks. Additionally, I argued that Burge's version
of direct realism is perfectly legitimate. And my argument is insulated from McDowell's
arguments for indefeasibly warranted perceptual beliefs.
In conclusion, there are three crucial claims of transcendental empiricism. The first claim
is that mind and world are directly related in perceptual experience. This logically follows from
McDowell's disjunctivism. However, it seems that McDowell's direct realism is inaccurate, for
his disjunctivism is false, according to perceptual psychology. Second, transcendental
empiricism claims that there is no common factor between animal perception and human
perception. However, this too is false according to perceptual psychology. Not only do animals
and humans share an integral element of perception their perceptions are equally
epistemologically significant. A related claim of transcendental empiricism is that human beings
possess a second nature. Disjunctivism is supposed to adequately explain the ontology of second
nature. Nevertheless, according to Burge, there is nothing special about our perceptual
experience, because of the dictates of the proximality principle. Hence disjunctivism does not
provide an adequate explanation of human and animal experience. Moreover, McDowell's
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disjunctivism is unmotivated, because Burge's form of direct realism is cogent, and it can
dissolve McDowellian objections. Therefore disjunctivism is false, inadequate and unmotivated--in which case a central pillar of transcendental empiricism has imploded.
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